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Abstract 
Military construction (MILCON) represents 40% of the federal government’s $30 
billion construction budget.  The federal budget is fixed; therefore, any cost overages 
likely affect project scope or requirements. This study investigated if MILCON 
procurement costs more than private industry construction and if so, what causes the cost 
premiums.  A combination of in-depth literature review, expert interviews, a unique case 
study, expert surveys, and geospatial statistical analysis answered the research question.  
The case study evaluated two nearly identical projects to determine how internal factors, 
in addition to public laws, affect MILCON cost premiums.   
This study confirmed the existence of MILCON cost premiums.  Additionally, 11 
major cost premium themes emerged: overly restrictive statements of requirements, 
failing to balance risk, stifling or not applying innovation, unique MILCON 
requirements, parameterization of the execution process, selection of construction 
specifications, schedule and submittal policies, perception of MILCON construction 
agents, anti-terrorism/force protection requirements, Federal Acquisition Regulations, 
and socioeconomic laws and policies.  Additionally, in spite of the contract requirement 
similarities, once complete, the studied projects differed by over a year of construction 
time and $7 million.  Research frequently cites federal laws and policies as the primary 
cost premium driver; however, this research demonstrated internal construction policies, 
which the military can control, also cause increased cost premiums. 
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 1 
AN ANALYSIS OF COST PREMIUMS AND LOSSES ASSOCIATED WITH USAF 
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION (MILCON)  
I. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the topic of study, provide limited 
background information, set the research objectives, and present an overview of the 
research methodology.  This chapter defines military construction (MILCON) and 
provides a limited background into MILCON execution, procurement, and acquisition 
methods.  This limited background provides a baseline for the primary and secondary 
research objectives.  Based on these objectives, this chapter summarizes the 
methodologies applied and codifies the scope and limitations.  Finally, this chapter 
outlines the remainder of the thesis.  This chapter sets a uniform knowledge base for the 
white paper and two scholarly articles. 
Background 
Military Construction 
The MILCON program is a multi-billion dollar yearly acquisition and 
capitalization endeavor.  For fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD) 
requested almost $12.5 billion for MILCON (112th Congress 2011).  However, budget 
constraints and scarce resources for the coming years have forced the DoD to take a hard 
look at all expenditures, including construction.  As part of this hard look, the United 
States Air Force (USAF) decreased its proposed FY13 MILCON budget from $1.3 
billion to $400 million, almost a 70% reduction (Schogol 2012).  The final FY 2013 
 2 
MILCON budget authorized $6.5 billion of DoD MILCON with only $258 million for 
the USAF (112th Congress 2013).  The reduction in MILCON spending has resulted in a 
desire to stretch each construction dollar as far as possible. 
Title 10, United States (U.S.) Code, Section 2801, defines military construction as 
“development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a military 
installation. MILCON includes construction projects for all types of buildings, roads, 
airfield pavements, and utility systems costing $750,000 or more” (Department of the Air 
Force 2010).  MILCON projects are large enough to require capitalization into the real 
property records.  This capitalization process is similar to construction in the private 
sector, where large construction projects are capitalized as company assets.  In addition to 
the explicit definition of MILCON projects, the U.S. government has also issued 
directives and policies regarding the execution of MILCON projects.  Department of 
Defense Directive 4270.5 dictates that, with few exceptions, the “Department of the Air 
Force shall use the services of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) for design and construction of the annual 
military construction program” (Department of Defense 2005).  If USACE and NAVFAC 
do not object, the Air Force can also execute a limited number of projects through the Air 
Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) (Department of the Air 
Force 2010).  In October of 2012, AFCEE and the Air Force Civil Engineer Support 
Agency (AFCESA) consolidated under a single entity called the Air Force Civil Engineer 
Center (AFCEC); this thesis will generally refer to AFCEC in lieu of AFCEE or 
AFCESA.  The selection, and policies, of design and construction agents may cause cost 
premiums for Air Force MILCON projects. 
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AFCEC sponsored this research effort to validate the existence of cost premiums 
associated with the Air Force MILCON program, and if premiums exist, determine the 
causes of these cost premiums. Additionally, AFCEC desired identification of possible 
mitigation techniques that could be applied to reduce costs.  This research adds to 
existing research, reports, and similar investigative efforts that have occurred or been 
requested by varying agencies in recent years. 
Military Construction Cost Premiums 
Anecdotal evidence frequently supports the notion that cost premiums are 
associated with MILCON procurement when compared to private sector construction.  
Recently, researchers have worked to validate the existence of additional costs associated 
with MILCON execution.  Pope (1990) investigated MILCON versus private 
industry/commercial construction from a cost perspective.  The goal of his research was 
to discover key “successes” from private industry construction and incorporate the 
lessons into the MILCON process.  His research showed quantitatively that military 
construction does cost more than private sector construction.  His research effort pointed 
to specific factors that increase cost: additional administrative requirements; more strict 
military standards; contract clauses and procurement restrictions; and legislative 
requirements, specifically the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) (Pope 1990).  However, further 
investigation is required because legislation and contract requirements have changed and 
been adapted numerous times since Pope’s research.   
In 2011, faced with austere budget conditions, the House Armed Services 
Committee noted that an assessment of construction unit costs found a noticeable 
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difference between MILCON costs and comparable facility construction in the 
commercial sector (112th Congress 2011).  The challenges specifically mentioned in this 
report align with Pope’s (1990) research, including legislative and contract clauses.  The 
committee noted that the cost for MILCON appeared to be 25% to 40% more than 
private-sector construction.  Based on this discovery, the committee directed the 
Secretary of Defense to report on these cost premiums and develop courses of action to 
reduce these costs (112th Congress 2011).  Based on this guidance, AFCEC codified 
some Air Force cost premiums and found a 37% cost premium for Air Force MILCON 
(Hartford 2012).  These recent studies demonstrate that the research conducted by Pope 
(1990), and the additional research efforts he proposed, is still valid in 2012.  There are 
cost premiums associated with MILCON execution when compared to private sector 
construction. 
Military Construction Execution 
Many research efforts have focused on varying aspects of MILCON execution.  
These studies have concentrated on private industry best practices such as relational 
contracting, schedule performance, and design-build procurement methods.  All of these 
research efforts have posed additional topics for investigation, including some 
specifically focusing on variables affecting construction costs. 
One of these industry best-practices, alliancing, was investigated from an Air 
Force perspective.  Recently, alliancing has become a performance enhancer and cost 
reducer in private sector construction.  Alliancing involves forming an advanced 
partnership where risk and reward are shared among the contract parties toward the 
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common goal of increased performance; it can increase performance and reduce costs, 
but federal acquisition regulations restrict some of the required aspects (Johnson et al. 
2012).  However, alliancing is simply an improvement on partnering, a policy adopted by 
USACE; thus, some aspects of alliancing can be implemented into MILCON and should 
pay dividends.  Additionally, Johnson et al.’s (2012) research demonstrated that 
alliancing can reduce pricing fluctuations in design-build projects. 
Unlike alliancing, the DoD and private industry have both adopted the method of 
design-build.  To that end, multiple research efforts have focused on design-build 
procurement.  Rosner et al. (2009) analyzed the performance of 835 MILCON projects, 
including 278 design-build projects, to see if execution method affected schedule, 
performance, and cost growth.  The analysis showed that design-build resulted in better 
performance for complicated construction; additionally, their research found that the 
facility type and cost have more influence on schedule than method of execution method 
(Rosner et al. 2009).  Gannon et al. (2012) analyzed design-build procurement in terms of 
scheduling shortfalls and found that restrictions in USACE design-build methodology 
caused schedule and cost growth.  Additionally, his research resulted in the concept of a 
construction “cone of uncertainty” showing variability in schedule based on percentage 
of the design completed (Figure 1).  Other industries, such as computer science, have 
applied this cone of uncertainty to cost (Little 2006). 
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Figure 1: Schedule cone of uncertainty (Gannon et al. 2012) 
 
These research efforts, and the frequent use of design-build in military and private 
industry construction, pose additional questions relating to MILCON cost premiums.  
The concept of Gannon et al.’s (2012) cone of uncertainty may also be applicable to 
construction cost in addition to schedule.  Between method of execution, design agent, 
and contractual partnering/alliancing, it becomes apparent that MILCON procurement is 
a complicated process involving many variables that could contribute to cost premiums. 
Research Objectives 
The overall research objective is to answer the question: do MILCON costs 
exceed private industry construction costs, thereby reducing the cost performance and 
effectiveness of USAF construction, and if so, what causes the MILCON cost premiums?  
This research objective was met by integrating research questions posed by the literature 
and direction from AFCEC to meet the following objectives: 
1. Validate the existence of cost premiums associated with MILCON compared to 
private-sector construction. 
2. Determine the variables that cause/affect MILCON cost premiums through the 
analysis of internal processes. 
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3. Analyze a limited number of variables to determine the effect on cost 
premiums.  Additionally, examine interactions between variables such as 
acquisition and execution method affecting scheduling. 
4. Create mitigation strategies for the analyzed variables for the USAF use to 
reduce MILCON cost premiums. 
These research objectives revolve around meeting the Air Force’s goal of reducing the 
cost of military construction procurement while also increasing performance.  Also, an 
additional objective of the research is to investigate MILCON cost premiums from both 
the government and construction contractor points of view.  A more accurate and 
unbiased determination of variables affecting cost should be discovered by analyzing 
both sides of the procurement process.   
Research Approach 
In order to meet the research objectives posed above, four phases of analysis 
occurred.  The research objectives were met through the combination of two scholarly 
articles and a white paper with their supporting appendices.  The three articles are each 
supported by one or more research phases.  While each phase of the research was critical 
to answering the overarching problem, each article had a different purpose or audience.  
Figure 2 illustrates the four phases, the inputs required, and how each phase linked to the 
three articles.   
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Figure 2: Research Approach, Inputs, and Outputs 
 
Phase 1 – Validate Cost Premiums 
The first phase answered the first research objective related to validating 
MILCON cost premiums.  This analysis involved a literature review of existing research 
and reports relating to MILCON and private industry construction costs.  According to 
Krathwohl (1998), a literature review has four functions: show which facets are 
important, show the depth of previous research, relate the problem to previous 
explanations, and determine methods and designs to use and avoid.  For this research 
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effort, the literature review helped scope the investigation while also meeting the phase 1 
requirement to validate the existence of MILCON cost premiums.  Past research 
demonstrated that there are substantial cost premiums.  This research phase supported the 
white paper for AFCEC as well as the journal article.  Additionally, the consolidation of 
MILCON cost and execution related research provides stepping stones for AFCEC to 
utilize for future research. 
Phase 2 – Determine Factors Causing Cost Premiums 
The second phase of this investigation into military cost premiums determined the 
factors that cause cost premiums.  An analysis of factors causing cost premiums based on 
internal MILCON processes was developed based on expert opinion and a case study.  
This section provides background information on causal analysis and case studies as well 
as a brief overview of the application of these methodologies.   
Causal Relationships 
Developing a causal relationship is the best way to develop mitigation 
methodologies for MILCON cost premiums.  To show a causal relationship, the entire 
causal chain must be analyzed, not just the last step (Krathwohl 1998).  For example, the 
requirement to buy an American-made bolt may add to the cost of construction.  
However, the entire causal chain would show that although the bolt did increase the cost 
of construction, the implementation of a law set a policy that required the contractor to 
procure the specific bolt; the cause of the additional cost is actually the implementation of 
a law.  A key element of causal relationships is they “are always inferred, never proven” 
(Krathwohl 1998, p. 131).  This statement means that causal relationships developed by 
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research are not necessarily proven but rather not disproven.  The framework chosen for 
analysis of MILCON procurement is designed to create a theory while documenting and 
validating some of the causes of MILCON cost premiums. 
Case Studies 
The concept of utilizing case studies to develop theory has existed since the late 
1960s and continues through today (Eisenhardt 1989).  Eisenhardt (1989) described how 
to build theories from case studies.  Her synthesis of previous work related to case studies 
developed a singular roadmap directing the use of case studies for theory development.  
Her eight-step process includes defining the research question, selecting case(s) to be 
studied, creating data gathering protocols, collecting the data, analyzing the data, shaping 
the hypothesis, comparing with similar and conflicting literature, and reaching closure.  
For this investigation, comparison to existing literature helps limit threats to internal 
validity.  The use of case studies in analysis typically “combines data collection methods 
such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations” (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 534).  
The qualitative and quantitative data provided by case studies require the use of multiple 
methodologies during analysis.  The qualitative aspects of the case study serve to 
describe the aspects of MILCON procurement that cost more than private industry or 
between construction agents, whereas the quantitative analysis seeks to describe the cost 
and schedule differences.  According to Ellram (1996), a case study is an appropriate 
methodology to answer these questions. 
Early in the research effort, the number of cases requiring study must be set.  
Analysis can be completed using multiple case studies or a single case study.  A single 
 11 
case study can be analyzed because “each case study is in and of itself a self-contained 
experiment, with unique context that is part of the experiment” (Ellram 1996, p. 100).  A 
single case is appropriate when it “represents a critical case to test a well-formulated 
theory, an extreme or unique case, or a case which reveals a previously inaccessible 
phenomenon” (Ellram 1996, p. 100).  In the case of this research effort, a single case 
study is utilized because the DoD has never before constructed two of the same buildings 
in the same location at the same time via different execution methods, an inaccessible 
phenomenon.  When utilizing a single case study, it is imperative to minimize threats to 
validity to allow for generalization of the results.  This can be accomplished by utilizing 
multiple data sources within the case study, such as focus groups, meetings, after-action 
reports, and memos (Ellram 1996).  The use of quantitative documentation, standards, 
and written and verbal qualitative information helps limit the threat to validity posed 
through the use of a single case study.  
Case study analysis is not without its weaknesses.  First, the use of case studies 
can yield theory and causes that are overly complex (Eisenhardt 1989).  The volume of 
data available based on case studies and the researcher’s goal to use all of the data 
available can cause this weakness.  To limit this weakness, the research should focus on 
applicable, simple, data while keeping in mind the need for internal and external validity.  
Second, the results of case studies can be so specific or narrow that the results cannot be 
generalized (Eisenhardt 1989).  To limit this weakness, the researcher must ensure theory 
developed from a case study has external validity.  A theory requires external validity in 
order to be generalized to the entire population (Krathwohl 1998).  The research was 
designed to explain a theory and then validate the explanation with industry experts; this 
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explanatory case study with validation design helps improve the external validity (Yin 
2009).  While the case study alone cannot limit all threats to internal and external 
validity, validating the results with additional data, such as interview and survey data, can 
lend credibility to, and improve, the validity of the results. 
Likert-style Survey 
Surveys describe or quantify “the attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of a population” 
(Patten 2009).  The survey used in this study was developed to determine the level of 
influence different factors have on MILCON cost premiums based on expert opinion, or 
beliefs.  The influence of different cost factors could not be quantitatively calculated due 
to the lack of similar, specific, data between private industry and MILCON projects.  
Additionally, the survey provided validity to the case study results and thereby allowed a 
limited generalization of the results.  The survey consisted of two overarching questions.  
Both questions ask the respondents to rate the level of influence factors have on the cost 
of MILCON projects; however, the first question asks for a comparison between 
MILCON and private industry construction while the second question requires a 
comparison between the case study projects.  Each of these two overarching questions 
had a series of cost premium factors listed underneath that required a Likert-style 
response. 
All respondents rated how each factor influences cost premiums; therefore, the 
standard Likert scale was not appropriate.  The standard five-point Likert scale breaks 
down as Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Neutral (3), Agree (4), and Strongly Agree 
(5); however, this survey used: Not at All (1), To a Limited Extent (2), To a Moderate 
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Extent (3), To a Large Extent (4), and To a Very Large Extent (5) (Carifio and Perla 
2007).  In this case, no negative responses were required because respondents were told 
to assume that MILCON cost premiums exist based on previous literature; therefore, no 
factors could lower the cost of MILCON compared to private industry.  One of the 
limitations of the scale, as written, is that it does not associate a percentage or dollar 
figure to each rating.  This limitation is partially mitigated by ensuring respondents all 
qualify as experts in the career field and have enough breadth of knowledge to understand 
the size and scope of MILCON projects.  
Methodology Application 
In the case of this specific research, two projects constructed via the same 
statement of requirements at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), Alaska, were 
compared to search for the root causes of differences in cost and performance.  By 
focusing on the differences between the projects and cost premiums rather than the base 
cost, the results drawn from these Alaska projects can be applied regardless of location.  
Contract requirement differences and after-action reports were analyzed to determine 
factors that could cause cost premiums.  Additionally, semi-structured interviews with 
contractors specializing in MILCON and private industry construction projects allowed 
for the determination of additional factors shown to cause cost premiums.   
Industry experts validated all of the determined factors through the use of a 
Likert-style survey.  In total 32, or 75%, of the survey questions relate to requirement 
differences noted during the case study analysis.  To limit the survey length, factors 
quantitatively known to cause cost premiums, such as Davis-Bacon Act wage rates, were 
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omitted from the survey.   However, Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) drive many 
of these quantitative factors, so the factors were included in a general form.  The 
combination of these two research streams allowed for the creation of a comprehensive 
list of factors that cause MILCON cost premiums. 
Phase 3 – Cost Premium Factor Analysis 
The third phase focused on an in-depth analysis of one factor, Davis-Bacon Act 
(DBA) wage rates, shown to cause cost premiums and general analysis of other 
influential factors.  The further investigation of variables was based on expert opinion 
obtained via a survey on the influence of each variable as well as the ability of the USAF 
to affect the factor.  Additionally, limiting the quantitative in-depth analysis to a single 
factor occurred due to data availability and expert insistence that these wage rates 
represent a large cost premium.  This phase utilized the results of expert interviews, 
geospatial analysis, and statistical inquiry.  Phase 3 allowed for a detailed understanding 
of the root causes of some of the cost premium factors. 
Quantitative Geospatial Analysis 
Geospatial analysis is a unique method of quantitative analysis providing for both 
statistical analysis based on geography as well as visual representation of data and results.  
Specifically, geospatial analysis is the “formal quantitative study of phenomena that 
manifest themselves in space” (Anselin 1989).  Geospatial analysis is grounded in 
statistics and mathematics while adding elements of space.  Geospatial analysis of data 
must meet all the requirements of the performed statistical tests being performed and 
have valid and accurate geospatial parameters.  Another key attribute of geospatial 
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analysis is its ability to create a single time-based sample out of a series of geospatial data 
points (Anselin 1989).  This ability means geospatial analysis of a set of data across an 
area can be considered a single point in time comprised of hundreds or thousands of 
geospatially attributed points.  However, one of the main flaws to geospatial analysis is 
the existence of geospatial errors.  Geospatial errors exist when the location data of a 
point is not accurate enough for the level of analysis or differs from the point’s true 
location (Anselin 1989).  However, in this research, the analysis of wage rates occurs 
mainly on a national level and at its smallest point across an entire Air Force base.  Any 
location geospatial error is negligible due to the large area covered.   
DBA and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) wage rates are both geospatially 
related.  The wage rates are representative of a specific location on earth.  Geospatial 
analysis of these wage rates allowed for the determination of differences across space.  
Additionally, through the use of surface generation, a limited amount of data, such as 
DBA wage rates at USAF bases, could be extrapolated to present a visual of wage rate 
trends across the country.  Geospatial analysis allowed for the examination of wage rates 
across space at a point in time. 
Statistical Analysis 
Research performed during phase 3 required the use of inferential and descriptive 
statistics.  Descriptive statistics, such as the mean, histogram, and standard deviation 
helped present the survey results.  Non-parametric statistics provided ranks for the level 
of influence of each surveyed cost premium factor based on each of the three 
demographics.  The three demographics are USACE personnel, USAF civil engineers 
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and contracting officers, and contractors.  Finally, inferential statistics described the 
statistical significance of results based on a large quantity of data.  For the analysis of 
DBA wage rates, inferential statistics based on a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) and matched pairs t-test provided confidence intervals and p-values 
representative of the statistical significance of the results.  These quantitative 
methodologies were critical to conclusions based on the third phase of this research 
approach. 
Phase 4 – Develop Mitigation Strategies 
The fourth, and final, phase developed mitigation strategies for the factors shown 
to cause cost premiums.  The development of these mitigation strategies answered the 
final research objective by showing where cost mitigation efforts could be applied.  The 
recommended mitigation strategies were synthesized from existing literature, expert 
interviews, or a combination of both.  Additionally, mitigation strategies were developed 
based on the linkage between influential cost premium factors and the case study contract 
requirement differences.  This research phase provided Air Force Civil Engineers and 
AFCEC with documented evidence that can be used to adapt MILCON procurement rules 
and execution. 
Scope and Limitations 
This research effort focused on USAF MILCON procurement.  Although the 
findings may apply to other branches of the military, the scope of the research was USAF 
MILCON primarily executed through USACE or AFCEC.  Additionally, all cost 
premium causes presented are only directly applicable to non-contingency MILCON 
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procurement.  Furthermore, the quantitative Davis-Bacon Act wage rate research applies 
only to the carpenter and electrician trades at USAF bases.   
As with all research, there were limitations to this study of MILCON cost 
premiums.  The lack of quantitative data was the largest limitation.  Since data related to 
the same facilities constructed on and off base were not available, it was not possible to 
do an exact comparison and factor analysis.  Additionally, contractors were not able to 
provide an equivalent estimate of costs for constructing a MILCON facility off base.  
Finally, the USAF does not track any loss in scope during pre-final bid negotiations in 
any database.  This means that if a bid comes back too high the USAF does not document 
changes implemented to ensure the bid meets the programmed amount.  Results were 
determined from qualitative source data and expert opinion due to the lack of quantitative 
data.   
The use of a single case study makes the result difficult to generalize to all 
MILCON projects.  However, the case study presented a unique opportunity to analyze 
internal factors that affect cost between the standard process and a more innovative 
approach.  In this case, the unique dataset and validation with industry experts through 
surveys and interviews help overcome limitations to generalizability.  For expert 
validation, the small sample surveyed, and limited population of experts with general 
MILCON knowledge and experience with the specific case study, limited the statistical 
significance.  However, even with the limitations mentioned above, this research presents 
viable causes of cost premiums as well as possible mitigation strategies.  In addition to 
the general limitations mentioned in this section, each article contains a description of the 
applicable limitations. 
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Organizational Impact 
Military construction cost premiums affect the ability of the military to meet its 
war fighting mission by expending limited resources in an inefficient manner.  These cost 
premiums have limited construction performance and become noticeable line items in 
austere budgets.  Due to these premiums, leaders have been tasked to find ways to 
mitigate excess costs.  Additionally, based on Congressional requirements, the Air Force 
is required to do a MILCON cost premium analysis.  Through this research, the Air Force 
should be able to reduce its MILCON spending while gaining construction performance.  
Furthermore, determination and mitigation of variables causing cost premiums should 
more closely align MILCON procurement with private industry practices.  Increasing the 
similarities will enable construction contractors to more efficiently utilize their resources 
on both government and private construction contracts.    
Determining the cost premiums of MILCON procurement is a key step in 
reducing military spending.  The reduction of wasteful spending in MILCON projects 
should be value-added for the military unit requiring a facility as well as the contractor 
executing the project.  While people generally scoff at the concept of “doing more with 
less,” the determination and mitigation of MILCON cost premiums should allow the Air 
Force to do just that.  Increasing the efficiency of military construction will result in 
increased mission capabilities and reduced taxpayers bills. 
Overview 
This chapter provided the framework for the study by describing the impacts of 
cost on federal procurement, the need and desire for the research effort, the research 
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objectives, the research approach, and the organizational impacts.  This thesis follows a 
modified scholarly article format and presents three separate articles, a white paper and 
two scholarly papers, in chapters two through four.  Although each article can be read as 
a standalone, they flow from one to another with Chapter II providing the most 
background information and results to Chapter IV providing in-depth analysis of a single 
factor.  Specifically, Chapter II contains the MILCON cost premium white paper 
developed for AFCEC.  In addition to cost premium factors and mitigation strategies for 
USAF MILCON procurement, the white paper provides extensive literature review.  The 
detailed look into the many causes for MILCON cost premiums provided the basis for the 
next chapter’s journal article.  Chapter III contains the journal article submitted to the 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management.  The article synthesizes expert 
interviews, the case study, and survey results to present general themes shown to cause 
MILCON, and thus public-sector, cost premiums.  Chapter IV presents the journal article 
submitted to the Lean Construction Journal.  The article quantifies cost premiums based 
on DBA wage rates through a comparison with local area wage rates.  Chapter V 
provides overarching conclusions and serves to provide a simplified answer to the 
MILCON cost premium research question.  Additionally, Chapter V contains suggestions 
for future research.  Finally, appendices A through D support the three articles by 
providing further details, such as additional background information, detailed 
methodologies, and full results.  
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II. White Paper: Report for AFCEC on MILCON Cost Premium Research, Causes 
and Mitigation Strategies 
This chapter contains the white paper developed for the Air Force Civil Engineer 
Center (AFCEC) use.  The goal of the white paper was to provide an extensive literature 
review of previous research relating to military construction (MILCON) and methods of 
executing MILCON.  The literature review presented in this white paper also provides 
detailed background for Chapters III and IV.  Additionally, the white paper includes 
analysis of factors causing or influencing cost premiums from the United States Air Force 
(USAF) perspective.  Also, this white paper includes expert suggestions directly relating 
to the mitigation of cost premiums during USAF execution of MILCON.  Finally, this 
white paper suggests future research avenues related to MILCON cost premiums.  
Appendix A and Appendix B contain additional supporting information for this white 
paper. 
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Report on MILCON Cost Premium Research, Causes, and 
Suggested Mitigation Strategies 
Developed for the Air Force Civil Engineer Center 
Introduction 
The United States Air Force’s (USAF) military construction (MILCON) budget, 
with the exception of the deliberate pause in fiscal year 2013, is worth billions of dollars 
yearly.  However, anecdotal and limited quantitative evidence has shown that MILCON 
procurements costs hundreds of millions of dollars per year more than equivalent 
construction would cost in the private sector.  The Air Force Center for Engineering and 
the Environment (AFCEE), which was recently combined with the Air Force Civil 
Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA) to form the Air Force Civil Engineer Center 
(AFCEC), sponsored research to determine the causes of MILCON cost premiums.  This 
white paper is one element of the MILCON cost premium research.  The sponsored 
research resulted in two other documents, a geospatial and statistical analysis presented in 
a scholarly article regarding the effects of Davis-Bacon Act wage rates and a journal 
article presenting the analysis of a case study and survey regarding USAF MILCON 
generalized to public-sector construction.  This white paper provides USAF civil 
engineers information regarding MILCON cost premiums from an Air Force perspective.  
Additionally, the specific cost premiums have been categorized according to how much 
control different levels of the USAF or DoD engineer community have over each cost 
premium.  By providing a thorough background and a simple list of findings and 
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suggestions, this paper sets the foundation for change in the MILCON procurement 
process as well as suggested improvements to allow for future, more in-depth, research. 
Literature Review 
This literature review establishes a foundation of knowledge related to military 
construction based on published literature and standards.  The purpose is to understand 
the characteristics of MILCON procurement, applicable rules and regulations, and 
research as it relates to MILCON procurement and costs.  This literature review begins 
by defining key terms and standards that apply to MILCON level construction.  A 
discussion of construction execution methods and acquisition processes follows the 
MILCON background.  Although this literature review references previous, published, 
research efforts, the following section focuses specifically on previous research and 
investigations directly related to MILCON cost premiums.  All components of this 
literature review combine to form a comprehensive and cohesive picture of MILCON and 
previous research. 
Military Construction Standards 
Military construction, known as MILCON, is a specific type of construction 
executed by military entities.  Title 10, United States Code, Section 2801, defines 
military construction as “any construction, development, conversion, or extension of any 
kind carried out with respect to a military installation. MILCON includes construction 
projects for all types of buildings, roads, airfield pavements, and utility systems costing 
$750,000 or more” (Department of the Air Force 2010, p. 25).  The second sentence of 
the definition is the unique attribute of MILCON type construction; specifically, 
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MILCON projects cost $750,000 or more.  Military construction with costs below this 
threshold is called unspecified minor military construction and is governed by different 
rules and regulations (Department of the Air Force 2003).  The difference between 
MILCON and minor military construction starts with the funding stream, military 
construction authority as opposed to operations and maintenance funds, and continues 
into execution agents, authorities, and limitations on the type of construction authorized 
(Department of the Air Force 2003).  However, this research endeavor focuses solely on 
large MILCON projects; therefore, the background information presented is primarily 
applicable to MILCON procurement rather than unspecified minor military construction.  
While officially codified in public law, Air Force engineers utilize guidance provided in 
Air Force Instructions (AFI).  The applicable AFIs break MILCON procurement into 
planning and programming (AFI 32-1021) and then design and construction (AFI 32-
1023). 
MILCON Planning and Programming 
The first phase of a MILCON project, planning and programming, occurs at least 
3 to 5 years before project execution.  AFI 32-1021 dedicates an entire chapter to 
MILCON project planning because it sets the foundation for a MILCON level project.  
The AFI dictates that installations must “identify future facility needs 3 – 5 years in the 
future and determine which needs cannot be met with existing facilities” (Department of 
the Air Force 2010, p. 7).  Once installation leaders identify and approve the needs, 
further planning actions focus on a certificate of compliance ensuring the project, as 
planned, meets environmental, seismic, and explosive arc and airfield clearance 
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requirements in addition to other requirements based on additional AFIs and executive 
orders (Department of the Air Force 2010).  While this planning phase occurs long before 
project approval or execution, it is a critical component of MILCON procurement; failure 
to properly plan ensures project failure.   
Once engineers complete a certificate of compliance, the project can enter the 
programming phase.  AFI 32-1012 defines programming as “the process of developing 
and obtaining approval and funding for MILCON projects” (Department of the Air Force 
2010, p. 25).  It is during this phase of MILCON procurement that the project is further 
developed and codified by engineers and the end-user.  In order for approval to be 
granted by the Air Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Congress, the 
project must be developed, justified, and include a cost estimate (Department of the Air 
Force 2010).  Additionally, in an attempt to control excess costs, all MILCON projects 
over $2 million require the completion of a detailed economic analysis (Department of 
the Air Force 2010).  Engineers and comptrollers work together to complete economic 
analyses on MILCON projects.  Once the project programming is completed, the project 
documentation is sent to Headquarters USAF (HQ USAF) where it competes with other 
MILCON requirements throughout the Air Force.  HQ USAF sends the finalized and 
prioritized list of MILCON projects to the OSD for entry into the 6-year Future Years 
Defense Program (FYDP).  The FYDP is a portion of the president’s budget that is 
submitted to Congress.  Finally, Congress receives the list of MILCON projects requested 
and decides whether to provide authorization and appropriation for each project 
(Department of the Air Force 2010).   Once authorization and appropriation are received 
from Congress, the MILCON project can enter the design and construction phase. 
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MILCON Design and Construction 
AFI 32-1023 contains the governing documentation for the design and 
construction of MILCON projects.  The AFI sets goals, rules, and restrictions for the 
design of Air Force facilities.  Specifically, it mentions that facilities should “enable 
mission execution and enhance occupant safety and quality of life by providing 
sustainable facilities” (Department of the Air Force 2010, p. 10).  It requires functional 
flexible designs developed with accessibility and cost management in mind (Department 
of the Air Force 2010).  The 2010 version of the AFI now specifies that design decisions 
should be based on the life-cycle cost of a facility; however, this requirement is not in the 
programming AFI which provides guidance for MILCON project programming and 
estimating (Department of the Air Force 2010).  This lack of consistent guidance means 
that although the design should be cost effective based on the life-cycle costs, 
Congressional authority and appropriations have already fixed the project cost.  The AFI 
continues by specifying that designs must meet Unified Facility Criteria (UFC); 
commercial standards, such as National Electric Code or National Fire Protection Code; 
Engineering Technical Letters (ETL); and the Whole Building Design Guide 
(Department of the Air Force 2010).  Additionally, the AFI specifies the use of “the 
United States Green Building Council’s (USGBC) LEED Green Building Rating System 
as a tool to incorporate sustainable design principles and subsequently to measure the 
sustainability achieved” (Department of the Air Force 2010, p. 17).  The remaining 
portion of the AFI’s chapter is dedicated to requirements that may not apply to all 
projects, such as utility metering, environmental regulations, and design management 
(Department of the Air Force 2010).  The AFI attempts to control cost and scope by 
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mandating, post Congressional approval, that project scope remain fixed, and that costs 
can only increase by 25% without reprogramming and approval (Department of the Air 
Force 2010).  This mandate fixes the scope at least 3 to 5 years before project design.  
While costs can change; additional funding is not authorized by Congress and comes at 
the expense of other MILCON projects.  MILCON budgets are fixed on a yearly basis; 
therefore, overages from one project are removed from another project unless Congress 
authorizes additional funding.  Once the design is complete, the MILCON project is 
transferred to the construction phase. 
AFI 32-1023 also focuses on construction management, specifically the roles and 
responsibilities of the construction management team and the phases of construction.  
The construction manager (CM) is the individual or team responsible for monitoring 
construction on a day-to-day basis.  AFI 32-1023 dictates 22 tasks that are the 
responsibility of the CM.  In general, the CM monitors and reports on construction 
progress, oversees the construction agent (CA) including changes and scheduling, 
completes documentation for all changes and funding requests, and is responsible for 
ensuring the project meets its requirements (Department of the Air Force 2010).  The 
unique role of the Air Force CM is to oversee another military entity executing the 
contract (AFCEC, USACE, or NAVFAC) as well as the contractor doing the work.  This 
layer of oversight ensures construction projects, regardless of method or agent of 
execution, meet Air Force needs.  With the roles of the CM defined, the AFI continues by 
specifying the phases of construction.   Per the AFI, these phases include: the 
construction management plan dictating roles, responsibilities, procedures; a red zone 
meeting held at 80 percent of construction completion; construction acceptance 
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procedures; and post-occupancy inspections to ensure proper construction completion, 
and that errors are remedied within the warranty period (Department of the Air Force 
2010).  Additionally, the AFI specifies the ability to occupy the facility during 
construction and joint occupancy, as well as noting that the CM and CA share 
responsibility for ensuring the quality of construction (Department of the Air Force 
2010).  The construction phase of MILCON procurement is one of the shortest in the long 
MILCON process but is also the most visible, and the phase that creates an enduring 
facility. 
MILCON Roles and Responsibilities for the Air Force 
Although the MILCON procurement is a DoD-wide enterprise, Air Force 
application of MILCON procurement differs from the implementation by other branches.  
These differences are most noticeable in the oversight and execution of the construction 
phase.  This section clarifies the roles and responsibilities of key players based on AFI 
and DoD guidance.  Table 1 presents a simplified list of agencies and entities with unique 
responsibilities in the Air Force MILCON process.  Additionally, Table 1 specifies the 
branch of the entity as well as whether it is local to the base or a field operating agency 
(FOA) functioning out of a dislocated location.   
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Table 1: MILCON Agency/Entity Roles and Responsibilities 
Name Branch MILCON Role/Responsibility 
Design Agent (DA)/ 
Construction Agent 
(CA) 
Army, Navy, 
or Air Force 
(FOA likely) 
The DoD component responsible for the 
technical execution of the construction or 
design and performs the duties of the 
contracting officer. 
Design Manager (DM) 
/ Construction 
Manager (CM) 
Air Force 
(local) 
Air Force organization designated to manage 
construction and interface with the DA/CA.  
Responsible for local construction oversight and 
ensuring project meets USAF needs. 
Air Force Center for 
Engineering and the 
Environment 
(AFCEE/AFCEC-
West) 
Air Force 
(FOA) 
Air Force MILCON program manager and 
possible DA/CA or DM/CM.  Creates planning 
guidance and provides technical planning 
assistance for Air Force engineers.  
Air Force Civil 
Engineer Support 
Agency 
(AFCESA/AFCEC-
East) 
Air Force 
(FOA) 
Develops, coordinates, and interprets UFCs and 
ETLs to ensure compliance with all policies.  
Responsible for the ETL system.  Responsible 
for facility energy conservation, metering, and 
renewable energy via Air Force Facility Energy 
Center. 
Note: All roles/responsibilities adapted from AFI 32-1023 (Department of the Air Force 
2010) 
 
DoD Directive 4270.5 dictates the specific agencies authorized to act as the DA, 
CA, or DA/CA.  Additionally, the directive states that, with few exceptions, the “Air 
Force shall use the services of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) or the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) for design and construction of the annual 
military construction program” (Department of Defense 2005, p. 3).  However, the 
directive allows AFCEC to execute a limited number of projects if the Air Force and 
NAVFAC/USACE agree it is the “most efficient, expeditious, and cost-effective way” to 
complete a project (Department of Defense 2005, p. 3).  Having USACE and NAVFAC 
execute projects with additional oversight provided by Air Force construction and design 
managers creates unique relationships.  Compared to Navy and Army MILCON 
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procurement, the Air Force provides an additional layer of oversight over both the 
contractor as well as the DA/CA.  These roles and responsibilities are critical to 
successful MILCON procurement. 
Construction Specification Standards 
Construction specifications define facility requirements.  Generally, three forms 
of specifications are used: method-based specifications (MBS), end-result specifications 
(ERS), and performance-related specifications (PRS) (Dhakal et al. 2009).  The MBS is 
the classical form of specification where the design and construction agent prescribes 
construction procedures for the contractor to follow.  With ERS, the contractor is fully 
responsible for the construction procedures and quality control, but the construction agent 
accepts or rejects the final results based on an explicit quality assurance plan.  Finally, the 
PRS grew from statistically based quality assurance specifications and are specifications 
that relate quality characteristics and/or life-cycle costs to expected performance of the 
work completed (Dhakal et al. 2009).  Studies by the Federal Highway Administration 
and analysis of paving contracts in New Brunswick provide further evidence that moving 
from MBS to ERS does not result in performance degradation (Dhakal et al. 2009).  
MILCON projects can utilize any of these construction specification standards but 
frequently use MBS. 
Project Management  
Prior to the detailed discussion of MILCON execution and acquisition, it is 
important to understand that all methods have benefits and disadvantages.  The best 
approach attempts to balance advantages and disadvantages so that no party is wronged.  
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The project management “iron triangle” (Figure 3) shows the facets of a project that must 
be balanced: scope/performance, schedule, and cost.  In general, project managers are 
able to optimize two of the three elements through the selection of acquisition and 
execution method (Chan et al. 2004).  Based on the needs of the user, the critical facets 
can vary.  Additionally, all cost premium factors will apply to at least one of the facets of 
the project management iron triangle.  This means that project managers will be able to 
understand the additional costs and sacrifices being made by each factor causing 
MILCON cost premiums.  The combination of a basic understanding of the project 
management iron triangle, as well as the in-depth knowledge of where each cost premium 
lies, allows project managers to better manage MILCON procurement.  
 
Figure 3: Construction iron triangle 
 
MILCON Execution  
This section focuses on the methods of execution and acquisition utilized for 
MILCON procurement.  In private industry, many execution and acquisition methods are 
available including design-bid-build, design-build, multi-prime, construction manager at 
risk, construction manager, engineer-procure-construct, and private-public-partnerships 
(Kelleher and Walters 2009).  However, policies restrict MILCON execution to specific 
methods of execution, generally the traditional design-bid-build (DBB) or the design-
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build (DB) method (AFCEE 2008).  This section will briefly describe each applicable 
execution method followed by a discussion of current research into MILCON execution.  
Further information is available in AFCEE’s (AFCEC’s) United States Air Force Project 
Manager’s Guide for Design and Construction. 
Design-Bid-Build 
The traditional method of construction execution is the DBB process.  In this 
case, the Air Force issues a request for a design to an architect-engineer (A-E) firm 
(AFCEE 2008).  The Air Force works with the design agent to fully define the project 
scope and cost (AFCEE 2008), which is used to update the programming documentation 
that goes to Congress if completed prior to Congressional approval.  The A-E firm 
completes the design of the entire facility including “drawings, specifications, design 
analysis, and cost estimate” (AFCEE 2008, p. C-1).  These construction documents 
become the property of the Air Force at contract completion.  Once Congress authorizes 
the MILCON project, the designs are given to a separate contractor for construction.  The 
advantage to this method is that the design features are known so the bids should be very 
accurate (Kelleher and Walters 2009).  Additionally, the DBB method has been tested in 
court; consequently, dispute resolution is generally predictable (Kelleher and Walters 
2009).  However, the DBB process does not take into account contractor and 
subcontractor input and may not reflect correct material pricing at the time of project 
execution; these issues can end up delaying a project or requiring additional funding 
(AFCEE 2008).  The design-bid-build process has been utilized since the start of federal 
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construction procurement, but over time construction execution has shifted towards a 
design-build relationship.  
Design-Build 
The design-build execution method is based around the “master builder” concept 
where a single contractor designs and constructs the project (Kelleher and Walters 2009).  
While the Air Force lists six variations of the DB method, they all revolve around a 
single contractor taking the project from start to finish, thereby improving execution 
speed and reducing overall project costs (AFCEE 2008).  Even though the advantages 
appeared immediately, policy restricted the Air Force from utilizing the DB method until 
the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (Rosner et al. 2009).  The traditional DB method is the 
two-step or one-step method where a contract is awarded based on a set of specifications 
and/or preliminary design and the contractor then designs and executes construction in 
one fluid motion (AFCEE 2008).  The difference between the one-step and two-step 
method is that in the two-step DB process contractors are short listed based on 
qualifications; shortening the list of prospective bidders increases competition among the 
technically capable construction firms (Molenaar et al. 1999).  The design-build+ method 
is a form of DB which brings the contractor into the planning phase early to help with all 
phases of execution; these contracts normally involve the award of a contract to a 
construction team that executes a series of construction projects (AFCEE 2008).  Another 
variant is the design-build (turnkey) method.  For this method, a fixed price is established 
along with minimum requirements and contractors bid with the expectation of building 
multiple versions of the same facility for a set cost (AFCEE 2008).  All of these design-
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build methods shift risk from the government onto the contractor but allow for potential 
cost and time savings; the private sector uses design-build extensively and has become 
the preferred method for Air Force MILCON execution. 
Previous researchers have determined factors that can influence or help determine 
the success of a DB project.  Chan et al. (2004) performed a meta-analysis of previous 
literature and determined the criteria used to determine DB project success.  Their 
research found that four objective criteria and five subjective criteria characterize 
success.  The objective criteria are time, cost, quality, and safety.  The subjective criteria 
are: meeting specifications/employer’s requirements; conformance to expectation of 
project team members; functionality; aesthetics; and reduction in dispute (Chan et al. 
2004).  Lam et al. (2008) applied those criteria to develop a mathematical model to 
predict DB success.  Their investigation also identified success factors and determined 
causal relationships between the critical success factors and success indicators.  Lam et 
al.’s (2008) research utilized time, cost, quality, and functionality as the success 
indicators.  The model determined that the critical success factors for DB success include 
“the project nature, the effectiveness of project management action, and the application of 
innovative management approaches” (Lam et al. 2008, p. 336).  For project nature, Lam 
et al. (2008) determined that successful DB projects provide room for contractor input, 
are decently complex, allow the contractor to propose and implement alternative 
solutions, and allow the contractor to design structures to suit their construction methods.  
Effective project management for DB requires proper contract documentation and 
controls to allow contractor flexibility while ensuring all requirements are met.  Finally, 
the adoption of innovative management approaches includes using value management 
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and patterning (Lam et al. 2008).  Value management involves removing project elements 
that do not increase value.  Partnering involves establishing relationships between 
contractors and construction agents where all parties work towards common goals 
together rather than at each other’s expense (Lam et al. 2008).  Research demonstrated 
that these three elements are critical elements of DB project success. 
Other Execution Methods 
Air Force MILCON execution is generally a tightly controlled process; however, 
waivers can be obtained to utilize a variety of execution methods when cost or time 
savings are evident.  For example, construction can be executed using the U.S. General 
Services Administration (GSA) schedule catalog by procuring turnkey facilities with 
installation (GSA 2012).  Another alternative execution method is the procurement of 
MILCON facilities through an Enhanced Use Lease (EUL).  The EUL allows the Air 
Force to trade property for construction services (Bates 2011).  These alternative 
execution methods are only a sample of the possibilities; however, these methods are 
used infrequently due to the extra effort required for execution. 
MILCON Acquisition Methods 
The acquisition method, or construction contract type, for MILCON is the means 
used to fund and contract MILCON execution.  The construction contract types utilized 
for Air Force construction procurement include the following (AFCEE 2008).  
• Indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) – multi-period contracts for an 
unknown number of construction requirements 
• Firm fixed price – a lump sum contract 
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• Fixed price with economic price adjustment – a lump sum that can be adjusted 
for economic contingencies 
• Fixed price with incentive firm – a fixed price contract that allows for 
adjustment of profit and final contract price 
• Fixed price with award fees – a fixed price contract with an award based on 
Government evaluation 
• Cost plus incentive fee – a cost reimbursement contract with an adjustable 
incentive fee 
• Cost plus award fee – a cost reimbursement contract with an award based on 
Government evaluation 
• Cost plus fixed fee – a cost reimbursement contract that pays cost plus a fee 
that is fixed at the inception of the contract 
Although additional procurement methods exist, they are rarely utilized in MILCON and 
therefore not discussed here.  In addition to the information provided in the USAF Project 
Manager’s Guide for Design and Construction, the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) part 16 governs all of these acquisition methods.  Furthermore, the pricing for cost 
plus can be based on established pricing, actual price paid, or catalog prices; these details 
are solidified during contract award or advertisement and vary from project to project 
(AFCEE 2008).  In general, most MILCON projects strive for a firm fixed price where 
the costs are known up front.  However, the use of firm fixed prices requires the 
contractor to commit to a set price early in the design process (Molenaar et al. 1999).  
Both firm fixed and cost plus, including their variants, can be utilized with any execution 
method. The execution and procurement method options require design and construction 
agents to select the execution and acquisition method.   
 36 
Research in MILCON Acquisition/Execution 
The multitude of acquisition and execution methods has led to a series of research 
endeavors attempting to determine how execution and acquisition methods affect 
MILCON performance.  This section focuses on research into execution methods 
followed by research into acquisition and procurement method. 
Design-Bid-Build and Design-Build Research 
The performance of MILCON projects based on execution method has been 
investigated in terms of cost, performance, and schedule.  Molenaar, Songer, and Barash 
(1999) investigated design-build evolution and performance in the public-sector.  They 
focused on performance differences in DB projects based on the one-step, two-step, or 
qualifications-based method of execution.  The qualifications-based method utilizes a 
lower level of design, allows prequalification of bidders, and the award is competitively 
negotiated rather than the lump sum utilized for the one- or two-step process.  The results 
of the 104 public-sector projects they studied show that the two-step process, which 
limits the number of bidders, has the best schedule and budget performance.  However, 
the research shows that qualification-based execution results in significantly lower 
administrative burdens by transferring the responsibility onto the contractor (Molenaar et 
al. 1999).  Overall, their results suggest that the Air Force should utilize the two-step DB 
execution method in order to maximize cost and schedule performance. 
Rosner, Thal, and West (2009) narrowed design-build research to Air Force 
MILCON projects by analyzing 835 projects against six performance metrics based on 
execution method.  They analyzed 278 design-build and 557 design-bid-build projects; 
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the disparity in the number of projects analyzed by execution method was based on the 
fact that DB was not heavily utilized at the beginning of the study period (1996-2006) 
(Rosner et al. 2009).  The six metrics the projects were measured against were unit cost, 
cost growth, schedule growth, modifications per million dollars, current working 
estimate/programmed amount ratio, and total project time; additionally, they performed 
the analysis based on facility type.  Their research concluded that DB outperformed DBB 
in two metrics, cost growth and the number of modifications, while DBB outperformed 
DB for project time (Rosner et al. 2009).  However, the project time performance was to 
be expected because DBB projects sometimes have “off-the-shelf” designs available and 
thus design time is not included.  A 2009 study of U.S. Navy dorm construction found 
similar results; DB resulted in reduced cost and schedule growth (Hale et al. 2009).  The 
Navy study found that the reductions in cost and schedule growth, as well as overall 
construction schedule, were statistically significant (Hale et al. 2009).  Finally, the 
Rosner et al. (2009) research effort revealed that the DB method was best suited for 
“seven out of nine facility types: airfield pavements, operations, corrosion control, 
administration, dormitories, fitness centers, and child development centers,” while 
storage and operations facilities did not favor one method over the other.  Overall, the 
authors advocate the utilization of DB for the majority of Air Force MILCON 
procurement. 
Gannon, Feng, and Sitzabee (2012) completed additional research into schedule 
performance for design-build projects.  Their research was based on a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of three MILCON projects executed by USACE and overseen by the 
88th Civil Engineer Directorate at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio.  The research question 
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considered was: “do initial schedules specified in federal design-build facility 
procurements provide reliable forecasting for project control” (Gannon et al. 2012).  
Furthermore, this question was refined by setting the goal of understanding the 
scheduling process and analyzing how changes affect schedule uncertainty.  The results 
of the study show that modifying the project results in cost and schedule growth; 
specifically, the later the change occurs, the stronger the negative effect on schedule and 
cost.  Additionally, Gannon et al. (2012) observed that USACE required the initial 
schedule in the first 2 months of a DB project although it takes 8-11 months to reach the 
100% design milestone (Gannon et al. 2012).  Based on case studies and observations 
related to construction scheduling Gannon et al. (2012) developed the cone of uncertainty 
(Figure 1) to demonstrate the variability in schedule based on design percentage 
completed.  The recommendation from their study is that MILCON design-build 
procedures should align more closely to private industry policies and allow for flexible 
scheduling until the design is solidified (Gannon et al. 2012).  While the DB method is 
known to outperform DBB, their research shows that policies must be adapted to gain all 
the performance improvements available. 
 
Figure 4: Schedule cone of uncertainty (Gannon et al. 2012) 
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Acquisition/Procurement Method Research 
Regardless of the execution method chosen, there are a variety of acquisition 
methods available.  Research has shown that 88% of public-sector projects use lump-sum 
fixed price contracts (Molenaar et al. 1999).  Due to the heavy utilization of fixed price 
contracts, and restrictions on cost growth for MILCON projects, little research has 
investigated alternative acquisition methods.  However, options exist for the 
procurement, or award, of fixed price contracts.  El Wardani, Messner, and Horman 
(2006) compared these procurement methods for design-build projects.  They compared 
four methods (sole source, qualifications-based, best value, and low bid) against three 
performance metrics (cost, time, and quality).  These four procurement methods can be 
utilized to select contractors for almost any acquisition method.  Sole source selection is 
the selection of a single contractor based on performance and qualifications at the 
expense of price competition (El Wardani et al. 2006).  The Air Force is unable to use 
sole source selection for most construction due to FAR restrictions.  Qualifications-based 
selection is the selection of a contractor based on a request for qualifications; once 
selected, the DB contract is directly negotiated with the most qualified contractor (El 
Wardani et al. 2006).  The best value selection, supported by the Air Force as of 2010 and 
the most flexible selection method, allows the selection of a contractor based on 
evaluations of the design and cost.  Finally, low-bid selection chooses a contractor based 
solely on cost.  The study results show that low-bid has the lowest initial cost but the 
highest cost growth and very high schedule growth, 9.82% and 5.64%, respectively (El 
Wardani et al. 2006).  These results align with guidance from AFCEC that dissuades the 
use of low-bid selection for MILCON procurement (AFCEE 2008).  Additionally, El 
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Wardani et al. (2006) found that qualifications-based selection results in excellent 
performance for cost growth and speed of construction, especially for low-complexity 
projects.  However, the best value method results in top performance in terms of schedule 
growth at the expense of initial cost.  Their study did not investigate if the higher cost of 
best value is related to design enhancements not offered by the other procurement 
methods.  Overall, El Wardani et al. (2006) conclude that no one procurement method 
outperforms any other method in all performance metrics; therefore, the procurement 
method must be selected based on the most critical metric for each project. 
Recently, Sullivan (2011) performed further investigation into best value 
procurement for construction versus other methodologies including Lean, Six Sigma, and 
Total Quality Management (TQM).  He investigated these management methodologies 
for use in construction because, in his opinion, construction has been “slow to adapt” 
with many projects over budget and behind schedule.  The results of his research show 
that best-value allows owners to select the best-fit contractor based on past performance, 
assessing and limiting risk, interviews, and prioritization of cost and performance 
(Sullivan 2011).  Additionally, Hammad et al.’s (2010) research of public building 
projects found that selecting based solely on low-bid could result in underbidding and 
excessive change requests.  Furthermore, Sullivan (2011) found that best value benefits 
both the owner and contractor while many of the other efficiency tools benefit one party 
significantly more than the other.  His findings also show that some management 
methodologies are ill suited to construction, including TQM which primarily improves 
vendor to supplier relationships.  Overall, Sullivan’s (2011) research effort supports the 
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utilization of tried and true construction procurement methods such as best value over 
newer management programs. 
MILCON Cost Premiums 
Large construction projects are inherently complicated endeavors; for the Air 
Force, strict planning, programming, and executing guidance, as well as the variety of 
execution and acquisition avenues available, increases these intricacies.  MILCON 
projects throughout the DoD are a multi-billion dollar line item on Congressional budgets 
each year, making them prime targets for cost saving measures (112th Congress 2011).  
The costs, limited quantity, and complicated nature of MILCON projects result in a 
variety of research comparing MILCON costs to private industry costs. 
MILCON Cost Investigations 
The cost of MILCON projects has been investigated multiple times over the past 
two decades.  Pope (1990) investigated MILCON procurement compared to private 
industry from a cost perspective.  The stated goal was to discover “successes” from 
private industry and integrate these successes into the MILCON process in order to 
realize cost savings.  His research investigated four specific questions: is there a 
difference in administrative effort between MILCON and private industry, do MILCON 
standards differ from national and local standards, are contractors restricted or 
constrained when working on MILCON projects compared to private industry, and does 
the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) cause MILCON wage rate differences compared to private 
industry.  Additionally, if differences were found in any of the areas, Pope (1990) 
investigated whether those differences impacted construction cost.  Pope’s (1990, p. 7) 
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research also attempted to determine if privatization, or the “transfer of government 
services, assets and/or enterprises to private-sector owners . . . when those owners and 
suppliers have the capability of providing better services at lower costs,” allowed for 
more efficient MILCON execution.  However, in the 22 years since his research, 
privatization has not been heavily used or considered for MILCON projects.   
In the background of his research, Pope (1990) discusses that a consensus could 
not be obtained as to whether federal facilities cost significantly more than their private 
industry counterparts.  One study found the cost ratio between federal and private 
construction was 151 to 100 while another found private costs to be 64.5% of federal 
costs with a final studying finding no significant difference (Pope 1990).  However, the 
study showing differences found “no hard evidence of cost differences arising from 
intangible factors such as labor standards, specification restrictions, extra federal 
documentation, or restrictive procurement policies” (Pope 1990, p. 38).  Industry experts 
disputed this point and presented other reports faulting procurement methods and 
administration for cost increases (Pope 1990).  These conflicting reports precipitated the 
need for Pope’s (1990) study specifically comparing MILCON projects to private 
industry construction. 
Pope (1990) conducted interviews with government engineers, managers, and 
contracting officers and then interviewed contractors with government and private 
industry experience.  The semi-structured interviews were conducted with the goal of 
answering each of the four investigative questions.  Pope (1990) found that the 
government believed that administrative requirements did not increase costs while the 
contractors disagreed, stating that administrative requirements did cause increased costs. 
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For the remaining investigative questions, both government employees and contractors 
believed construction standards, contract clauses, and the Davis-Bacon Act caused cost 
increases above private industry costs.  Additionally, Pope (1990) validated through 
quantitative comparison that the prevailing wage rate set by the Davis-Bacon Act was 
more expensive than wage rates paid in the local area.  His research showed that in 1990, 
MILCON procurement was more expensive than private industry construction; however, 
in 22 years, there have been many regulatory changes affecting MILCON procurement 
including tweaks to the Davis-Bacon Act. 
Beach (2008) analyzed MILCON cost and schedule performance based on the 
major command (MAJCOM) and the construction agent executing the project.  He sought 
to investigate the ability of MAJCOMs to accomplish projects with regards to schedule 
and cost contrasted against other MAJCOMs; additionally, he investigated how well the 
CAs accomplished projects compared to each other.  The CAs investigated include 
USACE, NAVFAC, and AFCEE.  Beach (2008) analyzed 1,322 completed USAF 
MILCON projects utilizing the earned value analysis metrics of cost performance index, 
schedule performance index, and the cost-schedule index.  The study did not take into 
account any reduction in project scope or facility performance losses due to the data 
provided and use of regression analysis.  These types of losses are not documented 
quantitatively and consistently across the Air Force.  Overall, his research found that the 
Air Force MILCON program “consistently delivers projects that are under budget” but 
frequently over schedule (Beach 2008, p. 81).  This finding validates the idea that 
MILCON projects are designed and executed to their programmed amount at the expense 
of schedule and requested capabilities.  Another interesting result of Beach’s (2008) 
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study is that the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) MAJCOM and Alaska district (POA) of the 
USACE have the best cost and schedule performance in comparison to other MAJCOMs 
and districts.  Additionally, no major variation appeared in cost or schedule performance 
based on the type of facility constructed (Beach 2008).  His quantitative research effort 
analyzed the internal performance of MILCON projects based on the costs and schedules 
set by the MAJCOM and CA; however, the research was accomplished without regard to 
how long construction should take or appropriate construction costs. 
In 2011, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) noted that the 
Department of Defense was unable to “provide competitive construction costs with 
comparable type facilities in the commercial sector” (112th Congress 2011, p. 291).  The 
committee noted that MILCON unit costs are typically 25% to 40% more than private-
sector costs (112th Congress 2011).  The HASC highlighted key challenges it believes 
contribute to the cost increases including federal contracting requirements, such as Davis-
Bacon wages and federal sub-contracting and small-business goals; additional design 
requirements, such as anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) measures; energy 
efficiency objectives; and a robust construction management capacity providing 
construction oversight.  Although Congress sets many of these requirements in Public 
Law, the committee found the markups to be “excessive and limit the purchasing ability 
of the” DoD (112th Congress 2011, p. 292).  The report requires the Secretary of Defense 
to report on these cost premiums; this requirement required input from the Air Force via 
AFCEC.  In early 2012, the AFCEC construction management section determined USAF 
MILCON unit costs are up to 37% higher than private industry construction (Hartford 
2012).  Table 2 breaks down AFCEC’s probable causes of USAF MILCON cost 
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premiums and the cost increases associated with each.  The fact that there are no 
equivalent data sets for a private industry project and a MILCON project limits the 
AFCEC study.  Therefore, the study compared historical unit costs from USAF MILCON 
to available private industry historical unit costs (Hartford 2012).  The HASC report and 
AFCEC study form the basis for continued research into the causes of MILCON cost 
premiums. 
Table 2: AFCEC Study Cost Premium Summary (Hartford 2012)  
Cost Premium % Increase 
Product: Type of Construction and Restrictive Specifications 10% 
Product: Energy and Sustainability Requirements 2% 
Product: AT/FP Requirements 2% 
Product: Facility Service Life Inconclusive 
Process: Base Security Requirements 5% 
Process: Project Planning and Definition Issues 3% 
Process: Contract Administrative Burdens 5% 
Process: Contracting Requirements – Socioeconomic Clauses 3% 
Process: Contracting Requirements – Business Protection Clauses 1% 
Process: Contracting Requirements – Labor Clauses 6% 
Process: Contracting Requirements – Bonding (Miller Act) Inconclusive 
Process: Contracting Requirements – Insurance  Inconclusive 
Process: Contracting Requirements – Quality Control Inconclusive 
 
Research supports the notion that MILCON costs more than equivalent private 
sector construction.  Additionally, interviews with industry experts confirm that, in 
general, MILCON costs more than equivalent private industry construction.  Table 3 
provides a summary of the causes of MILCON cost premiums according to previous 
research.  Most of the previous research has focused on, and faulted, policies or laws 
outside of the DoD or USAF’s span of control.  Analysis of the previous research 
validated the existence of MILCON cost premiums.  This research adds to the body of 
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knowledge relating to the causes of MILCON cost premiums by primarily examining 
internal causes. 
Table 3: Causes of MILCON Cost Premiums According to Previous Research 
Factor Influencing Cost Premiums 
Type 
(Internal/ 
External) 
Previous studies 
Pope 
(1990) 
112th 
Congress 
(2011) 
Hartford 
(2012) 
Additional administrative requirements Both    
Strict military standards Internal    
Contract and procurement restrictions External    
Davis-Bacon Act wage rates External    
Socioeconomic clauses/requirements External    
Construction type and restrictive 
specifications Internal    
Energy and sustainability requirements External    
Anti-terrorism/force protection 
requirements Both    
Base security requirements Both    
Project planning and definition issues Internal    
Government quality-assurance capacity Both    
 
Specific MILCON Cost Investigations 
In addition to research into the general costs of MILCON procurement, other 
studies have focused solely on singular, key, elements of MILCON execution.  
Researchers have suggested that the MILCON cost increases over private industry start 
with planning and programming.  Conference proceedings cited by Pope (1990, p. 41) 
state “the MILCON design and construction agent is forced . . . to manage cost to the 
Congressionally authorized and appropriated programmed amount”.  Managing 
MILCON projects to this programmed amount pushes the programmer to increase the 
estimate in order to ensure project success regardless of the number of years until 
construction or changes in material costs or economic conditions.  Additionally, once the 
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programmed amount is fixed, the “designer is urged to ‘design to budget’ since there is 
no motivation to return excess funds” (Pope 1990, p. 42).  This demonstrates how 
MILCON cost additions can begin in the early phases; however, cost premiums can 
continue into the design and execution of construction.  
Nielsen (2007) investigated how change orders during construction of MILCON 
projects affect overall performance.  He specifically investigated 31 MILCON projects 
and the data loaded into the Air Force civil engineer’s database, ACES.  The results of his 
research show errors in pre-construction activities, such as unforeseen site or 
environmental conditions, user changes, and design errors, are the most common causes 
of MILCON change orders.  Nielsen’s (2007) quantitative analysis determined most 
change orders were due to design deficiencies and user change requests with the fewest 
caused by value engineering proposals, exercised options, and unforeseen environmental 
site conditions.  Additionally, Nielsen (2007) found that USACE and NAVFAC had 
lower change order costs than AFCEC; however, he points out that the results are 
questionable due to inaccurate and incomplete data used for analysis.  Gannon et al. 
(2012) researched how the types and scope of change orders affected MILCON 
scheduling.  Their research showed changes resulted from Air Force/USACE driven 
contract modifications, definition and sequencing corrections, weather delays, hidden 
rework, and process learning.  The research shows that executing change orders late in 
construction execution causes inaccurate tracking of both schedule and costs in the time 
leading up to award of the modification as well as immediately afterward (Gannon et al. 
2012).  The results of both Gannon et al. (2012) and Nielsen’s (2007) studies suggest 
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MILCON project managers should ensure pre-construction activities, especially design 
reviews, are well executed to limit change orders and, therefore, limit cost overruns. 
Data Gathering and Analysis 
A combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies were utilized to 
determine the factors causing MILCON cost premiums.   Data inputs included the use of 
an extensive literature review, a single MILCON project case study, government and 
contractor expert interviews, a Likert-style survey, and geospatial and statistical analysis.  
The synergy of these data sources allowed the determination of MILCON cost premium 
causes and the development of this white paper.  This white paper does not, in general, 
present specific quantitative values for each MILCON cost premium. 
Case Study 
The case study was based on two weather shelters constructed at the same time, 
with the same basic requirements, by two different construction agents at Joint Base 
Elmendorf-Richardson (JBER), Alaska.  USACE constructed one weather shelter while 
the 673d Civil Engineer Group (CEG) with AFCEC constructed the other one.  In the 
end, the CEG weather shelter cost 27% less (~$7M) and took less than half the time to 
construct while meeting or exceeding all requirements.  To determine the causes of the 
cost and schedule differences, an analysis of contract documents, after action reports 
(AAR), and interview data occurred.   
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Interviews and Survey 
Semi-structured expert interviews were conducted with government personnel 
from contracting, civil engineering, and USACE who were familiar with MILCON and 
the case study projects.  Additionally, further interviews were conducted with contractors 
experienced in MILCON and private-sector construction.  The interviews utilized open-
ended questions to allow the respondents to mention causes of MILCON cost premiums 
or mitigation methods without guiding the discussion.  Finally, a 43-question Likert-style 
survey was developed based on discoveries made during the interviews and case study.  
A limited number of government and contractor experts rated the level of influence each 
factor has on MILCON cost premiums as: not at all, to a limited extent, to a moderate 
extent, to a large extent, or to a very large extent.  The respondents represented three 
demographics: USAF personnel, including civil engineers and contracting officers; 
USACE personnel; and contractors.  The results of the survey also linked back to specific 
contract requirement differences noted during the case study.   
Geospatial and Statistical Analysis 
Analysis of DBA wage rates required the use of geospatial and statistical analysis.  
The comparison of DBA wage rates at USAF installations with Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) average wages outside of the base quantified the hourly differences 
between MILCON and civilian wages.  Inferential statistics were used to describe the 
differences and validate the statistical significance.  Descriptive statistics were applied to 
analyze the case study’s cost and schedule differences.  Responses to the Likert-style 
survey were analyzed using descriptive statistics including non-parametric ranking and 
 50 
distribution analysis.  The combination of statistical and geospatial methods allowed 
some MILCON cost premiums to be quantified.  
Limitations 
As with all research, there are limitations to this study of MILCON cost 
premiums.  The lack of quantitative data is the largest limitation.  Since data related to the 
same facilities constructed on and off base is not available, it is not possible to do an 
exact comparison and factor analysis.  Additionally, contractors are not able to provide an 
equivalent estimate of costs for constructing a MILCON facility off base.  Finally, the 
USAF does not track any reduction in scope during pre-final bid negotiations in any 
database.  This means that if a bid comes back too high, the USAF does not document 
changes implemented to ensure the bid meets the programmed amount.  Results were 
determined from qualitative source data and expert opinion due to the lack of quantitative 
data.   
The use of a single case study makes the result difficult to generalize to all 
MILCON projects.  However, the case study presented a unique opportunity to analyze 
internal factors that affect cost between the standard process and a more innovative 
approach.  In this case, the unique dataset and validation with industry experts through 
surveys and interviews help overcome limitations to generalizability.  For expert 
validation, the small sample surveyed, and limited population of experts with general 
MILCON knowledge and experience with the specific case study, limited the statistical 
significance.  However, even with the limitations mentioned above, this white paper 
presents viable, researched, causes of cost premium as well as possible mitigation 
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strategies. All cost premium causes presented are only directly applicable to non-
contingency MILCON procurement. 
This white paper does not contain detailed information regarding the data or 
methodologies applied.  Detailed information is available in the full MILCON cost 
premium research thesis published in March of 2013.  The full thesis is available at 
www.DTIC.mil and is titled An Analysis of Cost Premiums and Losses Associated with 
USAF Military Construction by Daniel Blomberg.  The full thesis contains the survey 
distributed, the raw case study contract requirement differences, and statistical and 
geospatial analysis information. 
Cost Premium Causes & Mitigation Strategies 
This section contains the major factors shown to cause MILCON cost premiums 
from a USAF perspective.  While the survey contained 43 possible factors based on 
expert interviews and case study analysis, this section highlights the main cost premium 
causes and categorizes them into general themes.  Additionally, the cost premiums are 
broken into sections by the ability of the USAF to affect change.  The USAF controllable 
cost premiums include factors that cause additional costs but can be mitigated internally 
by the USAF.  The DoD controllable cost premiums contains factors that can be 
mitigated by working with other DoD entities such as USACE and NAVFAC.  Finally, 
the outside DoD control cost premiums contain factors that cannot be directly changed by 
the USAF or DoD but cause additional costs.  By breaking down cost premium causes 
into these categories, USAF engineers can focus their efforts on areas where change can 
be implemented. 
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USAF Controllable Cost Premiums 
This section contains cost premiums that can be controlled, mitigated, or affected 
by the USAF.  Each cost premium contains a description, limited analysis, and suggested 
mitigation strategies. 
Development of Overly Restrictive Requirements 
Description: The USAF develops requirements for execution by a, possibly 
separate, design and construction agent.  These requirements are sometimes above what 
is required or are not adapted to the facility environment.  This cost premium is also 
directly related to “stifling or not applying innovation” in this section and “selection of 
construction specifications” in the DoD controllable cost premiums section. 
Analysis: Survey and interview results indicated that most USAF engineers and 
contractors fault the construction agent for overly-prescriptive requirements.  However, 
further investigation showed that the USAF is partially at fault for the overly specific 
requirements.  Research found that the USAF required explicit materials in specific 
facilities based on commander discretion, squadron heritage, or a “that’s what we’ve 
always done” mentality.  Specifying these requirements adds additional costs to the initial 
construction as well as the life-cycle because it limits facility use.  While it appears that 
architectural standards do not add a significant cost, engineers must ensure that the 
standards are not based on the wants of a single person but rather a methodical, life-cycle 
cost conscious, process.  An example of this was the use of a low slope metal roof on the 
CEG weather shelter rather than the architecturally recommended built-up roof.  The 
built-up roof increased costs and limited construction methodology without any 
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advantage except for meeting the architectural standards.  Project managers must ensure 
the architectural standards do not limit construction practices unnecessarily.  
Additionally, analysis found that AFIs specify square footages for specific functions.  
While this is useful by not allowing functions to expand too much, engineers in cold-
weather climates mentioned that the square footage requirements sometimes do not allow 
enough space for all required functions and the appropriate amount of insulation.  In this 
case, the stringent requirement is hurting the life-cycle cost of the facility by increasing 
energy usage. Furthermore, the square footage and programming requirements have not 
been fully adapted to open floor plan technology or architecture. 
Mitigation: AFIs should either specify internal square footage rather than overall 
footprint or be updated to allow for square footage deviations based on environmental 
conditions.  Additionally, facility requirements for new bed-downs should be specified at 
an overall level, as broadly as reasonable, and restricted from local commander deviation.  
Finally, the USAF must not over-prescribe requirements to the design/construction agent 
for design-build projects.  The USAF should specify end-results and the functions 
required rather than material and methods.  Local base engineers should ensure 
architectural standards are not adding an unreasonable cost to facility acquisition. 
Selection of Acquisition Method Including a Failure to Balance Risk 
Description: Inappropriate selection of the acquisition method does not motivate 
the contractor to reduce costs or apply innovative techniques.  Also, the USAF does not 
gain cost savings through the selection of the execution or acquisition method because 
the balance of risk does not appear to vary based on the methods selected. 
 54 
Analysis of acquisition method: The literature review contained extensive 
background information regarding the acquisition methods available to USAF personnel.  
However, most MILCON projects are programmed and executed as firm fixed price 
contracts.  This has two main issues; first, contractors may be designing and constructing 
to the programmed amount rather than to meet the actual requirements (Pope 1990).  
Second, there is little incentive for construction agents, USAF engineers, or contractors to 
innovate or reduce costs since none of these stakeholders can use the savings.  If USAF 
personnel implemented firm fixed price with incentives, they could incentivize the 
contractor to reduce life-cycle costs rather than initial costs, thereby giving the 
government long-term savings while not affecting the contractor’s expected bottom line.  
The selection of acquisition method can help balance risk and motivate innovation.  
Additionally, DB cost savings are not as evident in MILCON procurement as private 
industry construction because all parties do not share the savings.  While the FAR 
currently disallows the outright sharing of savings, engineers can use savings from DB to 
award bid options, thereby increasing MILCON performance while not negatively 
affecting the contractor.  The CEG weather shelter demonstrated how cost savings could 
be used to fund bid options and resulted in an improved facility. 
Analysis of failure to balance risk: In private sector construction, risk shifts based 
on the execution and acquisition method (Kelleher and Walters 2009).  Shifting from 
design-bid-build to design-build shifts risk from the construction agent to the contractor.  
However, in MILCON procurement, sometimes the risk shifts so far toward the 
contractor that it causes cost premiums.  To avoid litigation, construction agents choose 
to specify every requirement possible even in DB execution.  To combat the additional 
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risk, contractors are forced to raise their prices.  This imbalance of risk directly affects 
construction costs.  A method that helps mitigate risk involves partnering with the 
contractor.  AARs for the CEG project lauded a partnership-oriented process as a large 
success in the CEG project that reduced cost while allowing for a more aggressive 
schedule.  Additionally, research by Johnson et al. (2012) codified how the USAF can 
partner with contractors within the confines of the FAR. 
Mitigation: The USAF should create simple guidelines to help engineers and 
contracting personnel select the correct acquisition method based on desired results.  
Additionally, the USAF should volunteer to test a variety of acquisition methods that 
reward reducing costs by sharing the savings.  Requesting this as a pilot study would 
provide the evidence required to adapt the FAR to allow for sharing of profit savings, 
thereby motivating the government and contractors to work together.  Furthermore, 
USAF engineers need to be aware that risk can be shifted based on the execution and 
acquisition method.  If the contract is not modified to reflect this shift in risk, then the 
selection was made in name only and no cost savings will be obtained.  USAF engineers 
should also work to partner with the contractor to balance risk and allow each party to 
help the other succeed. 
Stifling or Not Applying Innovation 
Description: MILCON construction agents write and regulate, sometimes 
unknowingly, innovation out of many construction projects, thereby requiring the use of 
older, more expensive, techniques and materials. 
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Analysis: The weather shelter AARs and interviews with contractors revealed a 
common theme that MILCON construction agents write requirements and contracts that 
directly limit innovation.  Two of the four factors rated as having a large influence on 
MILCON cost premiums fell directly into this innovation cost premium category.  
Additionally, outside research found that one of the three critical success indicators for 
design-build projects is the “adoption of innovative management approaches” (Lam et al. 
2008).  The CEG weather shelter project demonstrated how result-based RFPs allow for 
problem solving via innovative solutions.  Generally speaking, the prescriptive nature of 
the USACE weather shelter RFP limited the design and construction methods.  However, 
USACE stated that feedback from USAF representatives limited the design.  Examples of 
innovative features in the CEG weather shelter include simple things, such as sealed 
concrete flooring rather than vinyl, to more complicated changes, such as using electrical 
disconnects rather than installing all hazard-rated electrical infrastructure.  These changes 
saved money up-front in construction and reduced maintenance costs and did not affect 
the overall requirement for the facility.  Construction agents must work with their 
contractors rather than simply dismissing ideas that do not align to “the way it has always 
been done.”  Contractors have private industry experience and, therefore, are more likely 
to be aware of new construction techniques or suggest design changes that can improve 
facility functionality and maintainability or reduce costs. 
Mitigation: For DB MILCON projects, ensure RFPs are written in a results-based 
format that does not unnecessarily limit construction or design techniques.  Ensure USAF 
engineers work with the construction agent, end-users, and stakeholders to educate all 
individuals on requirements versus wants.  Work to change the “culture of no” by 
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partnering with contractors for solutions and listening to the suggestions.  Implement 
specification changes per “selection of construction specifications” coming up in the 
DoD controllable cost premiums section. 
Cost as a Schedule Metric 
Description: The value of the construction sets the allowed construction time. 
Analysis: Ribbon Cutter and/or Dirt Kicker metrics set the allowed construction 
time for USAF MILCON procurement based on the value of the construction project 
(673d Civil Engineer Group 2010).  For example, these metrics would have allowed 820 
days for the weather shelter project since it was over $20 million.  The CEG finished 15 
bays, two buildings, in just under 12 months while the USACE finished their seven bays 
in 27 months, including a delay for contaminated soil.  These metrics add substantial 
costs in terms of dollars expended paying the contractor, time without the constructed 
facility’s functionality, and administrative overhead supporting long duration projects.  
Additionally, these metrics reduce the ability for the government to negotiate.  In the 
private sector, owners can negotiate by granting more time for lower costs; for USAF 
MILCON, the contractors know the amount of time allowed and can bid accordingly.  
For DB execution, the contractor should be specifying the timeframe required; the USAF 
can then validate the timeframe based on the facility itself rather than a set metric.  For 
example, a large weather shelter can take less time to construct than a specialized data 
center regardless of the cost of each facility. 
Mitigation: Continue to adapt the schedule metrics.  The metrics can be adapted 
based on facility type, cost, and execution method rather than primarily on cost.  The new 
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Ribbon Cutter metrics are an improvement over Dirt Kicker, but the government needs to 
acknowledge that faster, proper, contractor execution can yield better results for all 
parties involved.  
Frequent Unforeseen Site Conditions 
Description: MILCON projects on brown sites, or previously disturbed earth, 
frequently encounter unforeseen site conditions, such as soil contamination, that require 
remediation before construction can continue.   
Analysis:  It is common to find soil contamination on or near the airfield.  Prior to 
construction, this contamination must be remediated.  The cost of remediation is not a 
cost premium because the same requirement exists in the private sector; however, the fact 
that it occurs after notice-to-proceed (NTP) causes the cost premium.  Contractors 
mentioned that for large brown site construction projects an environmental survey is 
executed prior to NTP or included in the DB contract.  Once NTP is issued, the 
contractor, and by proxy the government, have begun expending money.  If the project is 
placed on hold, such as during the USACE weather shelter project, the contractor is still 
paying for overhead and in some cases must pay his employees even though no 
construction is occurring.  This means during remediation the government is paying for 
construction that is not occurring as well as remediation costs.   
Mitigation: The USAF should fund companion projects to do geotechnical and 
environmental surveys for MILCON brown sites.  The up-front cost could easily reduce 
the overall construction cost of finding contamination or soil issues after NTP issuance.  
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Additionally, presenting the contractor with geotechnical information can allow for 
different facility designs during the proposal phase. 
Unique Attributes of MILCON Projects 
Description: USAF and USACE personnel believe that unique attributes of USAF 
MILCON projects are responsible for cost premiums.   
Analysis: In the expert survey, this factor ranked as the 1st and 6th most influential 
by USACE and USAF, respectively.  However, contractors ranked this factor the 29th 
most influential cost premium factor.  This disparity means that government engineers 
believe their projects have unique attributes compared to private industry, but these 
beliefs may be unfounded.  Additionally, this belief may cause government engineers to 
not accept commercial solutions that would work for MILCON.  For example, the use of 
a pre-engineered building (PEB) to construct a weather shelter was a difficult proposition 
for many government engineers.  However, the CEG weather shelter demonstrated that a 
design-build PEB can meet or exceed all military requirements while allowing the 
contractor to use standard commercial practices.  Although sometimes there are unique 
requirements, it is more likely that many MILCON facility features are the same as in the 
private sector.  For example, if an administrative facility contains a Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), the entire facility is not a unique 
administrative facility, only one portion.  Engineers must ensure they do not expand a 
single unique requirement to the entire facility.   
Mitigation: To mitigate this cost premium, USAF engineers and stakeholders 
must not over-specify their requirements.  Engineers and stakeholders must be aware of 
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the requirements for facility functions and not search for unique attributes of the military 
unit occupying the space.   
DoD Controllable Cost Premiums 
This section contains cost premiums that can be controlled, mitigated, or affected 
by the DoD.  Each cost premium contains a description, limited analysis, and suggested 
mitigation strategies. 
Parameterization of Execution Method 
Description: The USAF and its construction agents are not fully applying design-
build (DB) principles and thereby not gaining the performance and cost savings attained 
in the private sector; in some cases, MILCON procurement costs are higher than the 
classic DBB execution costs. 
Analysis: Government application of DB does not match private sector DB in 
terms of procedures or benefits; the government, as the owner and construction agent, 
remains heavily involved in the process including, in some cases, not allowing 
construction to commence until a design has been submitted and approved (Molenaar et 
al. 1999; Gannon et al. 2012).  In general, the government is adding additional parameters 
such as specifications, requirements, or oversight that do not allow for optimal DB 
performance.  In traditional DB execution, construction is on-going as the design gets 
finalized; for example, once the facility footprint has been specified and approved, 
earthwork can begin while the vertical portions are still being designed.  The requirement 
for design and construction in series rather than in parallel forces the project to match a 
DBB process with a single contractor and directly adds to costs by extending the 
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schedule.  The CEG weather shelter project allowed for an immediate start based on 
designs completed to that point.  On the other hand, USACE required a complete design 
package prior to construction.  The USACE policy demonstrates how construction agents 
can operate a DB project in methods suited for DBB.  Contractors and USAF personnel 
surveyed ranked USACE’s implementation of DB as the 4th and 6th most influential cost 
premium factor while USACE ranked it as the 12th.  However, USACE ranked the 
USAF’s implementation of DB as the 3rd most influential factor while contractors ranked 
it 18th and the USAF ranked it 31st.  These findings show disconnects between users, 
construction agents, and contractors.  Additionally, these results validate that MILCON 
DB projects are not being executed using standard DB procedures.  DB shifts the risk to 
the contractor and allows them to proceed faster and cheaper when design and 
construction occur in parallel and when contractors manage their own resources; 
MILCON contract policies limit or eliminate these benefits.   
Mitigation: Ensure all contract templates have been created using industry 
standard DB contracting mechanisms rather than DBB.  This includes making sure the 
contracts are requirements based rather than methods based and allow the contractor to 
manage their own design, schedule, and resources.  The over-restriction of DB execution 
converts the process into a DBB project executed by one contractor. 
Sub-factor: Submittal Management and Requirements 
Description: The submittal requirements and management system causes 
MILCON cost premiums. 
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Analysis: Based on interviews and survey data, the prescribed submittal system 
utilized by MILCON construction agents adds significant time and, therefore, costs to a 
MILCON project.  For the weather shelter projects, the USACE RFP specified that 
submittal approval would take at least 30 days once the contractor loaded the submittal 
into USACE’s custom software solution; contractors were also told that construction 
would be proceeding at risk if executed prior to submittal approval.  On the other hand, 
the CEG specified it would return submittals as soon as possible and only specified a 
form to be used as a cover sheet.  By working with the contractor, the CEG was able to 
help the contractor execute rapid approval for many elements.  Additionally, the USACE 
specified many submittals as approval required, where work cannot commence without 
approval, rather than for information.  In a DB project, there should not be very many 
“approval required” submittals since the contractor is responsible for a start-to-finish 
project that meets all requirements set out in the contract.  This extra layer of 
bureaucracy, with its very strict timelines, is another example of the parameterization of 
the DB execution method. 
Mitigation: Ensure all submittals required meet the expectations of those required 
for industry standard DB execution.  Remove the minimum amount of time to return a 
submittal and exchange it for a maximum amount of time or a time based on the type of 
submittal; for example, a full design will take longer to review than carpet swatches.  
Adapting the submittal policy will directly affect the misapplication of the execution 
process cost premium. 
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Sub-factor: Quality Control Requirements 
Description: Strict quality control (QC) requirements, beyond industry standards, 
add additional costs to MILCON projects. 
Analysis: The USACE and the CEG treated QC differently for their respective 
weather shelter projects.  The USACE implemented their standard QC and quality 
assurance process; the contract and RFP stated specific methods for ensuring quality.  
Additionally, the USACE required the contractor to employ one or more full-time 
personnel to solely act as QC.  In interviews, contractors mentioned that the need for a 
person solely tasked with QC is excessive.  On the other hand, the CEG partnered with 
the contractor to determine the best QC methods while still meeting USAF and industry 
requirements.  Based on contractor interviews, the CEG process more closely matches 
QC implementation found in private sector DB construction.  Construction agents must 
remember that the contractor is at risk during a DB project and is responsible for both the 
design and construction; this transfer of risk can allow deviations from USACE’s 
standard QC policies. 
Mitigation: Remove prescriptive QC requirements from DB RFPs and contracts.  
Require the contractor to propose and coordinate a QC plan with the government.  
Require the QC plan to meet industry standards and validate that key specifications have 
been attained. 
Selection of Construction Specifications 
Description: Overly prescriptive construction specifications increase the cost of 
MILCON dramatically over private sector construction. 
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Analysis: Based on the JBER weather shelter project contracts, as well as 
interview and survey data, most MILCON projects utilize method-based specifications 
(MBS).  The case study revealed 41 contract differences between USACE and CEG 
execution that directly related to construction specifications.  Additionally, three of the 
four cost premium factors rated as having a large influence on cost premiums directly 
relate to the selection of construction specifications.  All of the contractors surveyed 
mentioned that prescriptive methods and materials do not allow contractors to fully apply 
DB practices, be aggressive, or provide more economical solutions.  One respondent 
bluntly stated that “’don’t confuse reason with requirements’ is rampant and costly.”  For 
DB execution, the use of MBS limits how contractors can design and construct facilities.  
However, for DBB execution, where the construction agent is responsible for the design 
and specifications, the use of MBS can be appropriate.  Further research showed that 
MBS, end-result specifications (ERS), and performance-related specifications (PRS) can 
be used in combination to allow innovation in some areas while ensuring military 
standards in other areas.  Construction agents can apply multiple specification 
simultaneously to best meet the project’s needs.  Additionally, while looking through a 
thousand-page request for proposals (RFP), the use of templates which included MBS in 
multiple locations resulted in erroneous, or conflicting, specifications.   
Mitigation: DB MILCON projects should fully implement ERS and move toward 
PRS.  Additionally, they should incorporate requirements by standard reference rather 
than including a link to the reference as well as a MBS.  This allows industry standards to 
be included with ERS evaluation rather than industry standards with prescribed methods 
of execution that may vary from an updated industry standard.  Since the construction 
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agent sets some standards, the USAF must work with construction agents to impress the 
need for ERS rather than MBS. 
Construction Agent Fees 
Description: Initial project estimates do not always include the construction agent 
fee.  The agent fee is taken out of the project, and this, in turn, limits the scope of the 
project or requires additional funding to meet full project scope. 
Analysis:  All military construction agents charge a fee to manage a MILCON 
project.  This fee pays to cover litigation, inspection, administration, and engineer staff.  
While the fee itself is known and has been shown by the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be reasonable, construction agents have no desire to limit bidding or 
change orders.  Each cost increase or change order provides additional funding to the 
construction agent.  This means that problems during construction, design, or bidding can 
increase an agency’s budget.  The construction agent has agreed to perform the MILCON 
project based on the programmed amount and thus that should be the fee regardless of the 
bid.  Additionally, the USAF does not always gain its full due from the construction 
agent fee because base civil engineers may do their own inspection and oversight.  
Mitigation: First, ensure all project estimates include the construction agent fee.  
Second, work with USACE, NAVFAC, and AFCEC to set policy that the fee is based on 
the programmed amount, and that any deviations from that programmed amount do not 
increase or decrease the construction agent fee.  Finally, set policy that allows USAF 
engineers to work with construction agents to reduce the fee by providing construction 
inspection and/or administrative support. 
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Schedule Management 
Description: Construction agents, specifically USACE, require the use of non-
standard software to maintain the construction schedule.  This requirement results in the 
contractor maintaining schedules in multiple software programs and adds to the 
administrative costs. 
Analysis: This research validated findings by Gannon et al. (2012) by quantifying 
the schedule management cost premium as the 5th most influential cost premium from the 
contractor perspective.  However, USACE ranked it 36th out of 43 and USAF personnel 
ranked it 25th.  Additionally, contractors mentioned schedule management software in 
every interview conducted.  The software requirements for schedule management do not 
appear to integrate with industry-standard software solutions such as Microsoft Project.  
Therefore, the contractor ends up maintaining the schedule in a preferred software 
solution and providing updates to USACE through a specified solution.  For the JBER 
weather shelter projects, the CEG allowed the contractor to use a preferred software 
solution as long as it could meet certain requirements such as showing resource 
allocations and a critical path.  The CEG did not encounter any issues with this approach. 
Mitigation: Work with construction agents to remove the requirement for 
specified schedule management software.  Develop and implement ERS for schedule 
management while codifying how to show progress to the USAF and/or construction 
agent oversight. 
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Construction Agent Policies 
Description: Construction agents such as USACE, NAVFAC, and AFCEC have 
their own internal policies that can add to cost premiums.  Based on interview data, many 
of these non-standard policies come into effect at project closeout.  A specific example is 
the requirement for separate commissioning events for each major system. 
Analysis: Each construction agent has their own internal policies that govern the 
contractor’s responsibilities.  While some of these requirements generate individual cost 
premium factors, some of the more ambiguous elements fall into this cost premium 
category.  Multiple interviews and the CEG weather shelter AAR mentioned 
commissioning process policies.  Some construction agents require commissioning events 
for each major facility system.  This requires the contractor to pay for additional 
personnel to show up to different events.  The contractor passes these costs directly to the 
government.  Contractors and USAF engineers mention that having a combined 
commissioning event is sometimes appropriate and can save costs on all sides with the 
same end-result.  Other examples of internal policies include approval authorities for a 
variety of requests and specified timelines for information requests regardless of request 
scope.  In some cases, these rules vary not only by construction agent but also by the base 
or district. 
Mitigation: Task outside personnel to look into these types of additional rules and 
requirements and determine validity.  This could be a perfect application of a Lean or 
AFSO21 event where outside personnel can provide input on the policies.  Additionally, 
the USAF should request a funded lessons learned meeting, or “hot wash,” at project 
closeout with the construction agent and contractor where everyone should feel free to 
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bring up issues encountered or unproductive (non-value added) work accomplished 
throughout the project.  It can be difficult for personnel implementing the process to 
notice that a process is not adding value to the MILCON project; these mitigation 
strategies address the difficulty. 
Perception Management and Design and Construction Agent Selection 
Description: Negative perceptions about the processes and management style of 
the USACE causes MILCON cost premiums.  While negative perceptions also exist for 
NAVFAC and AFCEC, the perceptions were more pronounced for the USACE.  
Additionally, DoD directives specify the construction agent and in most cases it is not the 
USAF (AFCEC).  This specification directly affects the cost premiums associated with 
perception issues. 
Analysis of perception management: This cost premium is the most difficult to 
quantify.  Survey results showed that USAF personnel and contractors ranked the cost 
premium factor “USAF project through USACE” as the most influential factor while 
USACE ranked it 26th.  Additionally, contractors ranked the cost premium factor “USAF 
project through AFCEC (AFCEE)” as 6th most influential while USACE and USAF 
ranked it 21st and 25th, respectively.  This result shows that USACE and USAF have the 
perception they are not responsible for causing cost premiums while contractors feel the 
need to charge more than they would in the private sector since the project is for the 
military.  Additionally, during the technical evaluation for transferring construction agent 
from USACE to the USAF for the CEG weather shelter, a contractor specifically brought 
up, and codified, the “corps factor.”  The contractor stated that the supervision and 
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oversight brought to bear by USACE is significant compared to large corporate 
customers and other government agency customers (Moser 2009).  Additionally, multiple 
contractors stated that although the USACE has expressed a desire to operate 
construction projects similarly to the methods utilized off base, none of them had seen 
USACE actually apply these desires.  Furthermore, prime contractors have stated that 
subcontractors do not provide their best prices due to the additional requirements levied 
based on USACE involvement.  After speaking to USACE personnel, it is the 
government’s belief that there are no valid reasons for this perception; however, in the 
case of perception, the mere existence of it, regardless of reason, can add additional costs.  
Whether these costs are billed as additional administrative requirements, additional time 
for reviews, or additional costs to meet military standards does not matter if the basic 
requirement is “a USACE project costs more.”  The JBER weather shelter case study 
helps validate the existence of this perception-based cost premium since only internal 
factors could affect the price and schedule.  All published AARs stated that many 
performance gains were attained through the application of “outside the gate” 
construction techniques rather than a desire to apply those techniques.  
Analysis of DA/CA selection: One of the fastest ways to validate or mitigate cost 
premiums due to the use of the USACE is not to use them as the construction agent.  
While AFCEC is allowed to execute projects, permission is rarely granted.  Due to the 
requirement for USACE to execute projects throughout the U.S. for many different 
agencies, it has an extreme breadth of knowledge and is not necessarily vested in 
adapting its MILCON policies for a single client.  On the other hand, AFCEC can focus 
its large scale construction management solely on USAF MILCON.  This would allow 
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AFCEC to be more flexible with its contracts and work to mitigate MILCON cost 
premiums.  AFCEC could even be used to test different theories that could then be 
implemented by NAVFAC and USACE. 
Mitigation: The USACE needs to begin adopting policies previously mentioned in 
this white paper and publicize its changes.  Following that, the USACE needs to ensure 
that all districts are following the new policy rather than just acting in the status quo.  
Finally, USACE, NAVFAC, and the USAF need to partner with each other and 
contractors rather than always trying to blame one another.  Mitigating this perception 
issue could take many years before dividends are noticeable.  Additionally, advocate 
AFCEC as the construction agent for more MILCON projects.  Validate the request by 
detailing how AFCEC would like to work to mitigate MILCON cost premiums by 
experimenting with contract execution and acquisition changes.  Ensure that all parties 
understand the goal would be to share achievements with other construction agents 
without them having to deal with the additional burden from trying innovative 
techniques. 
Outside DoD Control Cost Premiums 
This section contains cost premiums that cannot be mitigated by the DoD or any 
of its entities.  These cost premiums require outside agencies to enact change; however, 
the DoD can present options and request changes to mitigate these cost premiums.  Each 
cost premium contains a description, limited analysis, and suggested mitigation 
strategies. 
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Anti-terrorism/Force Protection Requirements 
Description: DoD and government required anti-terrorism and force protection 
(AT/FP) specifications add additional cost to MILCON facilities compared to the private 
sector. 
Analysis: UFC 4-010-01 and AFI 10-245 require that MILCON facilities meet 
AT/FP requirements (Department of the Air Force 2003).  However, engineers can 
include AT/FP costs as a line item during project programming.  This helps mitigate the 
effect of costs associated with AT/FP.  Research found that although there is always an 
AT/FP requirement, the decision of which standard to apply based on facility occupancy 
varies.  For the JBER weather shelters, differing levels of AT/FP requirements were 
applied even though usage and location were similar.  This demonstrates the 
inconsistencies that can exist through the application of AT/FP requirements. 
Mitigation: This cost premium cannot be completely mitigated; however, the 
inclusion of an AT/FP line item during programming limits the effects on project scope.  
However, the AFI and DoD instructions should ensure that engineers can easily 
determine the AT/FP requirements for each facility; the current interpretation allows for 
gray areas that can change the facility cost.  
Federal Acquisition Regulations 
Description: The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) restricts and guides 
government procurement, including the MILCON program.  These restrictions and 
guidance add additional costs, administrative and otherwise, to MILCON execution. 
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Analysis: Overall, the respondents rated the FAR as moderately influencing 
MILCON cost premiums.  However, specific requirements, such as 8A and small-
business policies, as well as additional administrative requirements, were rated as more 
influential towards MILCON cost premiums.  Additionally, there are numerous FAR 
clauses included in some MILCON projects but not in others.  This disparity means that 
contractors must thoroughly investigate a contract’s RFP to ensure there are no 
additional, or abnormal, clauses.  This directly increases the administrative requirements 
in bidding and the maintenance of compliance documentation.  Additionally, the JBER 
case study demonstrated that FAR requirements can be inappropriately applied through 
the use of boilerplate templates.  Some FAR clauses, such as the use of Y2K compliant 
material, are left in when they should be removed while other clauses are not 
appropriately adapted, such as including the full text for cost plus acquisition on a firm 
fixed price contract.  While it is likely that the FAR, and many of its requirements, cannot 
be removed, the USAF can still limit FAR-based cost premiums by not including extra, 
unnecessary, FAR clauses.  Additionally, the JBER weather shelter case study 
demonstrated that many cost premiums exist regardless of FAR requirements.  Both 
shelters met FAR requirements but the costs still varied dramatically, thus demonstrating 
that internal requirements can heavily affect cost premiums. 
Mitigation: USAF engineers need to be aware of all FAR clauses included in their 
construction contracts.  Additionally, Congress should be notified of clauses that no 
longer serve a purpose so those can be removed from public law.  Contracting officers 
and specialists should select FAR clauses based on project requirements rather than a 
template containing “what was used last time.” 
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Socioeconomic Laws and Policies Including the Davis-Bacon Act 
Description: Socioeconomic laws and policies such as the Buy American Act, the 
Davis-Bacon Act (DBA), and small business policies directly add to the cost of MILCON 
above private industry.  Additionally, DBA prevailing wage rates do not accurately 
reflect the local area’s hourly wages and thereby directly increase MILCON costs. 
Analysis of socioeconomic laws and policies: Policies and public law passed by 
Congress directly add to the cost of MILCON procurement by requiring particular 
materials, workers, or company usage.  This research did not focus heavily on the 
socioeconomic policies affecting cost premium due to the inability of the USAF to 
directly mitigate theses costs.  However, multiple surveys and interviews directly 
mentioned that these types of policies increase the cost of MILCON procurement.  
Additionally, small business policy requirements have a flow-down clause where the 
prime and sub-contractors both have to meet usage requirements.  Validating compliance 
adds at best an administrative burden, and at worst adds costs by motivating small 
businesses to raise prices since they are guaranteed work. 
Analysis of DBA prevailing wage rates: Public law requires the use of DBA 
prevailing wage rates for all federal construction in excess of $2,000 (Department of 
Labor 2012).  A 1996 study demonstrated that these wage rates do not accurately 
represent the local area’s wage rates (United States Government Accountability Office 
2011).  Additionally, a recent study of USAF bases found that the DBA wage rates are 
114% and 118% of the local area’s hourly wage rate for carpenters and electricians, 
respectively (Chapter IV).  Since labor is generally 30% of a construction’s project costs, 
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these wage rates can directly affect the overall cost of MILCON projects (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2011). 
Mitigation: Sponsor additional research to quantify the cost premiums associated 
with each socioeconomic policy.  Following that, use the data to advocate that Congress 
change or adapt socioeconomic policies.  Specifically, advocate that Congress adapt 
DBA wage rates to more accurately reflect the surrounding area’s wage rates.  If 
required, sponsor additional research to exactly quantify the costs to the Air Force due to 
DBA prevailing wage rates for use in proposing cost saving measures. 
Factors Shown Not to Cause Cost Premiums 
This section contains factors initially believed to cause MILCON cost premiums 
but were determined not to cause cost premiums or only cause a very limited amount of 
cost premium.  This section is included to help guide and scope future research.  
Research found that safety requirements in EM 385-1-1, the USACE safety manual, do 
not cause additional cost premiums.  This is likely because these safety requirements 
match OSHA requirements closely and are also heavily utilized outside of MILCON 
procurement.  Additionally, project signage requirements do not represent a MILCON 
cost premium.  Although the USACE prescribes exact signage specifications for the 
construction site, this cost is negligible for a MILCON project since private industry 
utilizes similar signs.  Finally, the government requirement for warranty performance 
bonds was shown not to cause noticeable MILCON cost premiums.  Based on these 
findings, USAF engineers should implement EM 385-1-1, in whole or part, on all 
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contractor construction projects rather than attempting to create and implement their own 
non-standard safety specifications. 
Summary of Cost Premium Cause Categories 
The previous sections have discussed in detail the causes of MILCON cost 
premiums.  Table 4 summarizes the findings and highlights the agencies that can 
implement changes to address each cost premium.  Categories that cannot be controlled 
by any DoD entity have a level of control of “external.”  Additionally, Table 4 lists 
previous cost premium studies that have also faulted these cost premium causes.  Based 
on interview and survey data, mitigation efforts should focus first on the 10 items 
highlighted with an asterisk (*) due to their larger influence on cost premiums.  
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Table 4: Summary of Cost Premiums Cause Categories 
Cost Premium Cause Category 
Level of 
Control 
Previous Studies 
Pope 
(1990) 
112th 
Congress 
(2011) 
Hartford 
(2012) 
Development of overly restrictive 
requirements* USAF    
Selection of acquisition method including a 
failure to balance risk* USAF    
Stifling or not applying innovation* USAF    
Cost as a schedule metric USAF    
Frequent unforeseen sight conditions USAF    
Unique attributes of MILCON projects* USAF    
Parameterization of the execution method* DoD    
Selection of construction specifications* DoD    
Construction agent fees DoD    
Schedule management policies* DoD    
Construction agent policies DoD    
Perception management including 
construction agent selection* DoD    
Anti-terrorism/force protection  External    
Federal Acquisition Regulations* External    
Socioeconomic laws and policies including 
the Davis-Bacon Act* External    
Future Research 
The AFCEC can help enable future research into MILCON cost premiums by 
working to gather and provide data for researchers.  To fully investigate MILCON cost 
premiums, the AFCEC must begin gathering data immediately and expect results in 3 to 
5 years due to the MILCON process.  Some of the key data points that should be 
collected include: 
• Initial programming estimate 
• Initial bid, even if it is unofficial 
• Initial project scope (less broad than the 1391 (programming document) but 
more broad than a statement of work) 
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• Any scope changes implemented to meet cost restrictions (items such as the 
removal of parking lots, work moved to other projects, removal of interior 
walls) 
• Schedule information including initial estimated time to completion, 
contractor’s schedule used for bidding, and final completion date 
• Estimated life-cycle cost at initial bid 
While the current software solutions cannot track all of this information; the AFCEC can 
track this information as part of the move to asset management based facility 
maintenance and procurement.  Tracking the information mentioned above, in addition to 
the current MILCON data, would allow for quantitative MILCON research. 
The AFCEC should also advocate to be the construction agent for MILCON 
projects.  Proper coordination with the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) would 
allow AFCEC to select an engineer from a given base to be involved in the execution of a 
MILCON project, including implementing adaptations to attempt to reduce cost 
premiums, with a follow-on assignment to AFIT to execute cost premium research based 
on the MILCON project just completed, and finally ending up at AFCEC to implement 
changes.  This series of events would allow AFCEC to take an asset management 
approach to MILCON costs and groom subject matter experts.  Additionally, this 
approach would allow for experimentation rather than case study analysis.  Finally, the 
AFCEC can enable future MILCON cost premium research by continuing to sponsor 
thesis-level research efforts.  Engaging with AFIT would allow for low-cost research 
streams while keeping MILCON cost premiums at the forefront of leader’s minds.  
Future research exists in the form of analysis of public laws, such as quantifying the 
effects Davis-Bacon Act wage rates, all the way to doing a large scale survey of involved 
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stakeholders to quantify qualitative cost premiums.  This research project provides a 
starting point for many future research streams. 
Conclusions 
There are cost premiums associated with MILCON procurement.  These cost 
premiums reduce the overall performance of MILCON by frequently requiring the scope 
of a project to be reduced to meet budgetary restrictions.  Additionally, the removal of 
elements of a project, such as parking and energy efficient products, due to budget 
limitations decreases the life-cycle performance of a facility.  This white paper 
documented 15 overarching, interconnected, factors shown to cause cost premiums.  
Addressing any number or elements of these factors will start reducing cost premiums 
and thereby increase MILCON performance.  Engineers should understand that a request 
to de-scope a project does not mean that the initial estimate was poorly executed, but 
rather that cost premiums exist and should be addressed.  The USAF needs to think about 
MILCON projects from a final use, or end-result, perspective rather than a “what is 
wanted right now” view.  In a fiscally conservative environment, engineers will begin to 
accept good enough rather than perfect; on the other hand, reducing MILCON cost 
premiums could allow engineers to accept the right product with the correct quality.  
MILCON cost premiums directly affect the ability for the USAF to procure new 
facilities, remove dilapidated infrastructure, and ultimately execute its combat mission.  
MILCON cost premiums take away from “tip-of-the-spear” activities without gaining any 
benefits in terms of facility performance.  Regardless of the fiscal environment, the 
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USAF should begin reducing excess construction costs caused by policy rather than 
requirement. 
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III. Journal Article: Discovery of Internal and External Factors Causing Military 
Construction Cost Premiums 
The journal article presented in this chapter was submitted for publication in the 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management.  At the time of thesis completion, 
the journal article was not yet accepted or rejected.  This journal article presents the 
results of the MILCON cost premium case study and survey from a more general 
perspective.  While the content has not been changed, technical adaptations have 
occurred for inclusion in this thesis.  Further support and information regarding the 
content contained in this article is available in Appendix A and Appendix B.   
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Abstract 
Each year the United States invests $30 billion in federal construction.  Military 
construction (MILCON) represents 40%, $12 billion, of that capital investment.  This 
study confirmed the existence of MILCON cost premiums compared to private sector 
construction through an analysis of existing research.  Then this study evaluated two 
nearly identical projects and used expert interviews and surveys to determine which 
factors influence the cost premiums.  In addition to identifying 28 factors that moderately 
or largely influence cost premiums, five overarching cost premium themes emerged: 
failing to balance risk, additional public-sector requirements, stifling or not applying 
innovation, selection of construction specifications, and parameterization of the execution 
process.  Additionally, once complete, two nearly identical projects differed by over a 
year of construction time and $7 million in spite of the contract requirement similarities.  
Research frequently cites federal laws and policies as the primary cost premium driver; 
however, this research demonstrated that internal construction agent policies also cause 
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increased cost premiums.  Mitigating the causes of internal cost premiums could improve 
public-sector construction cost performance. 
Key Words (Subject Headings) 
Assets; Contract management; Construction Costs; Construction management; 
Design/build; Government; Military Engineering; Procurement 
 
Introduction 
In 2010 and 2011, the United States spent over $30 billion for federal construction 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2012).  For fiscal year (FY) 2013, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) requested almost $12.5 billion for capitalized military construction (MILCON); 
however, due to budgetary constraints, the DoD only received authorization for $6.5 
billion of MILCON (112th Congress 2011; 112th Congress 2013).  The MILCON 
program represents a large portion of federal construction; therefore, excess money 
expended due to cost premiums represents money that is not available for other programs.  
Additionally, as a result of the near 50% reduction in authorized MILCON, engineers 
need to improve the cost performance of the MILCON program. 
To improve construction performance in terms of life-cycle costs, schedule, and 
final product received, military engineers implement industry best practices such as 
design-build execution and asset management principles.  One of the twelve facets of 
asset management in facility execution is using innovative contracting procedures to form 
partnerships rather than simply relying upon low-bid for contractor selection (Cotts et al. 
2010).  Innovative contracting requires selecting the proper procurement route for each 
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project rather than using the same procurement method, the comfortable method, for 
every project, and that can be difficult for both military and public sector engineers 
(Lædre et al. 2006).  The public sector followed private industry in embracing design-
build construction; now it must incorporate asset management thinking into the entire 
process of facility procurement (Molenaar et al. 1999; Gannon et al. 2012).  
Objectives 
This paper presents the results of an investigation into USAF MILCON 
procurement cost premiums.  This investigation confirmed that MILCON costs exceed 
private industry and then investigated possible mitigation strategies for reducing 
excessive cost premiums.  Meeting this goal required a three-fold approach.  First, 
MILCON and private industry costs were identified and analyzed through existing 
literature.  Second, facility construction acquisition and execution methods were 
explored.  Finally, a case study was performed using two MILCON projects.  The study 
examined two construction projects with the same requirements, executed using different 
procurement methods.  Presented here are several factors that influence MILCON cost 
premiums, which provides valuable insight to both DoD and private construction 
engineers and contract administrators in all construction industries. 
Background and Literature 
Additional rules and regulations levied on public construction, including that done 
by the military, make public construction unique.  First, nearly all federal construction 
must follow the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) codified as Chapter 1 of Title 48 
of the Code of Federal Regulation (Federal Acquisition Regulation 2005).  Public law 
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defines military construction as “development, conversion, or extension of any kind 
carried out with respect to a military installation. MILCON includes construction projects 
… costing $750,000 or more” (Department of the Air Force 2010).  In addition to the 
explicit definition of MILCON projects, the U.S. government also limited which 
construction agencies may execute MILCON; DoD Directive 4270.5 dictates that, with 
few exceptions, the “Department of the Air Force shall use the services of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (USACE) or the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) 
for design and construction of the annual military construction program” (Department of 
Defense 2005).  With USACE and NAVFAC concurrence, the Air Force can execute a 
limited number of projects through the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) 
(Department of the Air Force 2010).  In October 2012, AFCEC was formed with the 
merger of as the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) and the 
Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (AFCESA); this paper uses the new title of 
AFCEC.  This study investigated if the policies of the selected design and construction 
agent cause cost premiums for Air Force MILCON projects.  Additionally, due to federal 
restrictions and policies, many more stakeholders exist in USAF MILCON procurement 
than in standard industry construction.  The end-user of a project can be one or more on-
base organizations; the owner, a civil engineer squadron; the design and construction 
agent, USACE, NAVFAC, or AFCEC; the contractor; and Congressional leaders, who 
dictate many social and economic policies.  The number of stakeholders, with differing 
interests, makes MILCON procurement a complicated endeavor with many facets that 
can cause cost premiums.   
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Military Construction Cost Premiums 
Anecdotal evidence frequently supports the notion that costs associated with 
MILCON procurement are higher than those in the private sector.  Recent efforts to 
confirm the existence of cost premiums associated with MILCON execution include a 
qualitative study by Pope (1990) in which he compared MILCON to private 
industry/commercial construction and showed that military construction costs more than 
private sector construction.  In 2011, faced with austere budget conditions, the House 
Armed Services Committee (HASC) noted that an assessment of construction costs found 
a 25% to 40% unit cost difference between MILCON costs and comparable facility 
construction in the commercial sector (112th Congress 2011).  Following a request from 
the HASC, AFCEC codified Air Force cost premiums and found a 37% cost premium for 
USAF MILCON based on a comparison of historical costs for similar building types 
(Hartford 2012).  Table 5 lists the factors responsible for MILCON cost premiums based 
on the previous studies.  Additionally, the table indicates whether the factor can be 
controlled by the DoD (internal) or is based on requirements from another entity 
(external), such as Congress.  While all three studies confirm the existence of cost 
premiums, there are variations in the factors shown to influence the premiums.  
Furthermore, many of the factors blamed for cost premiums are outside the control of the 
DoD.  These studies serve to confirm the existence of MILCON cost premiums when 
compared to private industry construction procurement; however, many of the factors 
addressed cannot be controlled or changed by the DoD. 
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Table 5: Factors Shown to Influence Cost Premiums Based on Previous Research 
Factor Influencing Cost Premiums 
Type 
(Internal/ 
External) 
Previous studies 
Pope 
(1990) 
112th 
Congress 
(2011) 
Hartford 
(2012) 
Additional administrative 
requirements Both    
Strict military standards Internal    
Contract and procurement restrictions External    
Davis-Bacon Act wage rates External    
Socioeconomic clauses/requirements External    
Construction type and restrictive 
specifications Internal    
Energy and sustainability 
requirements External    
Anti-terrorism/force protection 
requirements Both    
Base security requirements Both    
Project planning and definition issues Internal    
Government quality-assurance 
capacity Both    
Construction Execution and Acquisition 
Extensive research has investigated construction execution and acquisition 
methods for private industry, public industry, and MILCON procurement.  These studies 
focused on private industry best practices such as relational contracting, schedule 
performance, and design-build procurement methods (Johnson et al. 2012; Rosner et al. 
2009; Hale et al. 2009; Molenaar et al. 1999).  While public construction strives to meet 
the performance achieved by private industry, it has to do so in a methodical way to limit 
risk and meet regulatory requirements. 
In private industry, many execution and acquisition methods are available ranging 
from design-bid-build and design-build to construction manager and private-public-
partnerships (Kelleher and Walters 2009).  However, MILCON is restricted to limited 
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methods of execution, which are typically, traditional design-bid-build (DBB) or design-
build (DB) (AFCEE 2008).  Public-sector construction projects, including MILCON, 
traditionally used the DBB method where an architect-engineer firm creates a design and 
a separate contractor constructs the facility (AFCEE 2008).  However, starting in 1996, 
public-sector engineers began following private industry and implementing DB execution 
where a single contractor takes the project from design through construction completion 
(Molenaar et al. 1999; Rosner et al. 2009).  A 2008 study of 835 USAF MILCON 
projects determined that DB execution resulted in better performance for complicated 
construction endeavors (Rosner et al. 2009).  Additionally, results published in 2009 for 
U.S. Navy MILCON living quarters showed a statistically significant improvement in 
reduction of cost and schedule growth as well as overall construction time (Hale et al. 
2009).  However, to reduce the risk of inadequate facilities, the public-sector has heavily 
restricted the use of DB.  While research into public-sector DB projects has shown that 
limiting the number of bidders based on their qualifications is most effective, portions of 
the FAR limit the number of qualifications-based restrictions that can be used (Molenaar 
et al. 1999; Federal Acquisition Regulation 2005).  Finally, Gannon et al. (2012) found 
that USACE DB policy forced contractors to commit to a schedule and cost within the 
first 2 months of a project although it takes 8 to 11 months to reach the 100% design 
milestone.  Consequently, contractors charge more to limit their risk due to changes in the 
final design.  While public-sector construction strives to implement private-industry DB 
procurement, some significant differences exist.  
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Research Methods 
Research into MILCON cost premiums is a qualitative and quantitative endeavor.  
An evaluation of research literature confirmed the existence of MILCON cost premiums.  
Following this confirmation, methodologies were selected based on their appropriateness 
for analyzing the available data and producing results that limit threats to internal and 
external validity.  A unique case study, including its reports and contract documents, 
identified internal causes of cost premiums.  Following the case study, interviews and 
surveys identified additional causes and validated and quantified the cost premiums.  This 
section details research methods related to the case study, interviews, and survey. 
Weather Shelter Case Study 
Two projects constructed during the same time frame at Joint Base Elmendorf-
Richardson (JBER) near Anchorage, Alaska, presented a unique opportunity to analyze 
factors that influence MILCON cost premiums.  This opportunity was unique for several 
reasons.  First, the two projects had the same initial requirement: construct a 7-bay 
weather shelter.  A weather shelter is a basic shelter for aircraft and personnel during 
maintenance, fueling, and arming operations.  Figure 5 presents a general single-line 
diagram of the functional areas required in both weather shelters.  Both weather shelters 
contain seven hangar bays; a support area; ancillary support spaces for building 
mechanical, communications, and fire protection systems; restrooms; and pass through 
access (673d Civil Engineer Group 2009; U.S. Army Engineer District, Alaska 2008).  
Second, the construction agents executed the projects via different contract and oversight 
methods.  The construction agents varied methods based on internal policies, personnel 
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experience, and expected costs.  Finally, since both projects occurred at the same location 
using MILCON authorized funds, they were subject to the same set of rules and 
regulations.  This limited the number of variables that could cause widely different cost, 
schedule, and performance results.  A single case study is appropriate because the ability 
to analyze two public-sector projects with the same requirements, but different methods 
of execution, is a unique and normally inaccessible phenomenon (Ellram 1996).  This 
case studied enabled research into internal cost premium factors rather than the same 
external factors identified by previous research.   
 
Figure 5: Layout of 7-bay Weather Shelter 
 
Qualitative data, after action reports (AAR), interviews with engineers from the 
673 Civil Engineer Group (CEG) and USACE Alaska District, and contract documents 
were analyzed to determine the factors that affected each project’s cost performance.  
Three different AARs were analyzed to isolate common factors.  Additionally, 
quantitative data, including cost estimates and actual costs, were available for each of the 
projects.   
Interview & Survey 
Semi-structured interviews with government and contractor experts in MILCON 
construction added validity to the case study findings.  A purposive sample was chosen 
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due to the limited sample size and quantity of the experts with the requisite weather 
shelter and general MILCON knowledge.  The interviewers gained insight to develop 
mitigation strategies and determine factors that could cause cost premiums.  The 
interviewer asked government employees for their opinion on policies that cause cost 
premiums as well as changes implemented to address cost premiums.  Additionally, the 
interviewer asked contractors about differences between MILCON and private sector 
construction processes and policies.  A survey was developed based on common factors 
from the interviews as well as additional factors from the JBER MILCON case study.   
The survey contained 33 Likert-style questions relating to factors that could cause 
cost premiums on all MILCON projects and 10 questions related to the JBER weather 
shelters specifically.  The survey asked respondents to rate each factor’s level of 
influence on MILCON cost premiums as:  
• not at all 
• to a limited extent 
• to a moderate extent 
• to a large extent 
• to a very large extent   
The survey respondents represented three demographic groups: USACE Alaska District 
engineers and contract specialists, USAF civil engineers and contracting officers, and 
contractors with both MILCON and private industry experience.  The results of the 
survey rated the level of influence different factors, including policy and construction 
agent variations, have on MILCON cost premiums.  The low number of available 
respondents, 18 in total, required the use of non-parametric descriptive statistics.  The 
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responses were ranked from most to least influential for each demographic group.  If 
multiple factors had the same average level of influence, each factor received the same 
rank.  Additionally, a weighted average for each factor was calculated by averaging each 
factor’s level of influence within each demographic group; this weighted averaged 
provided an overall level of influence rank for each factor.  The weighted average 
mitigated the effects of having a varying number of respondents from each demographic.  
Integration of the case study, interviews, and surveys limits threats to validity and permits 
limited generalization of the results. 
General Results 
Weather Shelter Construction Comparison 
Although engineers initially programmed both weather shelters to meet the same 
requirements, the construction techniques, cost, and schedule performance all varied 
widely.  The USACE constructed shelter A represents a standard MILCON DB project.  
Contractors bid on the project based on a statement of requirements and request for 
proposal (RFP) developed by the USACE Alaska District.  The CEG constructed shelter 
B by developing a statement of work and using the U.S. General Services Administration 
(GSA) Schedules Program and eBuy to procure a DB pre-engineered building (PEB) with 
installation.  Both solicitation processes allowed a “best value” based contract award 
(GSA 2010).  In the end, the contractor designed and constructed shelter A using standard 
construction practices including concrete masonry unit (CMU) walls and a built-up roof 
system.  Shelter B utilized PEB construction practices including a very low slope metal 
roof, insulated metal panels, and steel support structures.  The more costly shelter took 
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longer to construct and thus far did not result in better performance in terms end-user 
needs, facility performance, or maintainability.  Overall, both facilities perform their 
mission satisfactorily, but the procurement method, cost, and schedule varied 
considerably.   
Construction Results Differences 
 Although the requirement for the two weather shelters was the same, shelter A 
cost $25.8 million and took just over 27 months to complete while shelter B cost only 
$18.9 million and was completed in 12 months.  However, shelter A encountered 
contaminated soil that ended up costing 2 months of construction time.  Table 6 contains 
a description of the work performed, the costs for each shelter, and the percent difference 
in costs.  As shown, all elements of the PEB weather shelter (shelter B) cost less except 
for the 480V alternating current (AC) power system.  While the two projects began with 
the same requirements, shelter B cost 27% less and took less than half the time to 
construct when compared to shelter A.  Additionally, for both projects the programmed 
amounts, government estimates, were the same at $21.4 million.  The next portion of this 
study investigated the cause of these differences. 
Table 6: Weather Shelter Cost Comparison 
Work Description Shelter B Cost 
Shelter A 
Cost % Diff 
Shelter Construction & Site Work $16,088,586 $21,932,667 73% 
Design Services & Insurance $1,240,478 $2,135,132 58% 
270V DC Power $461,267 $683,668 67% 
480V AC Power $604,988 $490,678 123% 
Compressed Air System $144,665 $225,879 64% 
Hangar Floor Coating $193,837 $206,072 94% 
Interior Painting $142,730 $143,440 100% 
Total $18,876,551 $25,817,536 73% 
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Contract Analysis 
While the AARs identified many process requirement differences between the 
two projects, this study used the source contract documents to determine requirement 
differences.  Using the request for proposal (RFP) and statement of work (SOW) allowed 
for an unbiased look into construction policy variations to determine if there were 
differences that caused cost deviations.  Both the RFPs reference additional documents 
such as Unified Facility Codes (UFC); industry standards, such as National Electric 
Code; and military requirements, such as Air Force Instructions (AFI) and Engineering 
Technical Letters (ETL).  The differences between the contract requirements were 
categorized in two ways.  First, the difference was qualified as either a similar, but not 
the exact same, requirement in both projects or a requirement that does not exist in one of 
the two projects.  An example of the former is requiring floor covering but specifying 
different types.  Following that, a determination of the level of difference was qualified 
based on expert opinion as a minimal difference in requirement, a difference in 
requirements, or an extreme difference in requirements.  Items that existed only in one 
project were automatically rated as an extreme difference. 
The 1,009-page shelter A RFP is a consolidated RFP, SOW, and contract 
administration document.  On the other hand, shelter B released three documents, the 
RFP, SOW, and contractor administrative requirements, totaling 161 pages via the GSA 
system.  Table 7 states the number of contract requirement differences between the two 
shelters.  In addition to quantifying the requirement differences in each contract, the 
AARs highlight fundamental process differences. Each overarching cost premium theme 
contains discussion of the process differences.   
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Table 7: Summary of Contract Requirement Differences 
Difference Quantity 
Similar requirement, minimal difference 31 
Similar requirement, difference 35 
Similar requirement, extremely different 5 
Requirement only in one contract, extremely 
different 
46 
USACE more stringent 81 
CEG more stringent 3 
Expert Survey 
The expert survey was completed by nine personnel from USACE, Alaska 
District, five USAF personnel representing the CEG and Contracting Squadron, and four 
contractors representing experience with four different companies that have executed 
MILCON.  Table 8 summarizes the results for any factors rated as moderately or largely 
influencing cost premiums.  In addition to the factors presented in Table 8, another 15 
factors only influence MILCON cost premiums “to a limited extent” and one factor has 
no influence on cost premiums.  The table also presents the response weighted average 
and quantifies how many of the contract requirement differences relate to each factor.  
Finally, the table provides the overall rank based on level of influence and the rank for 
each demographic.  Eighty-three percent of the 102 contract differences linked to the 
survey fell into the moderately or largely influential categories.  The factors that have 
“specific” for their “applies to” can be applied only to the JBER weather shelter projects; 
on the other hand, the “general” factors can be applied to the weather shelters and most 
other MILCON projects.  The factors listed in Table 8 were combined with the contract 
requirement differences, interview data, and open-ended questions at the end of the 
survey to generate overarching themes regarding cost premiums. 
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Table 8: Moderately & Largely Influential MILCON Cost Premium Factors 
Applies 
To Factor 
Influence 
on 
MILCON 
Premiums 
Weighted 
Avg. 
Value 
# Contract 
Rqmt 
Differences 
Ranking 
C
on
tr
ac
to
r 
U
SA
C
E 
U
SA
F 
O
ve
ra
ll 
Specific CMU vs insulated metal panels for hangar bay walls Large 4.056 1 2 8 2 1 
General USAF project through USACE Large 4.052 0 1 25 1 2 
Specific 
100% hazard rated electrical systems in the hangar bays 
versus a de-energized system Large 4 1 2 5 3 3 
Specific Built up low slope roof versus metal panels Large 3.667 1 4 5 5 4 
General 
Unique attributes of USAF project vs private industry with 
similar end-use requirements Moderate 3.467 2 29 1 6 5 
General USACE implementation of design-build execution Moderate 3.43 7 4 12 6 6 
General Quality control requirements set by the government Moderate 3.411 9 8 7 6 7 
General Oversight on contractor by USACE/NAVFAC Moderate 3.389 1 8 19 3 8 
General Prescriptive design requirements rather than code references Moderate 3.306 23 16 4 15 9 
General Military design standards/specifications Moderate 3.259 4 18 2 15 10 
General FAR: 8A/small-business policies Moderate 3.175 1 18 9 6 11 
Specific Direct digital controls for all HVAC components Moderate 3.139 1 4 19 25 12 
General USAF project through AFCEE Moderate 3.139 0 8 19 12 12 
General Submittal process (administration/# of submittals) Moderate 3.115 14 8 27 6 14 
General Restrictions placed on construction methods Moderate 3.096 0 18 12 6 15 
General FAR: Administrative requirements Moderate 3.058 4 8 16 21 16 
General USAF implementation of design-build execution Moderate 3.05 0 18 3 31 17 
General Restrictions placed on designs Moderate 3.046 1 16 12 15 18 
Specific 
Additional capacity required in fire alarm system above and 
beyond current building scope Moderate 3 1 18 11 15 19 
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Applies 
To Factor 
Influence 
on 
MILCON 
Premiums 
Weighted 
Avg. 
Value 
# Contract 
Rqmt 
Differences 
Ranking 
C
on
tr
ac
to
r 
U
SA
C
E 
U
SA
F 
O
ve
ra
ll 
General Submittal timeline (time for approval/rejection) Moderate 2.974 1 8 30 14 20 
Specific 
Schedule management requirements required by USACE 
versus CE squadron Moderate 2.917 2 4 34 25 21 
General LEED for new construction requirements Moderate 2.896 2 18 12 21 22 
Specific Internal roof drains versus gutters Moderate 2.861 1 18 17 25 23 
Specific 
Inhabited vs low-occupancy anti-terrorism/force protection 
standards requirements Moderate 2.806 1 8 31 25 24 
General Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Moderate 2.758 2 27 9 31 25 
General Design review process Moderate 2.739 4 27 19 21 26 
Specific Requirement to develop test hangar concrete slabs Moderate 2.694 1 8 39 25 27 
General 
Fixed programmed amounts (allowed project cost) early in 
project development Moderate 2.528 0 40 19 12 28 
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Results: Overarching Cost Premium Themes 
The analysis of survey results, interviews, and case study data revealed five major 
overarching themes that influence cost premium which are shown in Table 9.  Table 9 
also shows the number of survey factors and contract requirement differences applying to 
each theme.  The survey factors and contract differences can fall into multiple themes.  
These data were combined with the interview and open-ended survey responses to 
provide the full analysis of each theme. 
Table 9: Cost Premium Themes 
Theme # Survey Factors 
# Contract 
Rqmt 
Differences 
Failing to Balance Risk 14 45 
Additional Public-sector Requirements 10 18 
Stifling or Not Applying Innovation 9 20 
Selection of Construction Specifications 11 41 
Parameterization of the Execution 
Process 
10 39 
Failing to Balance Risk 
The selection of acquisition and execution method, such as DB and FFP, directly 
affects the balance of risk between the contractor and construction agent.  Shifting from 
DBB to DB shifts risk from the construction agent to the contractor (Lam et al. 2008).  
However, in MILCON procurement, the risk is sometimes shifted so far toward the 
contractor that it causes cost premiums.  In private industry construction, the balancing of 
risk minimizes cost and enables the contractor to operate in parallel.  The interview and 
open-ended survey question revealed that some construction agents are litigation adverse; 
therefore, they specify everything possible in their contracts.  Contractors price projects 
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more costly due to the additional requirement to validate the design and construction 
against the abundance of specifications and regulations.  Forty-five contract differences 
and 14 cost premium factors fall into the theme of imbalanced risk. 
The most telling example of an imbalanced risk cannot be quantitatively 
validated, but the perception appears to cause cost premiums.  Contractors stated that the 
most influential cost premium factor is the construction agent and, in this case, the 
military construction agents drive cost increases.  However, survey result shows that 
construction agents perceive that they are not responsible for causing cost premiums 
while contractors feel the need to charge higher prices for MILCON than private sector 
projects.  The ability to implement changes to mitigate this cost premium falls within the 
realm of the DoD.  In this case, even if there is no quantifiable reason for the cost 
premium to exist, the military should address the perception issue and attempt to mitigate 
this cost premium. 
Research revealed two general schools of thought for the cause of the imbalanced 
risk.  First, military construction agents “partner” with contractors in name only.  Johnson 
et al.’s (2012) research revealed that, in many cases, the construction agent does not 
partner with the contractor either due to an erroneous belief that the FAR forbids it or to 
avoid accusations of showing preference for a given contractor.  Additionally, the AARs 
listed partnering as one of the primary drivers for success in the shelter B project (673d 
Civil Engineer Group 2010; Moser 2009).  Furthermore, Lam et al.’s (2008) general DB 
research found that partnering can result in a higher level of success for DB projects.  
Public-sector construction agents should look for ways to partner or ally with the 
 101 
contractor; alliancing can improve cost, schedule, and performance while benefiting both 
the contractor and construction agent.   
An adaptation of Gannon et al.’s (2012) cone of uncertainty (Figure 6) allows for 
visualization of how the improper application of DB can cause an imbalance of risk.  If 
the construction agent and contractor balance risk, as it affects cost, the balanced cost 
should appear near the center of the cone.  However, as more risk shifts to the contractor, 
the cost shifts towards the right side of the cone representing higher construction costs.  
Additionally, the earlier in the design process the contractor is locked in to a fixed cost 
and schedule, the higher the cost and longer the schedule tend to be.  Construction agents 
can balance risk by using an acquisition method with incentives or award fees that reward 
the contractor for above standard work, costs, or schedule.  By balancing risk via 
execution method and partnering with contractors, the government can lower 
construction costs and increase construction performance. 
 
Figure 6: Cost Cone of Uncertainty (Adapted from Gannon et al. 2012) 
 
Additional Public-sector Requirements 
The additional public-sector requirements theme encompasses a vast number of 
rules, regulations, public laws, and policies that can increase public-sector construction 
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costs compared to private industry.  The JBER weather shelter case study presented an 
opportunity to look into controllable, internal, cost factors since both projects had to meet 
the same federal regulations and policies.  This cost premium theme is represented by 10 
surveyed cost premium factors and 18 contract requirement differences.  Additionally, 
the open-ended survey responses frequently brought up additional government 
requirements such as the Buy American Act and Davis-Bacon Act wage rates.  The 5th 
and 11th most influential cost premium factors, based on the survey, include unique 
attributes of military projects compared to private industry and FAR 8A and small 
business policies.  Although all military facilities must meet anti-terrorism and force 
protection requirements, some facilities have more stringent requirements than other 
facilities based on function and occupancy.  Previous research and interview responses 
have specifically cited military specifications as a cause of cost premiums; however, most 
construction has moved away from military specifications towards industry standards and 
UFCs (673d Civil Engineer Group 2009; U.S. Army Engineer District, Alaska 2008). The 
weather shelter projects demonstrated that construction agents should be aware of the 
exact requirements for the facility requested and not always assume that the most 
stringent standards need to be applied.  The possible cost premiums can be mitigated by 
the construction agent through analysis of the requirement itself. 
 In addition to unique military policies, the federal government has implemented 
socioeconomic policies that increase the cost of public-sector construction.  The survey 
highlighted small-business policies, such as 8A source selection, and administrative 
requirements from the FAR as moderately influencing costs.  Additionally, the 
requirement to use Davis-Bacon wage rates increases the cost of public-sector 
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construction.  While the original intent of the Davis-Bacon Act was to ensure a fair wage 
and ensure wages paid by contractors doing federal work are appropriate for the area, 
recent studies have shown these wage rates do not reflect the private sector construction 
industry correctly and cause additional and unnecessary cost premiums (Hartford 2012; 
Pope 1990).   Although many of the specific elements in this cost premium theme are 
outside the control of the DoD, engineers, contracting specialists, and project managers 
can limit the effect by treating each project as unique and applying only the necessary 
specifications for the specific project.   
Stifling or Not Applying Innovation 
The AAR and interviews with contractors revealed a common theme: the standard 
USAF MILCON DB process writes and regulates, sometimes unknowingly, innovation 
out of many construction projects.  The innovation theme contains 20 contract 
requirement differences which apply to 9 different cost premium factors.  Two of the 
factors rated as having a large influence on cost premiums are specific to the JBER 
weather shelter designs.  The remaining factors were all rated as moderately influencing 
cost premiums.  For the weather shelter projects, experts consider the shelter B approach 
more innovative than the approach used in shelter A.   
This study found that construction agents should not limit construction methods 
or designs for DB projects, especially prior to a design charrette.  The shelter A RFP 
limited the construction to CMU and thereby limited designs and construction methods.  
However, the shelter A construction agent stated that the end-user’s insistence on using 
certain materials and methods limited the design.  The shelter B RFP left the construction 
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material open as long as it met all requirements; the end-result ended up meeting or 
exceeding the requirements.  Construction agents should work to ensure they are 
receiving requirements from the client rather than detailed direction.  After all 
requirements have been identified, construction agents and contractors can work together 
to use innovative or standard practices that best balance schedule, cost, and performance 
while meeting all the requirements.  This is not to say that innovative materials or ideas 
are always the best option, but they should not be dismissed too quickly.  Lam et al. 
(2008) lends quantitative support to this concept based on their finding that allowing a 
DB contractor room to provide knowledge and expertise improves DB project success 
and allows the end-user to select previously unknown alternatives.     
Construction agents should educate users on how innovative solutions will meet 
their requirements.  For example, leadership throughout JBER had to be educated on the 
fact that a PEB is not always an “off-the-shelf” solution and can be designed and built for 
their precise needs.  One of the shelter B innovative ideas was to implement an electrical 
disconnect rather than installing all “hazard-rated” electrical infrastructure.  This single 
change resulted in large cost savings and emphasizes why construction agents must work 
with their contractors rather than simply dismissing ideas that do not align to “the way it 
has always been done.”  In another example, the shelter A RFP specified resilient vinyl 
flooring in its non-aircraft areas while the shelter B RFP allowed the contractor to select 
the floor covering, which ended up being a coating directly applied to the concrete slab.  
The shelter A RFP specified vinyl flooring because that is the standard the user was used 
to; on the other hand, the concrete sealant meets all requirements and ends up being more 
durable for maintenance activities.  From the simple, such as flooring type, to the 
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significant, such as insulated metal panels rather than CMU, construction agents should 
allow DB contractors to propose and implement innovative solutions that allow the use of 
different construction materials and methods without sacrificing quality. 
Selection of Construction Specifications 
Construction specifications define the requirements for a facility.  Generally, 
construction contracts use three forms of specifications: method-based specifications 
(MBS), end-result specifications (ERS), and performance-related specifications (PRS) 
(Dhakal et al. 2009).  The MBS is the classical form of specification where the design 
and construction agent prescribe construction procedures for the contractor to follow.  In 
ERS, the contractor is fully responsible for the construction procedures and quality 
control, but the construction agent accepts or rejects the final results based on a detailed 
quality assurance plan.  Finally, PRS grew from statistically-based quality assurance 
specifications and relate quality characteristics and/or life-cycle costs to expected 
performance of the work completed (Dhakal et al. 2009).  Based on the contracts 
analyzed and the interview and survey data, most MILCON projects utilize MBS 
regardless of execution method. 
For the two weather shelters analyzed, 23 contract requirement differences 
directly related to “prescriptive design requirements rather than code references.”  
Additionally, this overarching theme contains three of the four largely influential specific 
cost premium factors (Table 8).  Furthermore, all of the contractors surveyed mentioned 
that prescriptive methods and materials do not allow contractors to fully apply DB 
practices such as being aggressive or providing more economical solutions by taking 
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advantage of local purchase or economy of scale.  This finding goes against one of the 
key DB performance indicators: successful projects allow the contractor flexibility (Lam 
et al. 2008).  However, the utilization of MBS can help the contractor select the 
appropriate materials and methods that can meet the construction agent’s overall 
requirements.  
Based on this, and other research, construction executed using the DB 
methodology should implement at least ERS and in some cases PRS (Dhakal et al. 2009; 
Kelleher and Walters 2009).  However, some public-sector construction, especially in 
specialized areas such as the military, will always have unique requirements.  Engineers 
can implement ERS while still including explicit requirements; for example, in the case 
of the weather shelters, these requirements included concrete floors rated for a specific 
aircraft for a specific number of passes.  The contract for shelter A included references to 
industry standards, such as those published by ASCE, while also prescribing the floor 
construction thickness, mixture, and procedures.  On the other hand, the shelter B 
contract referenced the same industry standards and AFIs for the given aircraft but 
allowed the contractor to design and specify the floor concrete.  In the end, shelter A has 
uniform thickness concrete throughout while shelter B has thicker concrete where the 
aircraft rests and less thick concrete in non-aircraft loaded areas.  By using an ERS rather 
than an MRS, the contractor developed a method that saved time and money while 
maintaining the performance requirements.  ERS, and thusly PRS, can allow for more 
innovative designs and potential cost savings without sacrificing performance during DB 
execution (Dhakal et al. 2009).   
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Parameterization of the Execution Process 
Since the 1996 update to the FAR allowing the use of DB, many federal agencies 
use it primarily to execute their construction projects.  However, government application 
of DB does not match private sector DB in terms of procedures or benefits; the 
government, as the owner and construction agent, remains heavily involved in the process 
including, in some cases, not allowing construction to commence until a design has been 
submitted and approved (Molenaar et al. 1999; Gannon et al. 2012).  Additionally, 
analysis of the weather shelter RFPs made apparent the over parameterization, or 
specification, of requirements for a DB project.  While all of the cost premium themes, 
with the exception of additional public-sector requirements, can fall into the 
parameterization of the execution process theme, this section will focus on additional 
elements of inappropriate DB implementation. 
In traditional DB execution, construction is on-going as the design is finalized; for 
example, once the facility footprint has been specified and approved, earthwork can begin 
while the vertical portions are still being designed.  The requirement for design and 
construction in series rather than in parallel forces the project to match a DBB process 
with a single contractor and directly increases costs by extending the schedule.  
Additionally, in climates with limited construction seasons, delays caused by these 
policies are further compounded.  For the weather shelter projects, there were 39 contract 
differences related to the parameterization of DB theme; respondents rated 79% of them 
as moderately influencing cost premiums.  Specifically, the shelter B RFP allowed 
construction and design to occur in parallel while the shelter A RFP required a complete 
design prior to construction.  However, two of the factors in this theme were contentious 
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topics during the survey and another two factors revealed widely varying responses 
between demographics.   
The contentious factors shown to influence MILCON cost premiums are the 
military construction agents’ approaches to implementing DB processes.  Overall, 
respondents ranked military construction agents’ standard implementation of DB as the 
sixth most influential cost premium factor.  However, the construction agents did not 
rank the level of influence as highly as contractors or end-users.  These findings are 
significant because it demonstrates possible disconnects between end-users, construction 
agents, and contractors.  Without regard for blame, it is apparent that construction agent 
requirements and policies are limiting DB execution, thereby adding to construction costs 
and schedule.  However, the execution of shelter B demonstrated that military engineers 
are able to implement DB execution similarly to private industry.   
The other factors that directly relate to the application of DB include schedule 
management requirements.  When asked to compare the shelter A and shelter B schedule 
management requirements, contractors ranked the shelter A requirements as the fifth 
most influential factor.  Administrative burdens can cause additional costs for contractors 
while construction agents incorrectly believe the same burdens exist in private industry.  
The shelter A RFP prescribes schedule management software requirements; however, this 
prescribed software is not commonly used throughout industry.  Survey and interview 
responses, as well as Gannon et al.’s (2012) previous research, state that the use of non-
industry standard software (i.e. Primavera) ends up forcing the contractor to maintain at 
least two schedules, one in their normal software, such as Microsoft Project, and one in 
the custom-built construction agent software.  The shelter B RFP allowed the contractor 
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to select the software to be utilized as long as it met standard requirements, such as 
presenting resource distribution and a critical path.   
In addition to the parameterization of schedule management, the two weather 
shelter projects treated submittals differently.  The shelter A RFP specified that submittal 
approval would take at least 30 days, and construction would be proceeding at risk if 
executed prior to submittal approval.  This policy and the idea of construction proceeding 
at risk are more appropriate for a DBB contract.  The contractor has accepted that risk 
already through the use of DB; their ability to utilize materials, methods, and procedures 
of their choosing offsets this risk (Lam et al. 2008).  The shelter B RFP more 
appropriately aligned to standard DB practices and specified that submittals would be 
approved as soon as possible.  By working with the shelter B contractor, the construction 
agent was able to help the contractor execute rapid approval for many elements.  Some 
construction agents administer significantly more large construction projects than others; 
therefore, requiring a standardized submittal process helps with the internal 
administrative burden.  However, to allow DB to perform as expected, construction 
agents should be more flexible with approval timelines; the contractor is taking risk from 
the construction agent by being responsible for both design and construction.   
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper presented five themes that influence cost premiums in public-sector, 
specifically MILCON, construction based on a case study, expert surveys, and 
interviews.  The five cost premium themes are: 
• Failing to balance risk 
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• Additional public-sector requirements 
• Stifling or not applying innovation 
• Selection of construction specifications 
• Parameterization of the execution process 
The unique case study allowed for the determination of cost premiums caused by internal 
processes rather than those stipulated by Congressionally mandated laws and policies.  
Previous studies have attributed cost premiums to items such as Davis-Bacon Act wage 
rates and military requirements, but this study demonstrated that internal policies cause 
some cost premiums.  Specifically, the case study demonstrated that internal policies can 
cause a $7 million, or 27%, project cost difference.  Additionally, by combining expert 
opinion and AARs with contract documentation, this study was able to show which 
factors can, and to what degree, influence cost premiums.  Although this one case study 
provides evidence unique to these projects, it does validate the overall cost premium 
findings.  Furthermore, according to Patton (2001), the phenomenological findings based 
on expert opinions have substantial weight in determining the true reality.  
Overall, internal factors based on the parameterization of DB execution cause 
many cost premiums.  Parameterization of DB can occur by selecting restrictive 
specifications, stifling innovation, and failing to balance risk.   Based on previous 
research, this parameterization directly affects the likelihood of DB success by limiting 
contractor action and inputs while also expanding the construction timeline (Chan et al. 
2004; Lam et al. 2008).  Working to address internal causes of cost premiums can reduce 
costs and likely improve DB performance. 
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Relevance to Industry Practitioners and Researchers 
Although the results of this study focused on MILCON procurement, the findings 
can have significant implication for industry practitioners and researchers.  The fact that 
many of the factors influencing cost premiums were internal to the executing construction 
agent suggests that practitioners should begin with an internal audit to reduce costs and 
improve efficiency.  Additionally, studies could further investigate the effects of 
parameterizing the execution process.  This study showed that parameterization caused 
cost premiums; further research could investigate the effects on schedule, overall 
construction outcome, and likelihood of litigation.  
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IV. Journal Article: A Geospatial Statistical Analysis of Non-Value Added Costs 
Due to Davis-Bacon Act Prevailing Wage Rates 
The journal article presented in this chapter was submitted for publication in the 
Lean Construction Journal.  At the time of thesis completion, the journal article was not 
yet accepted or rejected.  This journal article presents the results of the investigation into 
cost premiums associated with the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) prevailing wage rates.  While 
the content has not been changed, technical adaptations have occurred for inclusion in 
this thesis.  Appendix C contains further supporting information including additional 
background and methodology details.  Appendix D contains a procedure log for all 
geospatial and statistical operations carried out in support of this DBA research. 
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Abstract 
Question: Do prevailing wage rates add non-value added costs to federal 
construction projects, specifically those executed by the United States Air Force? 
Purpose: The purpose of this research is to understand how prevailing (Davis-
Bacon Act) wage rates affect the cost of federal construction compared to private 
industry.  Additionally, this paper investigates concerns about the geospatial breakdown 
of prevailing wage rates. 
Research Method: Geospatial and statistical analysis of Davis-Bacon Act 
prevailing wage rates compared to Bureau of Labor Statistics industry wage rates. 
Findings: This paper also quantified a statistically significant difference (16%) in 
prevailing hourly wage rates versus private-sector wage rates for carpenters and 
electricians thereby codifying the non-value added prevailing wage based costs.  This 
paper documents how the geospatial breakdown for wage rate analysis for BLS has 
enough fidelity for DBA wage rate use at United States Air Force installations.   
Limitations: This research only invested prevailing wages at United States Air 
Force installations for the carpenter and electrician trades. 
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Implications: This research indicates a need to reexamine prevailing wage rates 
in pursuit of federal lean construction. 
Value for Practitioners: This paper quantifies cost differences, thereby 
demonstrating opportunities for realizing cost efficiencies, based on prevailing wage rates 
and promotes the removal of non-value added costs from federal construction projects. 
Keywords:  contract management, construction management, construction costs, 
military construction, public sector construction, lean construction, federal facility 
procurement, federal laws, waste 
Paper type: Full paper 
Introduction 
In 2010 and 2011, the United States spent over $30 billion for federal construction 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2012).  The Department of Defense (DoD) military construction 
program is responsible for 40%, or $12 billion, of the yearly construction expenditures 
(112th Congress 2011b).  Recent research revealed that military construction costs 
between 25% and 40% more than private industry; specific to the United States Air Force 
(USAF), one study found the additional costs to be 37% greater (112th Congress 2011b; 
Hartford 2012).  Given this large cost discrepancy, private industry construction can be 
used as a goal, or baseline, for an analysis of excessive costs in military construction.  To 
meet budgetary constraints and goals, investigating factors that cause military 
construction to cost more than private industry construction would be of value to the 
USAF.  Therefore, examining military construction costs through lean analysis helps 
identify areas of value added and non-value added, or waste, costs.   
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In general, military construction involves constructing or modifying a facility to 
meet a specific purpose.  This one-of-a-kind product makes it difficult to analyze many 
lean principles such as pull and striving for perfection (Koskela 2004).  Many lean 
construction analysis efforts focus on repetitive processes such as large scale residential 
construction where lessons learned on one house can be applied to the next (Gustafsson, 
Vessby, and Rask 2012).  Although military construction does not typically involve 
repetitive efforts, it can still be viewed from a lean construction perspective by focusing 
on the process, which is repeated for every project, rather than a single one-of-a-kind 
project. 
This study focused on examining labor costs through a lean lens.  Labor 
represents just over 30% of construction costs and is one of the few costs that can be 
changed without affecting building design or effectiveness (U.S. Census Bureau 2011).  
Specific regulations guide federal construction procurement; one of these requires the use 
of the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA) prevailing wage rates (Department of Labor 2012).  
These wage rates are trade and region specific.  Additionally, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) provides wage rate information for private industry construction through 
its surveys.  The BLS surveys workers throughout the United States (U.S.) and tabulates 
the information, including hourly wages, based on their trade and locality.  If there are 
substantial differences between the prevailing wage rates and surveyed wage rates, the 
extra costs can be considered type one, or necessary, waste (Womack and Jones 1996).  
However, necessary wastes due to regulatory requirements and public law are still wastes 
that can be addressed.  Since wage rate data are geospatially related, an analysis via a 
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geographic information system (GIS) can be used to compare the DBA wage rates to 
BLS wage surveys at USAF active duty bases.   
Objectives 
The overall goal of the research was to confirm and quantify the findings of 
numerous reports which found DBA prevailing wage rates to be a leading cause of 
military construction cost premiums compared to private industry construction costs.  To 
achieve this goal, the approach used in the research was to determine, via geospatial 
statistical analysis, if DBA prevailing wage rates vary greatly from the surrounding area 
wage rates as determined by the BLS wage surveys at USAF active duty base locations.  
Therefore, two hypotheses were developed to gain a better understanding of non-value 
added federal construction costs based on labor wages.  The first hypothesis addressed a 
comparison of prevailing wage rates and private industry wage rates.  The first alternate 
hypothesis is that there is a difference between the DBA prevailing wage rates and the 
wage rates paid in private industry.  The second research hypothesis addressed agency 
concerns about the geospatial breakdowns used for each type of wage rate.  The second 
alternative is that there is no difference between standardized DBA prevailing wage rates 
and those surveyed by the BLS based on geographic location.  The second hypothesis 
focused on whether the high and low wage rates occur in the same location. 
Background and Literature 
Lean Thinking, Construction, and Waste 
Originally, lean thinking focused on lean production.  Womack and Jones (1996) 
summarized five principles of lean thinking from a production perspective: 
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• Specify value 
• Identify and map the value stream 
• Make the process steps flow 
• Let the client, customer, or end-user pull value 
• Strive for perfection 
However, further studies have demonstrated that some of these lean thinking elements do 
not work as proposed for lean construction.  Koskela (2004) analyzed each of the five 
principles from a construction standpoint and determined that while Womack and Jones’ 
(1996) five principles are critical to implementing lean practices, many other principles 
exist, especially in the complex construction environment.  Despite these differences, the 
concept of waste exists in lean thinking regardless of the implementation environment.  
Womack and Jones (1996) define two types of waste.  Type one waste is necessary 
waste, which consists of activities or costs where value is not created but the waste 
cannot be eliminated based on current technology or policies.  Type two waste is pure 
waste, which consists of activities that consume resources without adding value such as 
wait time or rework.  Significant amounts of lean construction research have focused on 
costs and waste and found that showing savings is one of the best ways to motivate 
companies to implement lean construction practices (Alves and Tsao 2007).  This study 
focuses on type one waste and quantifies the cost to the U.S. government, specifically the 
USAF. 
Prevailing Wage Rates 
Prevailing wage rates are the wage rates paid to non-union employees working on 
projects funded by the government (Cavanaugh 2010).  There are multiple prevailing 
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wage rate programs both in the U.S. and internationally.  In the U.S., the McNamara-
O’Hara Service Contract Act sets prevailing wage rates for service contracts.  The Davis-
Bacon Act (DBA) fixes prevailing wage rates for federally funded construction projects; 
additionally, some states have prevailing wage rate acts for state-funded construction 
(Cavanaugh 2010).  This study focuses on the non-value added costs for construction as 
USAF installations; therefore, the applicable prevailing wage act is the Davis-Bacon Act 
(DBA).  
In 1931, Congress enacted the DBA to enable fair construction procurement 
practices (United States Government Accountability Office 2011).  Congress designed 
the act to “to protect communities and workers from the economic disruption caused by 
contractors hiring lower-wage workers from outside their local area, thus obtaining 
federal construction contracts by underbidding competitors who pay local wage rates” 
(United States Government Accountability Office 2011).  The Department of Labor 
(DOL) is responsible for administering the wage rates via its Wage and Hour Division 
(WHD) (Department of Labor 2012).  According to the WHD, “Davis-Bacon and Related 
Acts apply to contractors and subcontractors performing on federally funded or assisted 
contracts in excess of $2,000 for the construction, alteration, or repair (including painting 
and decorating) of public buildings or public works” (Department of Labor 2012).   
Currently, the DOL WHD uses voluntary surveys to determine the appropriate 
prevailing wages for a region (112th Congress 2011a).  Since 1996, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the DOL Inspector General have found and annotated 
issues with the method of surveying used by DOL WHD.  Inaccurate survey data, limited 
scope of surveys, out-of-date union data, and a lack of result validation causes these 
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issues (United States Government Accountability Office 2011).  Although the WHD 
implemented limited improvements, the process still results in the same type of errors.   
The DBA prevailing wage rates are specific to geographical areas (Cavanaugh 
2010).  The WHD attempts to create wage rates by county but can use any contiguous 
breakdown based on county areas, federally owned lands, wage data, and metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSA) (United States Government Accountability Office 2011).  While 
the GAO has documented problems with the method of data collection, public law 
requires that federal construction contractors use the results (Department of Labor 2012).     
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is “the principal Federal agency responsible 
for measuring labor market activity, working conditions, and price changes in the 
economy” (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012).  The BLS publishes average wage rates for 
construction and non-construction trades broken down geographically into metropolitan 
and non-metropolitan statistical areas (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011).  Since the 
primary responsibility of the BLS is labor statistics and analysis, it has an expert staff of 
statisticians and data collectors.  To that end, the House Subcommittee on Workforce 
Protections found that the DOL WHD is an enforcement agency that lacks the expertise 
provided by the BLS (112th Congress 2011a). However, the WHD stated that it could not 
use BLS data due to its lack of geographic coverage (112th Congress 2011a). 
Federal and Military Construction 
This study of DBA prevailing wage rates focused on the effect of those wage rates 
on USAF military construction.  Military construction is “any construction, development, 
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conversion, or extension of any kind carried out with respect to a military installation” 
(Department of the Air Force 2010).  There are two types of military construction; 
MILCON, which is, in general, construction activities costing $750,000 or more, and 
unspecified minor military construction, which is repair and maintenance of existing 
facilities or construction costing less than $750,000 (Department of the Air Force 2010).  
Public law codifies the rules and regulations governing military construction and requires 
both types of military construction to use DBA prevailing wage rates (Department of 
Labor 2012).  Previous research has determined that military construction costs more 
than private industry; many of these studies have found that DBA prevailing wage rates 
add to the cost premiums, or waste (112th Congress 2011b; Hartford 2012; Pope 1990; 
Carpenter 1992).  The many policies and laws regulating federal and military 
construction limit the waste analyzed in this study to type one, or necessary waste, and 
the scope to prevailing wage rates. 
Research Methods 
Two types of analysis were performed to determine the cost premiums associated 
with DBA prevailing wage rates.  The first was a geospatial analysis that combined the 
data and allowed for initial analysis.  Geospatial analysis is a unique method of 
quantitative analysis providing for both statistical analysis based on geography as well as 
a visual representation of data and results.  The second analysis was a statistical 
examination via multivariate analysis of the variance (MANOVA) and matched-pairs t-
tests to validate the statistical significance of the geospatial analysis results.   
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The geospatial analysis involved combining and analyzing geospatial and non-
geospatial data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the BLS, and the DOL WHD Wage 
Determinations Online system.  The BLS data were geospatially related to MSAs and 
non-MSAs.  The DBA data are not geospatially related and had to be manually extracted 
and associated with each USAF base.  Additionally, the DBA data are not the same 
across each area; some regions contain data for many tradecrafts while other areas 
contain a minimal amount.  For this research, the electrician and carpenter trades were 
analyzed because those trades existed in every DBA wage file and match exactly to a 
BLS trade. 
Geospatial analysis illustrated how the DBA prevailing wage rates and BLS wage 
survey results vary across space independently from each other.  Following the individual 
analysis, comparative analysis of the two wage rates quantified differences in wage rates 
and generated a graphic of the differences across space through the use of geographic 
surface generation.  The Kriging method generated the surface by interpolation between 
data points (USAF bases).  The Kriging surface generation method interpolates data 
based on the weighted moving average and data variance (Hu 1995).  The Kriging 
surface generation method makes more accurate predictions than other models due to its 
advanced modeling techniques.  The BLS wage survey rates did not require interpolation 
since geospatial data were available for the entire United States. 
The statistical analysis used MANOVA and matched-pairs t-tests to determine if 
the differences between BLS wage survey and DBA prevailing wage rates were 
statistically significant.  By comparing the differences in the wage rates, taking into 
account the mean, standard deviation, and standard error, an F-test or t-test value is 
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determined and used to generate a level of statistical significance (Neter and others 
1996).  A 95% confidence interval was applied to all statistical analyses.  To test the 
second hypothesis, both the BLS and DBA wage rates were standardized using Equation 
1. 
𝑍 = 𝑋 − 𝜇
𝜎
 
 
(1) 
Equation 1 
In the equation Z represents the standardized wage rate, X represents the wage rate, µ 
represents the average of all the wage rates, and σ represents the standard deviation of the 
wage rates.  The standardizing of the wage rates allowed for a direct comparison of the 
high and low values by location. 
Results and Analysis 
Individual Wage Rate Analysis 
The BLS and DBA wage rates were analyzed independently of each other both 
quantitatively and spatially.  Table 10 summarizes the quantitative results.  The DBA 
wages had more variability than the BLS rates; specifically, the DBA rates had a multi-
modal distribution while the distribution for the BLS rates was mound shaped.  The large 
standard deviation differences between BLS and DBA wage rates emphasize the wider 
distribution of the DBA wage rates.  Additionally, in some locations, the DBA prevailing 
wage rate is less than the BLS surveyed wage rates.  In these cases, the contractors could 
either pay the lower wage rate, perhaps by bringing in labor from outside the local area, 
or increase the wage rate to meet the local (BLS) labor rates.  If the contractor brought in 
out of state labor, it would defeat the intent and original purpose of the DBA.  However, 
if the contractor increases the hourly wages to meet BLS surveyed rates, the average 
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carpenter hourly wage rate would jump by 4.3% to $25.20.  Furthermore, the average 
electrician hourly wage rate would increase by 2.9% to $30.18 on USAF construction 
projects. 
Table 10: Quantitative Wage Rate Analysis 
Wage Rate Carpenter Electrician 
Average Max Min StdDev Average Max Min StdDev 
DBA $24.16 $43.59 $7.25 $10.39 $29.33 $48.28 $7.25 $9.54 
BLS $20.61 $34.26 $8.81 $5.75 $24.69 $39.33 $10.02 $6.15 
Wage Rate Differences Hypothesis 
The primary hypothesis for this study involved determining whether a statistically 
significant difference exists between DBA prevailing wage rates and BLS surveyed rates.  
First, the differences were illustrated graphically.  Figure 7 shows the carpenter wage 
differences between the DBA and BLS wage rates as a geographic surface based on 
USAF base location.  The Kriging method generated the surface from the USAF point 
data in order to make visualizing the difference easier.  The maximum difference is just 
over $20 per hour (red) and the minimum is around -$7 (blue).  The Southeast, Texas, 
and northern Midwest represent the areas with lower DBA wage rates than BLS while the 
rest of the country has higher DBA prevailing wage rates.  Figure 8 shows the wage rate 
differences for electricians with a maximum difference of almost $21 per hour and a 
minimum of -$17; however, since -$17 was considered an outlier, the next, non-outlier, 
minimum wage difference was -$7 per hour.  In the case of electrician wages, very few 
areas have lower DBA wage rates while most of the U.S. has prevailing wage rates that 
are higher than those paid by private industry.  While both figures demonstrate that the 
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difference distribution varies geographically, the Northeast, central Midwest, and West 
have higher prevailing wage rates for both trades. 
 
Figure 7: Carpenter Wage Rate Differences 
 
 
Figure 8: Electrician Wage Rate Differences 
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Quantitative analysis of the differences between the two wage rates quantified the 
statistical significance of differences and presented a comprehensive “picture” of the 
effects of DBA wages on USAF construction.  A MANOVA analysis of carpenter DBA 
and BLS wage rates returned an F-value of 60.97 resulting in a p-value of less than 
0.0001 showing statistically significant differences.  The matched-pairs t-test returned a 
mean difference of $3.55 with a 95% confidence interval between $2.65 and $4.44.  This 
means that, on average, the U.S. government expends $3.55 more per hour as waste to 
carpenters working on federally funded projects at USAF bases; this additional expense is 
type one waste.   
The MANOVA for the electrician wages also showed a statistically significant 
difference with an F-value of 108.67 resulting in a p-value of less than 0.0001.  In the 
case of the electricians, the average difference was $4.64 with a 95% confidence interval 
bounded by $3.76 and $5.51.  The monetary value of the waste for electricians is higher 
than the carpenter waste due to prevailing wage rates.  This statistical analysis strongly 
supports the theory that DBA wages differ from BLS wage rates and are normally higher.  
Table 11 presents a summary of the differences between the BLS and DBA wages.  
However, if contractors paid the higher wage rate at locations with lower DBA wages 
than BLS wages, the average differences for carpenters and electricians would be 120% 
and 122%, respectively.  The results show that, at best, the USAF pays a carpenter 14% 
more than the surrounding area and could be paying at least 20% more.  These large 
prevailing wage rate premiums emphasize how this “necessary” waste can significantly 
increase federal construction costs. 
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Table 11: Summary of Wage Rate Differences 
Wages Being 
Compared to BLS 
Carpenter Average Wage 
Difference 
Electrician Average Wage 
Difference 
$/hr % $/hr % 
DBA prevailing 
wage $3.55 114% $4.64 118% 
 
Finally, Table 12 shows the number of USAF bases that have prevailing wage 
rates above and below the BLS wage rate for the surrounding area.  They key takeaway is 
that most USAF bases have prevailing wage rates above wages paid in the surrounding 
area.    
Table 12: Summary of USAF Wage Rate Comparisons 
Trade 
# of Bases w/ 
DBA Below 
BLS 
# of Bases w/ 
DBA Above 
BLS 
% of Bases 
Below BLS 
Rate 
% of Bases 
Above BLS 
Rate 
Carpenter 68 121 36% 64% 
Electrician 33 156 17% 83% 
Carpenter & 
Electrician 22 113 12% 60% 
Wage Rate Geospatial Breakdown Hypothesis 
Geospatial analysis was critical to addressing the hypothesis related to DOL 
WHD’s concern that BLS geospatial divisions would be too inaccurate for prevailing 
wage rate use.  The BLS analyzes wage data based on metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
statistical areas.  The WHD sets DBA prevailing wage rates based on state, county, or 
smaller areas inside each county.  In some cases, the geographic breakdowns differ per 
trade for the same region.  Graphical comparisons of the BLS and DBA wage rates show 
that the high and low wages, in general, occur in the same region of the country for both 
trades.  Figure 9 demonstrates this similarity for the carpenter trade while Figure 10 
depicts the similarities for the electrician trade.  The color of the stars represents the DBA 
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wage rate while the color of the remainder of the map represents the BLS wage rate.  As 
shown, the lower rates occur in the Midwest and Southeast while the west coast, 
Northeast, and non-continental U.S. have higher wage rates for both DBA and BLS.  For 
the electrical trade, the wage rates are higher in general across the entire country.     
 
Figure 9: DBA & BLS Carpenter Wage Rate Combined Map 
 
Quantitative analysis directly addressed the second hypothesis and showed the 
similarities demonstrated graphically.  MANOVA performed on the standardized wage 
rates provided statistical validation of the similar trending.  The p-values of 0.5636 and 
0.8822 for carpenters and electricians respectively show differences between the 
normalized wage rates were statistically insignificant.  This finding supports the second 
alternative hypothesis and the notion that the DOL WHD could use the BLS geospatial 
divisions for setting DBA prevailing wage rates at USAF bases. 
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Figure 10: DBA & BLS Electrician Wage Rate Combined Map 
Limitations 
Due to the availability of data and method of analysis there are limitations to the 
conclusions drawn from this geospatial analysis.  Conclusions drawn from this analysis 
do not apply to specially funded realignment projects such as the Guam Realignment 
Fund.  Additionally, although both Davis-Bacon and BLS wage rates exist for trades 
other than carpenters and electricians these were the only trades analyzed.  This means 
this research can be used to show that wage rates differ and contribute to cost premiums, 
but cannot be used to specify an exact amount DBA prevailing wage rates add to 
construction projects.  Furthermore, the DBA analysis did not account for any fringe 
benefit pay since these benefits may be included in private industry pay but the BLS does 
not quantify them.  In addition, any Davis-Bacon wage determinations with multiple 
categories, such as over/under $1.5M, were averaged to represent USAF projects of both 
MILCON and unspecified minor construction scope.  Finally, this analysis treats all 
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USAF locations the same.  This means radar sites and test ranges have the same 
weighting as major installations with a greater volume of construction.  This limitation 
makes it impossible to quantify exactly how much extra money the USAF spends due to 
Davis-Bacon prevailing wage rates.  This analysis focuses on general additional costs 
rather than an exact quantity. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This analysis showed that the Davis-Bacon wage rates are not accurately 
representing industry wages for USAF bases.  This misrepresentation results in easily 
quantifiable type one waste for federal construction.  Specifically, 64% of USAF bases 
have higher DBA prevailing wage rates for carpenters, 83% of the bases have higher 
rates for electricians, and 60% of the bases have higher prevailing wage rates for both 
trades.  However, at bases with prevailing wage rates below the surrounding area’s wage 
rates, contractors may increase the wage rate paid or bring in labor from outside the local 
area; either of these options hurt the government by violating the premise of the DBA and 
increasing construction costs.  Additionally, this analysis confirms the House of 
Representatives Subcommittee belief that any fidelity lost through the use of BLS wage 
rates would be regained by not using statewide data for prevailing wage rates (112th 
Congress 2011a).  By demonstrating that the BLS and DBA wage rates agree with each 
other for regions with higher or lower wage rates, this study lends additional validation 
toward the subcommittee’s thought that fidelity would not be lost by changing to BLS 
statistical regions.   
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This research demonstrated graphically and statistically that the Davis-Bacon Act 
method of prevailing wage determination does not accurately reflect market conditions 
for carpenters and electricians, two major construction trades.  Therefore, the use of DBA 
results in type one waste and costs the taxpayers additional money for construction on 
USAF installations.  Adapting DBA wage rates to match local prevailing wages in 
geospatial breakdown as well as hourly rates would reduce USAF, and all federal, 
construction costs while still supporting local contractors and crafts persons and not 
removing any value from a construction project.  The federal government could address 
this inefficiency, i.e., type one waste, as the first step in implementing lean construction 
practices to address budgetary concerns. 
Disclaimer 
The views expressed in this article are those of the writers and do not reflect the 
official policy of position of the U.S. Air Force, Department of Defense, the U.S. 
Government, or the Air Force Institute of Technology. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter briefly summarizes the results presented in the white paper, two 
scholarly articles, and their supporting appendices.  While the scholarly articles each 
contain their own, in-depth, conclusions and recommendations, this chapter combines 
and simplifies the recommendations.  This chapter also addresses the overarching 
research problem and each of the research objectives.  Recommendations for future 
research follow the synopsis of conclusions and recommendations for addressing 
MILCON cost premiums. 
Research Objectives Addressed 
The overarching research objective was to determine if military construction 
(MILCON) costs exceed private industry costs, thereby reducing the cost performance 
and effectiveness of United States Air Force (USAF) construction, and if so, discover the 
causes of the MILCON cost premiums.  Four objectives, which directly relate to the four 
phases of research, addressed the broad objective.  The first objective related to 
confirming the existence of MILCON cost premiums.  This research confirmed the belief 
that MILCON cost premiums exist through an extensive literature review as well as 
expert interviews and surveys.  This confirmation of the existence of MILCON cost 
premiums addressed the first half of the overall research problem and set the baseline 
assumption for the remainder of the MILCON cost premium research.   
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Factors Causing MILCON Cost Premiums 
This section addresses the second secondary objective by summarizing the factors 
shown to cause or influence MILCON cost premiums.  While the expert survey identified 
43 possible factors, and half of which at least moderately effect MILCON cost premiums 
(Chapter III, Table 8), this section sticks to broad categories of cost premium causes.  
Table 13 lists the major cost premium factors and where additional information can be 
found relating to each factor.  Additionally, Table 13 identifies whether the factors are 
under the control of the Department of Defense (DoD) (internal), outside DoD control 
(external), or a combination of both.  The factors listed are general categories; some 
factors, such as schedule and submittal development, have many additional factors within 
them.  The chapters listed contain details relating to the individual factors.  Overall, this 
research found that although factors outside of the USAF or DoD control cause cost 
premiums, internal policies cause further cost premiums.  This research expands the body 
of knowledge related to these controllable cost premium factors rather than passing blame 
onto factors outside the span of control of the USAF or DoD.  While Table 13 lists many 
factors shown to cause cost premiums, it should not be considered all-encompassing; 
other factors, some of which are included in Chapter IV, can influence MILCON cost 
premiums based on the specific project, location, or execution method. 
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Table 13: Broad summary of factors causing MILCON cost premiums 
Cost Premium Factor 
Internal/ 
External 
Control 
Supporting 
Chapter(s) 
II III IV 
Development of overly restrictive statements of work or 
requirements Internal    
Failure to balance risk between all parties Both    
Stifling or not applying innovation Internal    
Unique attributes/requirements for MILCON projects Both    
Parameterization of the construction execution method Internal    
Selection of construction specifications Internal    
Schedule and submittal development and management 
policies Internal    
Perception of MILCON construction agents Internal    
Anti-terrorism/force protection requirements Both    
Federal Acquisition Regulations External    
Socioeconomic laws and policies including the Davis-Bacon 
Act (DBA) External    
 
Factor Analysis and Mitigation 
The third and fourth research objectives related to analyzing the factors shown to 
cause cost premiums and develop mitigation strategies where appropriate.  Analysis of 
cost premium factors under the span of control of the USAF or DoD found disconnects 
between different entities and agencies involved.  When contractors and government 
agencies disagree on whether or not a given factor results in cost premiums, the 
contractor is most likely adding to the cost while the government is not looking to 
address the contractor’s concerns and thereby reduce costs.  The overarching result of this 
research is that the USAF needs to better partner with its construction agents such as 
United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and Naval Facilities Engineering 
Command (NAVFAC) in order to begin addressing MILCON cost premiums.  
Additionally, partnering or alliancing with contractors will allow cost premium causes to 
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be mitigated through the synergy of new perspectives and experience.  This research 
found that 80% of the cost premium causing factors mentioned in Table 13 can be 
directly mitigated by USAF or DoD entities.  Mitigation of the remaining 20% will 
require an act of Congress.  This research also quantitatively demonstrated that DBA 
wage rates are higher than the local area wage rates and addressed the DBA wage rate 
administrator’s concern that the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) geospatial breakdown 
did not offer enough fidelity.  This information can allow the DoD to bring concerns 
regarding prevailing wage rates to Congress to begin to address the remaining 20% of the 
cost premium factors. 
 Overall Conclusions 
This research confirmed the anecdotal belief that MILCON costs more than 
similar private industry construction.  Additionally, this research found that internal DoD 
policies and actions cause many of these cost premiums.  Previous MILCON research 
focused on how public law and the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) restrict the 
ability to procure construction similarly to the private sector.  However, this research 
demonstrated that while those conclusions are true, there are many cost premium factors 
that the USAF can address independently to lower MILCON costs without impacting, or 
even improving, facility performance.  All parties involved with MILCON procurement 
and construction need to cooperate to help each other meet the user’s needs.  An attitude 
of cooperation, adaptation of contract templates to correctly reflect practices 
implemented in name only, and a focus on the required end-result rather than methods 
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applied will allow the USAF to reduce MILCON cost premiums and achieve more with 
fewer construction dollars. 
Opportunities for Future Research 
This research can act as a baseline for many additional research endeavors into 
MILCON cost premiums.  This research has provided a list of factors shown to cause 
increased MILCON costs above expected levels.  Future academic inquiries can address 
any number of these factors.  The following list contains specifics topics that have 
emerged where additional investigation can benefit USAF MILCON procurement. 
1. Specific, all-encompassing, quantitative Davis-Bacon Act wage rate 
analysis.  The geospatial statistical study carried out for this research effort 
focused on only carpenter and electrician trades.  In order to quantify the 
cost premiums associated with DBA wage rates, a researcher should 
investigate all trades and associate the cost premiums for each based to the 
amount of money expended on construction.  This would allow an exact 
dollar figure to be placed on the DBA wage rate cost premium. 
2. Survey and interview regarding MILCON cost premiums with a larger 
sample size.  The requirement for knowledge regarding the JBER weather 
shelter case study limited the number of survey participants for this 
research.  Additional insight could be gained by surveying a large sample 
size and using inferential statistics to associate a specific “level of 
influence” with each factor shown to cause cost premiums. 
3. Quantitative MILCON cost premium research.  This research would 
require a long term investment from AFCEC which involves tracking 
additional cost information.  Additionally, contractors would have to be 
willing to share quantitative cost data for projects similar in scope to 
MILCON facilities.  To do a full investigation, this future research would 
have to investigate more than just historical square footage costs. 
4. Undocumented scope changes that occur based on fixed programmed 
amounts.  It appears that when bids are too far above the programmed 
amount, engineers reduce scope by removing components of MILCON 
facilities.  Research into what changes to reduce the bids, and any 
performance losses, could help quantify the need to reduce cost premiums 
due to the loss of performance.  This investigation would require AFCEC 
 140 
to track additional information regarding changes to scope from project 
inception to bid acceptance. 
5. A comparison between private and government execution process, 
specifically design-build.  James Rosner (2008) also proposed this topic 
for additional research in his thesis related to MILCON DB execution.  
This research endeavor demonstrated the need to remedy DoD 
implementation of DB in order to gain the benefits seen in private 
industry.  Further investigation should compare each design and 
construction agent’s policies and management guides against private 
sector implementation of DB.  This future research could help MILCON 
execution align more properly to industry standard execution methods. 
6. Look into innovative construction materials and methods not currently 
used in MILCON.  Design and construction agencies restrict the use of 
certain methods and materials for MILCON execution.  An investigation 
into the reasons why certain materials, such as flexible plastic water pipes 
rather than copper, are not allowed and what risk the government would 
be accepting by allowing new industry standards in MILCON could help 
validate the need to allow innovation.  This investigation could also focus 
on whether or not the end result requirements or user preferences drive 
restrictions and limitations. 
7. Experiment during MILCON execution.  AFCEC should coordinate with 
researchers to implement suggested cost mitigation strategies from this 
research or private industry practices and then analyze the results.  By 
partnering with a researcher, changes could be thoroughly documented 
and analyzed in an academically rigorous way without taxing AFCEC’s 
limited resources.   
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Appendix A. MILCON Case Study Supporting Information 
Chapters II and III contain most of the results and analysis as it relates to the 
JBER weather shelter case study.  This appendix contains further methodology details 
including information about the database used.  Additionally, the final section of this 
appendix contains raw content exported from the case study contract requirement 
differences database.  All conclusions based on the data in this appendix are documented 
in Chapters II and III. 
Analysis Process Details 
Four broad data sources were available for this case study.  Both the USACE and 
CEG provided the RFPs (contract documents), including the SOW and specifications, 
which contractors used to bid on the weather shelter projects.  Additionally, CEG and 
USACE personnel were available for interviews whenever questions arose about the 
projects.  Also, the construction agents provided quantitative data such as the 
programming estimate, actual cost of construction, and schedule information.  Finally, 
AARs written by personnel from the CEG, USACE, and Air Force Audit Agency were 
obtained.  The synthesis of all the information provided results in a database of contract 
requirement differences. 
The programming documentation sets the initial, macro, project requirements.  
The first step of the case study was to ensure the two weather shelters had the same 
macro requirements.  Once it was demonstrated that the same requirements existed for 
both facilities the analysis of contract requirement differences could begin.  For this 
study, the contract documents provided an unbiased baseline of requirement differences.  
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The USACE RFP was considered the standard since it represents the majority of USAF 
MILCON.  For each requirement listed or defined in the USACE RFP, a search was 
made for an equivalent requirement in the CEG RFP.  Any differences in requirements, 
or lack of a requirement, was codified and entered in the database.  After the analysis of 
the contract documents, the AARs were used to ensure no requirement differences were 
missed.  Finally, any discrepancies or oddities were validated by asking project managers 
what was meant by the statement and how each contractor interpreted the statement.  
There were very few discrepancies noted during the case study research.  Once the 
database was populated with all the contract requirement differences, they were 
associated with existing, interview developed, survey questions or turned into new survey 
questions.  Finally, all the contract requirement differences were associated with contract 
line item numbers (CLIN).  By utilizing a variety of biased and unbiased sources, the 
single case study was able to ensure a thorough analysis of contract requirement 
differences and thereby discover any factor that could cause cost premiums. 
Case Study Database 
The development of a database that organizes all the data collected during the 
case study is critical to successful analysis (Yin 2009).  The use of a database with set 
parameters on what was documented for each contract difference helped establish a chain 
of evidence and thereby mitigate some threats to construct validity (Yin 2009).  Construct 
validity is validity that relies on both subjective judgments and empirical data, in this 
case the subjective judgment is that of the researcher (Patten 2009).  The use of a 
database, rather than a single data sheet, ensured data from different sources could be 
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linked together for analysis.  A Microsoft Access data stored all the survey and case study 
data.  Table 14 documents the case study database structure. 
Table 14: Case Study Database Structure 
Database 
Name 
Name Type Description 
ID ID Integer Auto populated by Access 
ShortName Requirement 
Short Name 
Text Simple identifier of the requirement 
USACE-doc USACE 
Containing 
Document 
Text Which USACE provided document 
contains the requirement 
USACE-sec USACE 
Section/Page 
Text Which section or page of the USACE 
document contain the requirement 
USAF-doc CEG 
Containing 
Document 
Text Which CEG provided document 
contains the requirement 
USAF-sec CEG 
Section/Page 
Text Which section of page of the CEG 
document contains the requirement 
Diff Difference Number 1 = Similar requirement exists but not 
the exact same 
2 = The requirement does not exist in 
one of the contracts 
DiffMag Level of 
Difference 
Text L = little difference in requirement 
M = difference in requirement 
H = extreme difference in requirement 
(required for Diff=2) 
DiffSide More 
Stringent 
Agency’s 
Requirement 
Text A = CEG specified a more stringent 
requirement 
C = USACE specified a more stringent 
requirement 
Notes Notes Rich Text Notes describing the difference between 
CEG and USACE projects 
Survey Survey 
Question 
Number 
Number Populated with the survey question 
number if directly linked to a survey 
question. 
USACE-CLIN Link to 
USACE 
CLIN 
Text USACE CLIN (cost id) containing this 
requirement.  Comma delimit if more 
than one. 
USAF-CLIN Link to CEG 
CLIN 
Text CEG CLIN (cost id) containing this 
requirement. Comma delimit if more 
than one. 
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Case Study Raw Data 
This section contains the raw case study information.  The first part lists the CLIN 
cost information.  The remaining parts present the raw contract requirement differences.  
The data has been sorted into five sections, four representing the level of influence, and 
the remaining section containing contract difference requirements not associated with a 
survey question. 
CLIN Costs 
The CEG and USACE projects used different CLINs.  Additionally, the USACE 
project included costs for work not completed on the CEG project; these costs are 
included in the CLIN list by construction agent but are not included in the pair analysis or 
the case study results.  Table 15 contains the USACE CLIN identifiers, descriptions, and 
costs.  Table 16 contains the CEG CLIN identifiers, descriptions, and costs.  Finally, 
Table 17 contains the linked cost data including broad descriptions. 
Table 15: USACE Shelter Costs by CLIN 
CLIN Description Cost 
0001 Design/Construct Site Work (outside 5') $3,637,966 
0002 Design Wx Shelter (within 5') $2,135,132 
0003 Construct 5-bay Weather Shelter $16,941,440 
0012AA Mod Option Item 0012AA $50,000 
0013 Offsite treatment contaminated soil $5,000 
0015 Construct Bay 6 & 7 $4,991,227 
0016 Provide/install 270V DC Power (7-bay) $683,668 
0017 Provide/install 480VAC, 3 Phase, 4 Pole (7-bay) $490,678 
0018 Provide/install compressed air system (7-bay) $225,879 
0019 Hangar Floor Coating $206,072 
0020 Interior Painting $143,440 
 
 145 
Table 16: CEG Shelter Costs by CLIN 
CLIN Description Cost 
0001AA Purchase Pre-fabricated 7-Bay Weather Shelter Hangar $1,232,685 
0001AB Freight for 7-Bay Weather Shelter Hangar $397,990 
0001AC Provide Ancillary Services $890,478 
0001AD Provide Installation & Site Preparation $14,457,911 
0001AF 270 V DC Power System $461,267 
0001AG 480 V AC Power System $604,988 
0001AH Compressed Air System $144,665 
0001AJ Hangar Floor Treatment $193,837 
0001AK Hangar Bay Interior Painting $142,730 
0001AL Builder's Risk Insurance Deductible $350,000 
 
Table 17: Matched CLINs and Shelter Costs 
CEG 
CLIN(s) 
USACE 
CLIN(s) Description CEG Cost 
USACE 
Cost 
1AA, 
1AB, 1AD 
0003, 
0015 Shelter Construction & Site Work $16,088,586 $21,932,667 
1AC, 1AL 0002 Design Services & Insurance $1,240,478 $2,135,132 
1AF 0016 270V DC Power $461,267 $683,668 
1AG 0017 480V AC Power $604,988 $490,678 
1AH 0018 Compressed Air System $144,665 $225,879 
1AJ 0019 Hangar Floor Coating $193,837 $206,072 
1AK 0020 Interior Painting $142,730 $143,440 
 
Largely Influential Contract Requirement Differences 
• Name: Exterior Wall Systems 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 46 
- 2.3.13) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B5.2) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USAF 
o Linked Survey Question: 36 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USAF specified the use of insulated metal panels for the exterior.  
USACE just specified the use of metal panels. 
• Name: Hangar Bay Electrical 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
110- 2.6.6) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D5.1) 
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o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 39 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001, 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AF, 0001AG 
o Notes: USACE required electrical in the hangar be hazard rated per NEC 
requirements.  USAF allowed for hazard rated or a de-energized circuit 
IAW AFOSH 91-100.  USACE was very prescriptive with the type of 
receptacles and controls required; USAF required meeting NEC and 
applicable ETLs. 
 
Both USAF and USACE specified the type of equipment that would be 
connected to the 270V and 480V power systems. 
• Name: Roof System 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 43 
2.3.10) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B5.3) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 35 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specifies a low-slope BUR, 2-ply modified hot-mopped in 
place.  USACE specifies exact roofing material requirements. USACE 
required interior roof drains. USACE required 20-year warranty. USACE 
required 2 roof access hatches. 
 
USAF required a low-slope metal panel assembly that does not shed snow.  
USAF allowed a gutter system.  USAF required 25-year warranty. USAF 
required 1 roof access hatch. 
 
Moderately Influential Contract Requirement Differences 
• Name: 100% Design submittal 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 27 
Part 6) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 44 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA 
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o Notes: USACE prescribed exact requirements and comments for the 100% 
design submittal.  USAF specified broad requirements not necessarily for 
a 100% design. 
• Name: 65% Design Submittal 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 
10-18 Part 4) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 44 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA 
o Notes: USACE prescribed the expectations of a 65% design to include 
what each discipline has to have complete. 
 
USAF did not specify 65% design submittal or requirements. 
• Name: 95% Design Submittal 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 
18-27) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 44 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA 
o Notes: COE prescribed exact requirements for the 95% design submittal 
summed up as “complete and buildable”.  USAF did not specify.  Includes 
requirements for each discipline.  USAF only mentioned drawings and 
analysis requirements in broad terms. 
• Name: Acceptable Building System Types 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
64) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B50) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specifically allowed: cast in place concrete foundations, 
concrete slabs on grade, structural steel columns, braces and beams, 
engineered metal trusses, roof assemblies with tributary dead loads.  
USAF did not specify building systems.  
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• Name: Additional References 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 2) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (2.4) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 16 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 001AD 
o Notes: USACE specifies many additional ETLS, TOs, AFIs, AFMs than 
USAF.  However, USAF says the list may not be all inclusive of all 
requirements that must be met for DoD projects.  Differences include ETL 
03-1 Storm water construction standards, ETL 03-3 - Air Force Carpet 
Standard 
• Name: Antiterrorism Requirements 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 5) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (2.3.5) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 31 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USAF weather shelter was planned to be low occupancy and 
therefore exempted from many AT/FP requirements.  USACE required the 
building to be considered inhabited but not a primary facility. 
• Name: Ceiling Finish 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 52 
2.3.24) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C3.4) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE prescribed a suspended ceiling.  USAF allowed suspended 
ceiling or a hard lid. 
• Name: Civil Scope 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
15) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G30) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA 
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o Notes: USACE is extremely prescriptive required a licensed civil engineer 
whereas USAF specifies civil objectives. 
• Name: Communication Room Criteria Sheet 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 682-683) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 2 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specified areas and heights, USAF said “as required”.  
Rest the same  
• Name: Compaction Tests 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
32-33) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (A1.4) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 11 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive with compaction tests.  USAF required 
appropriate compaction but did not specify testing.  In the general 
specifications USAF required the contractor to have an approved quality 
control plan. 
• Name: Contractor Quality Control 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 45 04.00 10) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 45 04.00 29) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 11 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USAF requires the control to develop and implement a quality 
control plan in coordination with the government. 
 
USACE specifies exact requires the contractor's quality control plan must 
meet including:- Exactly what content must be included in the quality 
control plan including formatting- A design quality control plan- How 
many personnel it takes to manage a quality control plan- Exact 
requirements for QC personnel (mainly graduate school or many years of 
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experience)- Phases of the quality control plan (including development)- 
A list of all tests and inspections 
• Name: Corridor Room Criteria Sheet 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 686-687) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 2 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE very prescriptive specifying corridor height, area, and 
width.  USAF specified what must be able to transit and fit in corridor.  
USAF specified exterior access; USACE did not.  USACE required walk 
off mats at entries.  
• Name: Design Reviews 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 3-
4 1.2) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 44 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE requires the contractor to print all comments and responses 
in Dr. Checks system and bring 35 copies.  USAF has no similar 
requirement.  Additionally, contractor must furnish a hard copy and 
annotated in Dr. Checks action taken against each comment. 
• Name: Design Submittal Requirement 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 5-
7) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.11) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE requires 41 hard copies of the 65%, 95%, and 100% 
designs.  USAF appears to only specify 3 copies of any submittal. 
• Name: Design Submittal Review 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 3 
1.2) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req () 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
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o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE requires the contractor to use Dr. Checks Review System 
and respond to comments on the design.  Following those comment a 
review meeting will be held.  The Government has 30 days to review and 
comment on the 65% and 95% design submittals. 
 
USAF requires submittals via an AF Form 3000 (submittal attached) and 
does not specify a time required to review and return. 
• Name: Door Roof Covers 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
45) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 15 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE specified sloped standing seam metal roof for canopies 
over each exterior door.  
• Name: Dust Control 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
14) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G1.1.4) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE is prescriptive on how dust will be controlled (water mist, 
temp enclosures, or other suitable methodology).  USAF says contractor 
shall provide dust controls. 
• Name: Electrical Room Criteria Sheet 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 680-681) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 2 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specified heights and areas; USAF said as required.  
USAF required rubber base at the walls, USACE did not specify. Rest the 
same. 
• Name: Environmental Protection Execution 
 152 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 57 20.00 10 Page 9 
Part 3) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 57 20.00 10) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specifies the exact way that the environment shall be 
protected including fencing off areas not to be disturbed and physically 
limiting the work area.  USACE sets specific requirements for how the 
environment shall be protected (required to be built in to the 
environmental protection plans). 
 
USAF left the execution of environmental protection to the contractor. 
• Name: Evaluation Rating System 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Basis for 
Award Part IV. (pg 43)) 
o CEG Source (Section): Tech Eval R1 (Volume II) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 2 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AC, 0001AD 
o Notes: COE and USAF evaluated the RFP using different ratings.  
However, the differences should not affect the outcome.  
• Name: FAR Clauses 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (pg 47-61) 
o CEG Source (Section): GSA Schedules (N/A) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 18 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: The COE RFP is required to include all FAR clauses referenced.  
The GSA Schedules process takes care of some of the clauses so 3 CES 
personnel did not have to include those in the SOW. 
 
Any cost differences based on this are more on the government 
administration side rather than the contractor side.  
• Name: FAR Clauses Differences 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00700) 
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o CEG Source (Section): Atch 2 (RFP Section I, pg 170) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 21 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: The following 38 FAR clauses are included in the USACE project 
but not the USAF project 
52.211-10 - Commencement, Prosecution and completion of work 
52.211-12 - Liquidated Damages 
52.211-15 - Defense priority and allocation requirements 
52.211-18 - Variation in Estimated Quantity 
52.215-11 - Price reduction for defective cost or pricing data 
modifications 
52.215-13 - subcontractor cost or pricing date-modifications 
52.215-21 - requirements for cost or pricing data or information other than 
cost or pricing data- modifications  
52.217-7 - Option for increase quantity-separately priced line item 
52.219-4 - Notice of price evaluation preferences for Hubzone small 
business concerns 
52.219-16 - Liquidated Damages--subcontracting plan 
52.219-25 - Small disadvantaged business participation program - 
disadvantaged status and reporting 
52.222-1 - Notice to the government of labor disputes 
52.222-23 - Notice of requirement for affirmative action to ensure equal 
employment opportunity for construction (covered by 52.222-27) 
52.222-39 – Notifications of employee rights concerning payment of 
union dues or fees 
52.223-3 - Hazardous Material Identification and Material Safety Data 
(included in OSHA and EM 385-1-1) 
52.223-13 - Certification of Toxic Chemical Release Reporting 
52.225-11 - Buy American Act - Construction Materials Under Trade 
Agreement 
52.231-5000 - Equipment ownership and operating expense schedule 
52.232-5000 - Payment for materials delivered off-site 
52.236-1 - Performance of work by the contractor 
52.236-4 – Physical data 
52.236-25 - Requirements for registration of designers 
52.244-6 - Subcontracts for commercial items 
52.246-12 - Inspection of construction (covered in -1 and -13) 
52.247-64 - Preference for privately owned US-flagged commercial 
vessels 
52.249-5000 - Basis for settlement of proposals 
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52.201-7000 – Contracting officer’s representative 
252.204-7000 - Disclosure of information 
252.215-7000 - Pricing adjustments 
252.219-7003 - Small business subcontracting plan 
252.222-7000 - Restrictions on employment of personnel 
252.223-7001 – Hazard warning labels 
252.223-7004 - Drug free work force 
252.227-7023 - Drawings and other data to become property of 
government 
252.227-7024 - Notice and approval of restricted designs 
252.236-7001 - Contract drawings, maps and specifications 
252.236-7008 - Contract prices-bidding schedules 
525.247-7023 – Transportation of supplies by sea 
  
The following clauses are included in the USAF project but not USACE: 
52.216-7 - Allowable cost and payment 
52.222-50 – Combating trafficking in persons 
252.225-7012 – Preference for certain domestic commodities 
252.225-7014 – Preference for domestic specialty metals 
252.225-7016 – Restriction on acquisition of ball and roller bearings 
252.232-7003 – Electronic submissions of payment requests and receiving 
reports 
252.244-7000 – Subcontracts for commercial items and commercial 
components (DoD contracts) 
   
• Name: FAR Clauses Full Text 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Section 00700 pg 62-
192) 
o CEG Source (Section): GSA Schedule, Specification - General Req () 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 21 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: Both GSA and COE contracting are required to meet FAR and 
DFAR requirements.  COE lists all of the FAR contract clauses while the 
USAF was not required to list all of the clauses since some are covered by 
the GSA process.  Additionally, when listed the USAF removed elements 
of the clauses that did not apply. 
 
Overall there are likely additional contractor administrative costs due to 
the inclusion of the full-text of all FAR clauses including the portions that 
do not apply to this contract.  For example clause 52.203-10 included all 
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the different type of awards (cost-plus-fixed, cost-plus-incentive, etc.) 
even thought this contract is a fixed price contract. 
• Name: Field Testing 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 
32-40) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (All) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 11 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE specified the exact testing to occur for each piece of 
equipment while also specifying that equipment shall be tested IAW 
industry codes and standards.  USAF solely specified testing IAW 
industry codes and standards. 
• Name: Fire Alarm System 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
135-138 2.7.8) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (D4.1) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 42 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE required the fire alarm system to include a 50% expansion 
capability and a minimum of 2 additional releasing zones.  USACE also 
specified an outside strobe facing the tower.  USACE also prescribed the 
features of the fire alarm whereas USAF specified a Monaco or equivalent 
system. 
 
USAF specified the system required and required a NFPA Class A 
addressable fire alarm system (but not including expansion).  
• Name: Fire Protection Design Coordination 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
128 2.7.4) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D40) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 10 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE requires the fire protection engineer (FPE) to meet with 
Elmendorf fire protection authorities to review all fire protection aspects 
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prior to the 65% submittal.  USAF required an FPE to be integral to the 
design team and only prescribes coordination with Elmendorf fire 
protection for the location of a Knox-Box. 
• Name: Fire Protection Manufacture's Rep 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
129 2.7.4) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 11 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE required the manufacture's representative for major fire 
protection components to lead testing at the project site.  USAF did not set 
this requirement. 
• Name: Fire Protection Quality Control Inspections 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
129 2.7.4) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 45 04.00 29 3.2 
(Page 37)) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 11 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE prescribed that the FPE shall conduct and document QC 
inspections at least monthly.  Additionally the FPE must be present for 
final acceptance, inspection and testing.  The USAF required the 
contractor to develop their own QC plan. 
• Name: Fire Protection System Prohibited Items 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
130) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 26 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE provided a list of prohibited items that would impact 
proposal evaluation.  
• Name: Fire provisions for masonry 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
41) 
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o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 16 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specifies the use of ETL 02-15 A1.1.1.2.1 a minimum of 
1-hour fire-rated masonry wall.  Both USACE and USAF require the use 
of the same ETLs and NFPA requirements but USACE specified masonry 
requirements whereas USAF left it open to the D-B contractor to decide 
material type. 
• Name: Fire Sprinkler Piping Requirements 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
132) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D4.3) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USAF required a sprinkler system IAW NFPA, UFC, and ELT 
requirements.  USACE required the same but then prescribed the exact 
piping, fittings, valves, and gaskets to be utilized in the system. 
• Name: Firms Who May Submit 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Part II) 
o CEG Source (Section): Atch 2 - Technical Analysis (Section 2) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 19 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE specifies an unrestricted and open competition for both 
large and small business.  USAF specified the use of the GSA Schedules 
Program. 
 
This difference meant the USACE RFP is significantly longer to specify 
all the contracting requirements.  These are not required for the USAF 
project since the contractor is already in the GSA Schedules Program. 
• Name: Hangar Floor 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
19) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (A1.4) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
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o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USAF gives the requirements based on loading (F22) which 
matches USACE.  USAF then references the appropriate AFIs, UFCs, and 
ETLS.  USACE goes further to reference all references but then prescribe 
mixtures for concrete.  
• Name: Hangar Heating 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
84-85) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D3.2) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE was very prescriptive on how the hangar shall be heated.  
USAF required hangar heating based on natural gas and forbid flames or 
glowing elements open to the atmosphere in the hangar areas.  USACE 
specified a 3 hour timeframe to return to design temperatures; USAF did 
not specify. 
• Name: Hangar Transition and Floor Slabs 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
21) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (A1.4 (page 38)) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USAF allowed the hangar floor to be constructed with varying 
thicknesses (NLT 6”) based on where the aircraft would actually be 
located whereas USACE required the entire floor to be at least 12” thick. 
• Name: Hangar Ventilation (including APU) 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
83) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D30) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USAF required mechanical ventilation at a rate of at least 1000cfm 
to maintain indoor air quality IAW ASHRAE standard 62.1 - ventilation 
for acceptable indoor air quality.  USACE prescribed exactly how the air 
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shall be ventilated as at least 3000cfm.  USACE then requires a separate 
ventilation system for the APU.  USAF required APU and hangar area to 
be ventilated in order to maintain air quality but did not specify a method.  
Both agencies required tempered make up air when the APU exhaust 
system is operating.  
• Name: HVAC Building Controls 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
99-103) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D3.4) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 38 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE prescribes extensive direct digital control (DDC) units that 
integrate to the energy monitoring and control system (EMCS).  USACE 
specifies that the DDC must serve the entire facility.  USAF determined 
that requirement impractical and only required DDC for monitoring 
boilers and collecting utility metering data due to mission requirements 
(hangar doors opening and closing). 
 
COE specified a laptop containing a modem and floppy disk drive. 
• Name: Interior Floor Finish 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 51 
2.3.22) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C3.2) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE required the use of linoleum flooring.  USAF required 
resilient flooring that can resist tool cart traffic.  USAF is willing to accept 
finished concrete. 
• Name: Interior Wall Finishes 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 51 
2.3.23) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C3.1) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD, 0001AK 
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o Notes: USACE specified exactly what the walls should be covered with in 
different rooms.  USAF requested contractor give consideration to room 
requirements and specified a finish level. 
• Name: Interior wall partitions 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
47) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C1.1) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE is much more prescriptive on walls compared to USAF.  
However the end result is the same.  USACE specifies the steel runner size 
whereas USAF requires gypsum board walls on metal studs.  
• Name: Interior Wall Systems 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 47 
2.3.14) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C1.2) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USAF 
o Linked Survey Question: 16 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specified walls would be masonry or concrete with 1-hour 
fire rating for walls and 45 minutes for openings.  USAF specified CMU 
or fire-rated insulated metal panels.  Required fire rating is 3 hours for 
walls and openings. 
• Name: Janitor's Closet Room Criteria 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 692-693) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 2 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE prescribed size, resilient flooring, and ceramic tile 
wainscoting.  USAF set “as required”, sealed concrete, and some sort of 
wainscoting. 
• Name: LEED Documentation 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 29) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (2.3.1) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 46 
 161 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AA 
o Notes: The USAF requires the contractor to show calculations used for 
LEED credits.  The USACE dedicates a section of specifications to how 
LEED will be documented.  The end results are similar but the path to get 
there varies.   
• Name: Lighting Equipment 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
109) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D5.3) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD, 0001AF, 0001AG 
o Notes: USAF specified interior lighting intensities and ASHREA 90.1 
requirements as well as giving consideration to LEED-NC requirements.  
USACE specified exact fixtures and lamps to be utilized as well as 
lighting intensities. 
 
USAF specified that exterior lights should face away from areas that 
interfere with flying operations.  
• Name: Mechanical Room Criteria Sheet 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 678-679) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 2 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specified area as 1200ft; USAF specified as “as required”.  
Rest same between agencies. 
• Name: Mechanical Specifics 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
92-99) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D30) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE has prescribed exact requirements for each and every type 
of heating system.  USAF references industry standards.  Cost differences 
are likely due to administrative requirements vs. actual HVAC equipment 
and installation. 
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USACE specified use of DOE Buying Energy Efficient Products 
Recommendations or Energy Star.  USAF specified energy efficient. 
• Name: Men's and Women's Restroom Criteria 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 688-689) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 15 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE required: ceramic tile wainscot; USAF did not specify 
type.  USACE required countertop mounted sinks, USAF required a wall 
mounted.  USACE required occupancy switched lights; USAF prescribed 
locally switched.  USACE required resilient flooring, USAF desired 
sealed concrete.  USAF required 2 women's water closets vs. USACE 
single. 
• Name: Non-government borrow sources 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 30.00 29 Page 6) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (Page 8 1.15) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 11 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE has specific requirements for the testing of non-
government borrow sources including an engineer with 3 years of 
experience performing the tests.  USAF specifies testing of non-
government borrow sources.  
• Name: Non-Hangar Bay Concrete 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 62 
2.4.8) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (A1.3) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015, 0001 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD, 0001AE 
o Notes: USACE is extremely prescriptive on concrete design and specs.  
USAF references ACI 302.1R and UFC requirements. 
• Name: Plumbing Installations 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
71) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D20) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
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o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive on how all plumbing will be installed 
(9 pages).  USAF states the plumbing must meet industry standards such 
as the International Plumbing Code.  USACE goes into specifics such as 
“reduction of pipe sizes shall be made with reducing tees or reducing 
fittings”.  Likely cost differences due administrative requirements vs. 
plumbing material and labor. 
• Name: Preconstruction Submittals 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 2) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE specifies additional submittals above and beyond USAF 
requirements.  Additionally, USACE specifies them as “preconstruction” 
whereas USAF specifies them as submittal requirements.- Certificates of 
insurance- Surety bonds- Construction progress schedule- Schedule of 
prices  
• Name: Quality Control System Software Requirement 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 45 02.00 10) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 11 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE specifies exactly what will exist in a quality control 
system (QCS).  USAF has no such requirements beyond using a quality 
control system as part of the quality control plan. 
 
The USACE QCS system must be able to transfer data to the government 
include administration data, finances, QC, submittal monitoring, and 
scheduling.  USACE has developed QCS software that the contractor must 
utilize. 
• Name: Quality Objectives 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 7) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
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o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 16 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE specifies that the facility shall be constructed with an 
anticipated life of 50 years with refurbishment at 20 years.  USAF does 
not specify. 
• Name: RFP Evaluation Process 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Part III) 
o CEG Source (Section): Tech Eval R1 (All) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 18 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE evaluates: experience, past performance, schedule, design 
solution &amp; drawings, and organization and management.  USAF 
evaluates: compliance with SOW and specs, management capabilities and 
approach, schedule, past performance, and price. 
• Name: Roof Drainage 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 23 
2.2.11) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G3.4) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 34 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE extremely prescriptive.  USAF: “Roof drainage shall be 
collected and discharged into the manhole.  USACE specifies rainfall 
intensity, size of infiltration basins, monitoring tubes.  
• Name: Schedule Activity Coding 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 8) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
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o Notes: USACE requires scheduling use the activity coding structured 
defined in the Standard Data Exchange Format in ER1-1-11 Appendix A.  
The structure must be used even if some fields are not used. 
• Name: Schedule Critical Activities 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page4-5 
3.3.2.4) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 32 01.00 10 
3.3.2.4) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE requires the following additional critical activities be 
scheduled:- Submission of the testing and air balance review report- 
Submission and approval of testing and balancing of HVAC plus 
commissioning plans and data- Air and water balance dates- HVAC 
commissioning dates- Controls testing plan- Controls testing- Performance 
verification testing- Other systems testing, if required  
• Name: Schedule Requirements 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: The following elements of the schedule are required by USACE 
and not the USAF:- Government activities (approvals, submittals, design 
reviews, etc.)- Responsibility (which party is responsible for performing 
the work)- Work areas (identify work area where activity occurs)- 
Modification or claim number (include mod/claim in in schedule)- Bid 
item (identify each activity's bid item number)- Phase of work- Category 
of work- Feature of work- Project start date- Constraint of last activity 
(calculated by critical path)- Early Project Completion (which activities 
were accelerated to complete the project early)- Interim completion dates- 
Start Phase X- End Phase X- Phase X (identify which phase activity is in)- 
Default progress data disallowed- Out-of-sequence progress (disallowed 
unless contracting officer specifically approves)- Negative lags disallowed  
• Name: Schedule Submission Requirements 
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o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 8-
9 3.5) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 Submittal 
Procedures) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Extremely Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USAF requires the schedule be submitted and the use of an 
industry standard program.  USACE has specific submittal requirements 
including:- 3 copies- 2 disks (floppy unless otherwise approved) with 
labels- specific file naming conventions- narrative reports- approved 
changes verification- schedule reports (activity numbers, description, etc.)- 
activity reports (list of all activities)- Logic report (preceding and 
succeeding activities)- Total float report- Earnings report (by bid item)- 
Network diagram- Continuous flow diagrams- Project milestone dates- 
Banding (grouping of activities)- S-curves of earnings 
• Name: Schedule: Critical Path Method 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 4 
3.3.1) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 32 01.00 10 3.3.1) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE requires the critical path method project schedule be in the 
precedence diagram method.  USAF only requires the use of the critical 
path method.  
• Name: Schedule: Directed changes 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 13 
3.8) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 21 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE specifies procedures for directed changes. USAF only 
references FAR requirements. 
• Name: Schedule: Ownership of float 
 167 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 13 
3.9) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 23 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE specifies that schedule float is not for the exclusive use of 
the contractor or government.  USAF does not specify. 
• Name: Schedule: Requests for time extensions 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 
12-13 3.7) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 11 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE specifies procedures and submittals required for requests 
for time extensions.  USAF only references FAR requirements. 
• Name: Schedule: Standard Data Exchange Format 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 
Appendix A) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 23 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE requires the use of the specific non-proprietary protocol 
called standard data exchange format for its schedule.  USAF does not 
specify. 
• Name: Site Drainage 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Pages 
22-23) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G3.4) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
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o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015, 0001 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD, 0001AE 
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive on storm drainage including specifics 
on culverts, infiltration basins, and drain rock.  USAF references the 
international plumbing code and UFC-3-260-02.  
• Name: Specification: Airfields and heavy-duty concrete pavement 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (32 13 13.03) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE included additional specifications for airfields and heavy-
duty concrete pavement including specific mixtures, how to tie-in, weather 
limitations.  USAF solely required the following of the UFC and IBC. 
 
USACE required government approval of concrete design (mix, ratio, 
etc.). 
• Name: Sprinkler System Design 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
132-133) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D4.2 & D4.3) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USAF required a sprinkler system that meets all NFPA and UFC 
requirements.  USACE prescribed exact elements of the sprinkler system 
to include color, deconfliction, and signage.  Additionally USACE 
specifies that the location of sprinklers and routing of pipes is subject to 
approval of the USACE Contracting Officer. 
• Name: Standard Hangar Bay Room Criteria 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (Pg 675) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (Ch 5) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD, 0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USAF specified a height of 27 ft. USACE specified height as 
required for clearance.  USAF required additional equipment.  
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USACE required an exterior personnel door and cable portal in the hangar 
aircraft door; USAF did not.  USACE required the walls to be painted 
CMU, USAF required painted CMU or metal panels.  
• Name: Storm Water Protection Plan Inspection 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 57 34.00 29) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 57 34.00 29) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 11 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE specifies the qualifications that a storm water protection 
plan inspector as meeting federal standard requirements.  USAF does not 
specify beyond requiring the contractor to meet federal standard 
requirements. 
• Name: Structural Steel 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
63) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B5.1) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive to include specifying types of 
indicators to be used and primer color.  USAF references industry 
standards. 
• Name: Submittal Classification 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 4 1.3) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE specifies that submittals are classified as government 
approved or information only.  USAF requires the contractor coordinate 
with the government to determine submittal requirements. 
• Name: Submittal Packages 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 8-) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.1.2) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
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o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive in the formatting of specifications, 
designs, and color prints received.  USAF required similar drawings, 
designs, and catalog cuts but did not specify a hard copy format. 
 
Note: Both USAF and USACE have the same electronic drawing 
requirements.  
• Name: Submittal procedures 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 6 1.11) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.11) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE requires 6 copies of submittals for government approval 
and 3 for information only.  USAF only requires 3 copies of submittals. 
• Name: Submittal Stamps 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 6-8 1.15) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE requires the use of a stamp by the contractor on submittal 
data to certify the submittal meets contract requirements.  USAF has no 
such requirement. 
• Name: Submittal Transmittal form 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 5-6 1.10) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.10) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
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o Notes: USACE requires the use of an ENG Form 4025.  USAF requires 
the use of an AF Form 3000. 
• Name: Submittal: Scheduling 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 5 1.9) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00 1.9) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 13 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USAF did not have a scheduling requirement for submittals.  
USACE specifies that submittals forming a system or interrelated items 
shall be submitted concurrently with adequate time allowed (14+ days) 
allowed for approval. 
• Name: Submittal: Withhold of payment 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 33 00 Page 5 1.6) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 12 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE specifies that payment will be withheld for materials used 
without approval. USAF does not specify beyond FAR requirements.  
• Name: Sustainable Design 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 7) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (2.3.1) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 46 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specifies the shelter should be able to be LEED “certified” 
while USAF specifies the project must meet as many prerequisites and 
credits as practical for LEED-NC. 
• Name: Telecommunications Requirements 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
115-117  2.6.11) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D5.4) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 32 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015 
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o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE prescribed communications configurations meeting and 
exceeding Elmendorf standards.  USAF required contractor meet 
Elmendorf Communication Installation Standards.  USACE also set 
minimum contractor qualifications including years of experience (3 years). 
• Name: Test Hangar Floor Area 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
21) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 33 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE required the construction of a 3m by 12m test slab with 4 
different surface textures.  Then a decision would be made regarding the 
final selected texture.  USAF did not have this requirement. 
• Name: Work Prior to 100% design 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 28 
6.4) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 2 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017, 0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE did not allow any field or construction work without 100% 
design approval.  This could be waived if a contractor identifies fast-track 
portions of the project at the start of design work.  Review of the 100% 
design can take 14 days.  
• Name: Year 2000 Compliance 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00800-159 SCR-38) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 21 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE uses an additional contract requirement to reference FAR 
39.106 requiring Y2K compliance.  The USAF does not include a special 
clause for this. 
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Limited Influence Contract Requirement Differences 
• Name: Bathroom Accessories 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
53) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C1.4.2) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 37 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE is very prescriptive on bathroom accessories with exact 
specifications for each item (including toilet tissue dispenser, tampon 
receptacle, waste receptacle, etc.).  USAF just required the item itself. 
• Name: Closeout Submittals - Warranty Management 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 78 02.00 10 1.3) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 78 02.00 10 1.3) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 49 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017, 0018 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE specifies a requirement for  performance bond, pre-
warranty conference, and a contractor's response to construction warranty 
service requirements.  Both USAF and USACE require a warranty 
management plan and warranty tags. 
• Name: Conference Meeting Records 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 3 
Part 1.1) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (Page 8 1.16) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 22 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE requires the contractor to prepare meeting minutes and 
provide within 10 working days.  USAF does not set a time table for 
meeting minutes.  
• Name: Environmental Protection Plans 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 57 20.00 10 Part 1) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 57 20.00 10 Part 
1) 
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o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 22 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE requires the following environmental protection plans that 
USAF does not:- Non-hazardous solid waste disposal plan- air pollution 
control plan- contaminant presentation plan- waste water management 
plan- A historical, archaeological, cultural resources, biological resources 
and wetlands plan- pesticide treatment plan 
• Name: Fire Protection System Training 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
130 2.7.4.F) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D40) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 40 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE required an 8-hour training session for fire protection 
operations and another 8-hour session for fire protection system 
maintenance.  USAF required a single 8-hour session on all elements of 
the fire protection system. 
• Name: Fire Protection System Warranty Maintenance 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
130 2.7.4.G) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 41 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE required that one month prior to fire protection system's 
warranty expiration the equipment distributer perform all recommended 
annual maintenance.  Additionally the equipment distributer must replace 
any defective or damaged parts, modify software as required, and re-
certify the system.  
• Name: Government Field Office 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 30.00 29 Page 5 
1.10) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
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o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 45 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE required a government field office be furnished with office 
furniture and four laptop computers with base stations.  USAF did not 
have requirement. 
• Name: Independent design review 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 20.00 29 Page 4-
5 1.6) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 43 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE requires the contractor to have an independent (not 
associated with the design) engineer/architect in each discipline review 
and certify the design and calculations as being correct and meeting the 
RFP requirements.  This must be done for 65%, 95%, and 100% designs. 
• Name: Progress Meeting Contents 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 
11-12 3.6.3) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 22 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specifies what content is required at progress meetings 
including: start and finish dates, time completion, cost completion, logic 
changes, and other changes. 
• Name: Red Zone Meeting 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 30.00 29 Page 8 
1.20) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (Page 8 1.16) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 22 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
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o Notes: USACE requires a specific red zone meeting at 75% completion.  
USAF does not specify a specific red zone meeting but does discuss punch 
lists and weekly meetings.  
• Name: RFP: Technical Solution, Organization and Management 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Part V 2, Tab 
B and C (pg 21-23)) 
o CEG Source (Section): Tech Eval R1 (All) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 22 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: USACE prescribes exactly how technical solutions will be given as 
part of the RFP as well as exactly what information and what format it 
shall be in for evaluating organization and management.  USAF does not 
prescribe the format. 
• Name: Safety and Occupational Health Requirements 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 35 29 Part 1) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 35 29) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 47 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: Both projects require the use of EM 385-1-1 however USACE also 
has additional specifications goes further into specifying exact submittals 
required.  The difference ends up being that the USACE requires 
government approval of accident prevention plans, activity hazard 
analysis, crane critical lift plans, and proof of qualifications for crane 
operators whereas USAF requires those items exist per OSHA and EM but 
not government approval. 
 
Additionally, USACE includes definitions in their specifications whereas 
those definitions also exist in OSHA and EM 385-1-1.  Overall, USACE 
just includes requirements out of EM 385-1-1 in their RFP. 
• Name: Submittal Procedures 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00800-156 (SCR-8)) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 33 00) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o Linked Survey Question: 22 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001 
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o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD 
o Notes: USAF specifies the use of an AF From 3000; USACE requires the 
use of a ENG Form 4288.  Both require the form in triplicate.  USACE 
specifies they need at least 30 days to review any submittal; USAF does 
not specify. 
 
Based on interviews the long process can increase construction time and 
thereby increase construction cost. 
• Name: Update submission following progress meeting requirement 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 32 01.00 10 Page 11 
3.6.2) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req (01 32 01.00 10 Page 
14 3.6.2) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 22 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specifies that an updated schedule is submitted 4 days 
after the meeting.  USAF requires an updated schedule be submitted 
before the next meeting. 
• Name: Videotaping of Tests & O&M Training 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 78 02.00 10 1.6) 
o CEG Source (Section): Specification - General Req () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 22 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017, 0018 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE required that all training and tests be videotapes and 
provided to the government.  USAF did not have this requirement. 
• Name: Windows 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
50-51 2.3.21C) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G5.4.4) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 41 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE required 5 year warranty; USAF did not specify.  Cost 
differences negligible with this project due to lack of windows. 
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Not Influential Contract Requirement Differences 
• Name: Air Force Project Sign 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 58 23.00 29) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o Linked Survey Question: 48 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE requires a specifically formatted project sign for the 
construction site.  The cost of the sign is incidental to the project. 
 
Contract Requirement Differences Not Linked to the Survey 
• Name: Demolition Work 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
13) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G10) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AE 
o Notes: The demolition of existing taxiway was not included or required 
for the USAF project.  Both projects did require similar earthwork for 
building construction.  For cost comparisons the demolition performed on 
the USACE project should be removed. 
• Name: Emergency Eye Wash/Showers 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
86) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D2.1.6) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE specified that water tempering system cannot be one per 
emergency fixture; USAF did not specify.  Otherwise requirements the 
same. 
• Name: Excavation and Handling of Contaminated Material 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (02 61 13) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
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o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015, 0013 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE included a specification on the excavation and handling of 
contaminated material.  USAF did not include specifications. 
• Name: Field Screen Testing of Soils for POL Contamination 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (31 09 20.00 29) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015, 0013 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
o Notes: USACE included specifications for field screen testing of soils for 
POL contamination.  USAF did not include such specification.  
Requirements specified in code. 
 
USACE contractor is required to field screen all excavated soils. 
• Name: Foam Alert System 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
140 2.7.8) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (D40) 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o USACE CLIN(s): 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: COE specified blue beacon alarms for foam system; USAF did not 
specify. 
• Name: Hangar Doors 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
47-48 2.3.16) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (B5.4.3) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: Both USAF and USACE specified vertical doors.  USACE allow 
steel panels or fabric.  USAF required fabric. 
 
Note: USAF could use GSA Selection door without markup. 
• Name: HVAC Heating/Cooling Set Points 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
77-78) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (D30) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
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o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE required a winter set point of 68oF, USAF required a set 
point of 65oF for the hangar bay. All other areas were the same. 
• Name: Low Level High Expansion Foam Systems 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
134 2.7.7) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09-F-22AWS-SOW (D40) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE is more prescriptive in the foam requirements by calling 
out specific ETL criteria as well as specifying the exact pipes and valves 
to be utilized.  USAF just required foam system to meet requirements.  
End result is the very similar. 
• Name: Proposed Schedule 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (00 22 11 Part V 2, Tab 
A (pg 20)) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC 
o Notes: The USAF did not specify a schedule time.  USACE specified a 
max duration of 540 days unless an alternate schedule optimizes costs in 
which case 750 days Is allowed.  However, both USACE and USAF must 
follow FAR 52.211-10 which specifies a maximum time. 
• Name: Restroom Hardware 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 52 
2.3.26) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (C1.4.1) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AA, 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE required chrome plated hardware. USAF specified heavy-
duty stainless steel hardware.  
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• Name: Site Electrical 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
118-120 2.6.14,15) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G40) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0001, 0003, 0015, 0016, 0017 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AF, 0001AG 
o Notes: USACE is more prescriptive than USAF but not by much for 
transformers and connections.  Both require metering and connection to 
existing base power. 
 
USACE is very prescriptive on conduit and raceway while still requiring 
meeting NEC. 
• Name: Sources for Reference Publication 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 42 00) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0002, 0003, 0012AA, 0013, 00015, 00016, 0017, 
0018, 0019, 0020 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AC, 0001AD, 0001AA, 0001AF, 0001AG, 0001AH, 
0001AJ, 0001AK 
o Notes: USACE includes a list of sources for reference materials.  USAF 
does not. 
• Name: Temporary Construction Facilities Specifications 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 50 02.00 10) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD 
o Notes: USACE included specific requirements for temporary construction 
facilities.  USAF did not include any requirements. 
• Name: Utility Stairs 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 54 
2.3.28) 
o CEG Source (Section):  () 
o Level of Difference: Requirement only in one contract, Extremely 
Different 
o More Stringent Agency: USACE 
o USACE CLIN(s): 0002, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s):  
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o Notes: USACE specified exact requirements for utility stairs. USAF did 
not specify. 
• Name: Water Line Upgrade 
o USACE Source (Section): RFP-ELM288-FINAL (01 19 10.00 29 Page 
26) 
o CEG Source (Section): FY09F-22AWS - SOW (G3.1) 
o Level of Difference: Similar requirement, Little Difference 
o More Stringent Agency:  
o USACE CLIN(s): 0001, 0003, 0015 
o CEG CLIN(s): 0001AD, 0001AE 
o Notes: USACE project required upgrading an 8” water line to 10”.  USAF 
project did not require upgrade but did require a 10” water line. 
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Appendix B. Survey and Interview Supporting Information 
This appendix contains supporting information for interviews and surveys carried 
out in support of research documented in Chapter II and Chapter III.  The first section 
contains further information on the development of the survey.  The second and third 
sections contain the sample characteristics and further detail on survey interpretation.  
The fourth and fifth sections contain the actual survey and interview questions.  The final 
section contains statistical analysis of all survey responses.  In order to maintain the 
anonymity of the respondents, the raw open-ended survey question and interview 
responses have not been documented in this thesis.  The author may be contacted for 
further information. 
Survey Development 
The survey consisted of two overarching questions.  Both questions ask the 
respondents to rate the level of influence factors have on the cost of MILCON projects; 
however, the first question asks for a comparison between MILCON and private industry 
construction while the second question requires a comparison between the CEG and 
USACE weather shelters.  Each of these two overarching questions had a series of cost 
premium factors listed underneath that required a Likert-style response.   
The cost premiums factors were developed by synthesizing contract requirement 
differences from the weather shelter case study with literature review and interview 
results.  In total 102, or 87%, of the contract requirement differences linked to factors in 
the survey.  All ten of the block two questions were developed based on contract 
requirement differences that could not be answered with a general comparison between 
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MILCON and private industry.  Additionally, 22 of the 33 block one questions directly 
linked to contract requirement differences.  In order to limit the survey length, factors 
quantitatively known to cause cost premiums, such as Davis-Bacon Act wage rates, were 
left out of the survey.   However, the FAR drives many of these quantitative factors, so 
they were included in a general form.  Although these factors were purposely not 
included many respondents mentioned the additional requirements in the open-ended 
response at the end of the survey. 
Follow on research, with the goal of using inferential statistics, will need a much 
larger sample size.  There are multiple barriers to success that could not be overcome for 
this study.  First, the requirement for knowledge related to the JBER case study greatly 
reduced the population of available experts.  A more broadly distributed survey would 
not be able to ask questions about specific MILCON projects.  Second, contractors and 
government employees are hesitant to answer questions or provide additional data 
because it can directly affect their organization’s performance.  For example, a contractor 
who provides information about why MILCON costs more could end up losing money if 
the Government improved its MILCON process and reduced costs.  However, many 
contractors pointed out that improving the process could increase their profits since many 
additional burdens could be removed.  Additionally, some government employees are 
hesitant to blame their own organization.  Finally, a larger survey would require full 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and an Air Force survey control number.  
Both of these elements take additional time to obtain, and the Air Force is hesitant to 
inundate personnel with surveys; thus, it is difficult to obtain a control number.  The 
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survey implemented supported the goals of this study; however, the lessons learned and 
understood can help future research. 
Institutional Review Board 
The AFIT Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed the interview and survey.  
The IRB granted the survey and interview an exemption from human experimentation 
requirements (32 CFR 219, DoDD 3216.2, and AFI 40-402) on 15 October 2012.  This 
study qualified for an exemption because no sensitive data was collected and respondent 
anonymity was maintained through the use of broad demographic information. 
Sample Characteristics 
A purposeful sample was utilized for both the surveys and interviews.  The 
purposive sample ensured all respondents were experts in the engineering, construction, 
and contracting fields with knowledge of private industry and MILCON or direct 
knowledge of the case study projects (Patten 2009).  Additionally, snowball sampling 
occurred with the survey when contractors and USACE provided additional points of 
contact.  Although snowball and purposive sampling bring can add additional bias to the 
study, the use of unbiased source documents mitigated this bias.  The sample involved 
three demographics.  The USAF personnel demographic contains engineers and 
contracting officers currently or previously assigned to the 3rd Civil Engineer Squadron, 
673d Civil Engineer Group, or 673d Contracting Squadron.  The USACE demographic 
contains engineers and contracting personnel assigned to USACE Alaska District.  
Finally, the contractor demographic contains engineers and contract specialists with 
private industry and MILCON experience.  In each demographic certain respondents did 
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not answer all of the survey questions.  This outcome was expected since all respondents 
were asked not to answer questions where they did not have experience or knowledge.  
The sample used for the survey and interviews provided knowledge, both broad and 
specific, that helped validate MILCON cost premiums and provide external validity to 
the case study findings. 
Survey Interpretation 
The limited population, and therefore limited sample size, resulted in the use of 
descriptive statistics rather than inferential statistics.  Descriptive statistics include using 
histograms, the mean median or mode, as well as qualitative descriptions of data (Neter et 
al. 1996).  The small sample size required the use of these statistics were utilized because 
the responses did reflect a standard distribution.  However, the use of descriptive 
statistics does not invalidate the results and even helps avoid issues with the Likert scale 
using ordinal data in a continuous manner (Carifio and Perla 2007).  Non-parametric 
statistics were used to rank each factors level of influence relative to one another for each 
demographic.  Additionally the responses were average for each demographic for each 
factor.  Finally, an overall weighted average was determined based on the response 
averages from each demographic.  All of these values were utilized to compare cost 
premium factors individually as well as in between demographics. 
Survey Given 
The survey given to USAF civil engineers and contracting personnel, USACE 
Alaska District, and contractors is shown in Table 18.  The survey was distributed 
electronically to all respondents. 
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Table 18: Electronically Distributed Survey 
Directions: Please place an x in the appropriate box rating the influence of each factor. 
Research has shown that MILCON projects cost more than equivalent private industry 
construction.  For the factors below it is given that MILCON projects costs more than private 
industry construction.  If you have no experience with one of the factors please leave it blank.  
The second block of questions relate specifically to the Army Corp of Engineers (standard) 
MILCON 7-bay weather shelters compared to the USAF GSA procured weather shelters.  
While this survey focuses on cost, the research team understands that in some instances the 
additional cost is merited. 
Demographic Information 
Please select (by bolding) the entity you 
associate with: 
USAF 
Engineering 
 
USA 
Engineering 
USAF 
Contracting   Contractor 
Questions Block 1 
Please rate the level of influence each factor 
below has on the cost of MILCON projects 
above private industry construction costs.  
Factor influence on MILCON cost premiums 
Not at 
all 
To a 
limited 
extent 
To a 
moderate 
extent 
To a 
large 
extent 
To a 
very 
large 
extent 
USAF implementation of design-build 
execution           
USACE implementation of design-build 
execution           
Design-build rather than design-bid-build           
Contracting method: Firm fixed price           
Fixed programmed amounts (allowed project 
cost) early in project development           
Oversight on contractor by local CE squadron           
Oversight on contractor by AFCEE           
Oversight on contractor by USACE/NAVFAC           
Quality control requirements set by the 
government           
Submittal process (administration/# of 
submittals)           
Submittal timeline (time for 
approval/rejection)           
Unique attributes of USAF project vs private 
industry with similar end-use requirements           
Military design standards/specifications           
Contract requirements for PEs (professional 
engineers)           
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)           
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FAR: 8A/small-business policies           
FAR: Restrictions on government-contractor 
alliancing/partnering           
FAR: Administrative requirements           
Non-FAR related administrative requirements           
Restrictions placed on designs           
Restrictions placed on construction methods           
USAF project through USACE           
USAF project through AFCEE           
Prescriptive design requirements rather than 
code references           
O&M training for government personnel           
Warranty requirements           
Requirement for a non-government 
independent design review           
Design review process           
Contractor provided government field office           
LEED for new construction requirements           
Safety requirements (OSHA & EM 385-1-1)           
Project signage requirements           
Requirement for warranty performance 
bonds           
Questions Block 2 
Please rate the level of influence each factor 
below has on the cost of the USACE weather 
shelter (standard) above USAF GSA-procured 
weather shelter costs.  
Factor influence on MILCON cost premiums 
Not at 
all 
To a 
limited 
extent 
To a 
moderate 
extent 
To a 
large 
extent 
To a 
very 
large 
extent 
Schedule management requirements 
required by USACE versus CE squadron           
Inhabited vs low-occupancy anti-
terrorism/force protection standards 
requirements           
Requirement to develop test hangar concrete 
slabs           
Internal roof drains versus gutters           
Built up low slope roof versus metal panels           
CMU vs insulated metal panels for hangar 
bay walls           
Acquisition of specified bathroom accessories 
versus requirement for non-specific 
bathroom accessories           
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Direct digital controls for all HVAC 
components           
100% hazard rated electrical systems in the 
hangar bays versus a de-energized system           
Additional capacity required in fire alarm 
system above and beyond current building 
scope           
Additional Comments 
Please feel free to provide comments for any of the factors, especially factors which you rated 
as having no influence or a strong influence on MILCON cost premiums. 
 
 
 
In addition to the survey the following text was included in the email to ensure all 
respondents understood their rights as they relate to the survey, the purpose of the 
research, and to comply with the guidelines of the IRB exemption: 
Purpose: 
The United States Air Force continually searches for methods to reduce 
construction costs and improve performance.  This research attempts to determine 
what factors cause military construction to cost more than private industry.  In 
order to validate and determine the influence of factors shown to cause increased 
costs, experts such as you are being surveyed.  The open ended and/or Likert style 
questions provide a deeper understanding of factors affecting the costs of military 
construction above standard private industry costs.  All answers are anonymous 
and cannot be traced back to you.   
Participation: 
Your participation in this data collection effort is greatly appreciated and desired.  
Though your participation is beneficial to this research, please remember that it is 
COMPLETELY VOLUNTARY.  Whether you decide to participate or withdraw 
from the survey or interview process will have no impact up your relationship 
with the researcher, the United States Air Force, or the Department of Defense. 
Confidentiality: 
Demographic data regarding the status of the interviewee is collected solely to 
allow the data to be interpreted more specifically.  All answers are 
ANONYMOUS and do not include name or organization. 
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Instructions: 
• Base all of your responses on your own personal experiences, thoughts, or 
desires 
• For open ended questions please ensure your answers are as clear as 
possible.  If more background information is required feel free to provide 
that information to the researched. 
• There is no “right” answer to the survey or open ended questions.  Please 
select the option you feel is most correct.  
• If you believe you do not have the experience to truthfully answer a 
question please leave it blank. 
Contact Information: 
If you have any questions, comments, or concerns about this survey or interview, 
please contact Capt Daniel Blomberg using the information below. 
AFIT/ENV BLDG 640/Room 104A 
2950 Hobson Way 
Wright Patterson AFB OH 45433‐7765 
Email: daniel.blomberg@afit.edu 
Advisor: paul.cotellesso@afit.edu 
Advisor: alfred.thal@afit.edu 
Phone: DSN 785‐3636 x7401, commercial (937) 255‐6565 x7401 
Interview Questions 
The following open-ended interview questions were asked to the government 
employees and contractors surveyed.  Questions two and three were only asked of 
contractors and question five was only asked of government employees. 
1. In your expert opinion, do you believe MILCON costs more than private 
industry construction?  If so, what are the causes of MILCON cost 
premiums compared to private industry construction? 
2. (Contractor Only) What is your overall experience working on MILCON 
projects compared to private industry construction? 
3. (Contractor Only) What, if any, additional factors are included for 
MILCON projects that are not included for private industry construction?  
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Additionally, do these factors vary by executing agent such as USACE, 
AFCEE, or the local civil engineer squadron? 
4. What is your opinion on the implementation of Air Force MILCON 
design-build processes compared to private industry implementation and 
the traditional Air Force MILCON design-bid-build execution? 
5. (Government Only) Have you seen any policies that either cause 
additional cost premiums or have worked to remove cost premiums?  If so, 
what are the policies and can they be controlled or influenced by the 
USAF? 
Survey Response Data 
This section contains the survey response data for all questions.  Table 20 
contains the general MILCON cost premium factors (Block 1 in Table 18) while Table 21 
contains cost premium factors directly related to the JBER weather shelter projects 
(Block 2 in Table 18).  Figure 11 shows the color key for the demographic data as 
depicted in each distribution.  Table 19 contains the cost premium identification numbers 
that link the survey question to a cost premium theme in the survey results table. 
 
Figure 11: Distribution Key for Survey Demographics 
 
Table 19: Cost Premium Theme IDs 
# Cost Premium Theme 
1 Selection of Construction Specifications 
2 Misapplication of Execution Process 
3 Stifling or Not Applying Innovation 
4 Failing to Balance Risk 
5 Additional Public-sector Requirements 
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Table 20: Survey Response Data - General MILCON Cost Premium Factors 
Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
USAF implementation of design-build 
execution 
• N: 16 AvgWeighted: 3.05 
• NUSACE: 8 AvgUSACE:3.75 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF:2.4 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor:3 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 3, 4 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
USACE implementation of design-build 
execution 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 3.43 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.89 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.40 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 4.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 7 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 2, 3, 4  
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Design-build rather than design-bid-build 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 2.32 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.56 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.40 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 2.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
Contracting method: Firm fixed price 
• N: 16 AvgWeighted: 2.30 
• NUSACE: 7 AvgUSACE: 2.00 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.40 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 2.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Limited 
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Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
Fixed programmed amounts (allowed 
project cost) early in project development 
• N: 16 AvgWeighted: 2.53 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.67 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 3.25 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 1.67 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Oversight on contractor by local CE 
squadron 
• N: 16 AvgWeighted: 2.06 
• NUSACE: 8 AvgUSACE: 2.38 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 1.80 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 2.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes: 4 
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
Oversight on contractor by AFCEE 
• N: 16 AvgWeighted: 2.43 
• NUSACE:8  AvgUSACE: 2.75 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.20 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 2.33 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes: 4 
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
Oversight on contractor by 
USACE/NAVFAC 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 3.39 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.67 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 4.00 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 3.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 4 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
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Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
Quality control requirements set by the 
government 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 3.41 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 3.33 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.40 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 3.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 9 
• Cost Premium Themes: 4 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Submittal process (administration/# of 
submittals) 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 3.11 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.44 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.40 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 3.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 14 
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 4 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Submittal timeline (time for 
approval/rejection) 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 2.97 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.22 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.20 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 3.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 4 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Unique attributes of USAF project vs 
private industry with similar end-use 
requirements 
• N: 17 AvgWeighted: 3.47 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 4.33 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.40 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 2.67 
• # of kt differences linked: 2 
• Cost Premium Themes: 3, 5 
• Overall influence: Moderate  
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Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
Military design standards/specifications 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 3.26 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 3.78 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.00 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 3.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 4 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3, 5 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Contract requirements for PEs 
(professional engineers) 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 2.14 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 1.67 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.00 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 1.75 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes: 4 
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 
• N: 17 AvgWeighted: 2.76 
• NUSACE: 8 AvgUSACE: 3.13 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.40 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 2.75 
• # of kt differences linked: 2 
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 5 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
FAR: 8A/small-business policies 
• N: 16 AvgWeighted: 3.18 
• NUSACE: 8 AvgUSACE: 3.13 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.40 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 3.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 5 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
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Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
FAR: Restrictions on government-
contractor alliancing/partnering 
• N: 15 AvgWeighted: 2.49 
• NUSACE: 7 AvgUSACE: 2.00 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.80 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 2.67 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 5 
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
FAR: Administrative requirements 
• N: 17 AvgWeighted: 3.06 
• NUSACE: 8 AvgUSACE: 2.88 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.80 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 3.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 4 
• Cost Premium Themes: 4, 5 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Non-FAR related administrative 
requirements 
• N: 15 AvgWeighted: 2.41 
• NUSACE: 7 AvgUSACE: 2.57 
• NUSAF:5  AvgUSAF: 3.00 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 1.67 
• # of kt differences linked: 8 
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 4 
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
Restrictions placed on designs 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 3.05 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.89 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.00 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 3.25 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
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Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
Restrictions placed on construction 
methods 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 3.10 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.89 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.40 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 3.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
USAF project through USACE 
• N: 16 AvgWeighted: 4.05 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.56 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 4.60 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 5.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 0 
• Cost Premium Themes: 4 
• Overall influence: Large 
 
USAF project through AFCEE 
• N: 12 AvgWeighted: 3.14 
• NUSACE: 6 AvgUSACE: 2.67 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 2.75 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 4.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 0  
• Cost Premium Themes: 4 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Prescriptive design requirements rather 
than code references 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 3.31 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 3.67 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 3.00 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 3.25 
• # of kt differences linked: 23 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
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Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
O&M training for government personnel 
• N: 17 AvgWeighted: 2.15 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 1.78 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.00 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 2.67 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 5 
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
Warranty requirements 
• N: 17 AvgWeighted: 2.23 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 1.89 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 1.80 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 3.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 2 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
Requirement for a non-government 
independent design review 
• N: 17 AvgWeighted: 2.41 
• NUSACE: 8 AvgUSACE: 2.13 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.60 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 2.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
Design review process 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 2.74 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.67 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.80 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 2.75 
• # of kt differences linked: 4 
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 3 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
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Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
Contractor provided government field 
office 
• N: 17 AvgWeighted: 1.99 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.11 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.20 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 1.67 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
LEED for new construction requirements 
• N: 17 AvgWeighted: 2.90 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.89 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 2.80 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 3.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 2 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Safety requirements (OSHA & EM 385-1-
1) 
• N: 18 AvgWeighted: 1.96 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 2.33 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 1.80 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 1.75 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 5 
• Overall influence: Limited 
 
Project signage requirements 
• N: 17 AvgWeighted: 1.29 
• NUSACE: 9 AvgUSACE: 1.33 
• NUSAF: 5 AvgUSAF: 1.20 
• NContractor: 4 AvgContractor: 1.33 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Not at all 
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Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
Requirement for warranty performance 
bonds 
• N: 14 AvgWeighted: 1.83 
• NUSACE: 8 AvgUSACE: 1.50 
• NUSAF: 3 AvgUSAF: 1.67 
• NContractor: 3 AvgContractor: 2.33 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 4 
• Overall influence: Limited 
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Table 21: Survey Response Data - Specific to Weather Shelters MILCON Cost 
Premium Factors 
Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
Schedule management requirements 
required by USACE versus CE squadron 
• N: 13 AvgWeighted: 2.92 
• NUSACE: 7 AvgUSACE: 2.00 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 2.75 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 4.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 2 
• Cost Premium Themes: 2, 5 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Inhabited vs low-occupancy anti-
terrorism/force protection standards 
requirements 
• N: 12 AvgWeighted: 2.81 
• NUSACE: 6 AvgUSACE: 2.17 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 2.75 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 3.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 5 
• Overall influence: Moderate  
Requirement to develop test hangar 
concrete slabs 
• N: 12 AvgWeighted: 2.69 
• NUSACE: 6 AvgUSACE: 1.83 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 2.75 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 3.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
Internal roof drains versus gutters 
• N: 12 AvgWeighted: 2.86 
• NUSACE: 6 AvgUSACE: 2.83 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 2.75 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 3.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
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Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
Built up low slope roof versus metal panels 
• N: 12 AvgWeighted: 3.67 
• NUSACE: 6 AvgUSACE: 3.50 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 3.50 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 4.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3 
• Overall influence: Large 
 
CMU vs insulated metal panels for hangar 
bay walls 
• N: 12 AvgWeighted: 4.06 
• NUSACE: 6 AvgUSACE: 3.17 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 4.50 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 4.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1 
• Overall influence: Large 
 
Acquisition of specified bathroom 
accessories versus requirement for non-
specific bathroom accessories 
• N: 12 AvgWeighted: 2.33 
• NUSACE: 6 AvgUSACE: 2.00 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 2.00 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 3.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1 
• Overall influence: Limited  
Direct digital controls for all HVAC 
components 
• N: 12 AvgWeighted: 3.14 
• NUSACE: 6 AvgUSACE: 2.67 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 3.25 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 3.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1 
• Overall influence: Moderate 
 
 203 
Question & Statistical Information Distribution 
100% hazard rated electrical systems in the 
hangar bays versus a de-energized system 
• N: 12 AvgWeighted: 4.00 
• NUSACE: 6 AvgUSACE: 3.50 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 4.00 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 4.50 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes: 1, 3 
• Overall influence: Large 
 
Additional capacity required in fire alarm 
system above and beyond current building 
scope 
• N: 11 AvgWeighted: 3.00 
• NUSACE: 5 AvgUSACE: 3.00 
• NUSAF: 4 AvgUSAF: 3.00 
• NContractor: 2 AvgContractor: 3.00 
• # of kt differences linked: 1 
• Cost Premium Themes:  
• Overall influence: Moderate  
Survey Response Results 
This section contains a synopsis of the survey response data.  This data is used 
and referenced throughout the thesis.  Table 22 (next page) contains each factor, its 
weighted average, qualitative level of influence on cost premiums, rank based on each 
demographic, and overall rank based on the weighted average.  The table is sorted based 
on factor cost premium influence from most to least influential factors, and highlights 
difference ranks between demographics. 
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Table 22: Survey Results Including Ranked Level of Influence 
Applies 
To Factor 
Influence 
on Cost 
Premiums 
Weighted 
Avg. 
Value 
Rank by Demographic 
Overall 
Rank USACE USAF Contractor 
Specific CMU vs insulated metal panels for hangar bay walls Large 4.06 8 2 2 1 
General USAF project through USACE Large 4.05 25 1 1 2 
Specific 100% hazard rated electrical systems in the hangar bays versus a de-energized system Large 4.00 5 3 2 3 
Specific Built up low slope roof versus metal panels Large 3.67 5 5 4 4 
General Unique attributes of USAF project vs private industry with similar end-use requirements Moderate 3.47 1 6 29 5 
General USACE implementation of design-build execution Moderate 3.43 12 6 4 6 
General Quality control requirements set by the government Moderate 3.41 7 6 8 7 
General Oversight on contractor by USACE/NAVFAC Moderate 3.39 19 3 8 8 
General Prescriptive design requirements rather than code references Moderate 3.31 4 15 16 9 
General Military design standards/specifications Moderate 3.26 2 15 18 10 
General FAR: 8A/small-business policies Moderate 3.18 9 6 18 11 
General USAF project through AFCEE Moderate 3.14 19 25 4 12 
Specific Direct digital controls for all HVAC components Moderate 3.14 19 12 8 12 
General Submittal process (administration/# of submittals) Moderate 3.12 27 6 8 14 
General Restrictions placed on construction methods Moderate 3.10 12 6 18 15 
General FAR: Administrative requirements Moderate 3.06 16 21 8 16 
General USAF implementation of design-build execution Moderate 3.05 3 31 18 17 
General Restrictions placed on designs Moderate 3.05 12 15 16 18 
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Applies 
To Factor 
Influence 
on Cost 
Premiums 
Weighted 
Avg. 
Value 
Rank by Demographic 
Overall 
Rank USACE USAF Contractor 
Specific Additional capacity required in fire alarm system above and beyond current building scope Moderate 3.00 11 15 18 19 
General Submittal timeline (time for approval/rejection) Moderate 2.97 30 14 8 20 
Specific Schedule management requirements required by USACE versus CE squadron Moderate 2.92 34 25 4 21 
General LEED for new construction requirements Moderate 2.90 12 21 18 22 
Specific Internal roof drains versus gutters Moderate 2.86 17 25 18 23 
Specific Inhabited vs low-occupancy anti-terrorism/force protection standards requirements Moderate 2.81 31 25 8 24 
General Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Moderate 2.76 9 31 27 25 
General Design review process Moderate 2.74 19 21 27 26 
Specific Requirement to develop test hangar concrete slabs Moderate 2.69 39 25 8 27 
General Fixed programmed amounts (allowed project cost) early in project development Moderate 2.53 19 12 40 28 
General FAR: Restrictions on government-contractor alliancing/partnering Limited 2.49 34 21 29 29 
General Oversight on contractor by AFCEE Limited 2.43 18 35 34 30 
General Non-FAR related administrative requirements Limited 2.41 24 15 40 31 
General Requirement for a non-government independent design review Limited 2.41 32 30 32 32 
Specific 
Acquisition of specified bathroom accessories 
versus requirement for non-specific bathroom 
accessories 
Limited 2.33 34 37 18 33 
General Design-build rather than design-bid-build Limited 2.32 25 31 36 34 
General Contracting method: Firm fixed price Limited 2.30 34 31 32 35 
General Warranty requirements Limited 2.23 38 39 18 36 
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Applies 
To Factor 
Influence 
on Cost 
Premiums 
Weighted 
Avg. 
Value 
Rank by Demographic 
Overall 
Rank USACE USAF Contractor 
General O&M training for government personnel Limited 2.15 40 37 29 37 
General Contract requirements for PEs (professional engineers) Limited 2.14 41 15 38 38 
General Oversight on contractor by local CE squadron Limited 2.06 28 39 36 39 
General Contractor provided government field office Limited 1.99 33 35 40 40 
General Safety requirements (OSHA & EM 385-1-1) Limited 1.96 29 39 38 41 
General Requirement for warranty performance bonds Limited 1.83 42 42 34 42 
General Project signage requirements Not at all 1.29 43 43 43 43 
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Appendix C. Davis-Bacon Wage Rate Analysis Supporting Information 
This appendix includes additional information that supports Chapter IV. Journal 
Article: A Geospatial Statistical Analysis of .  This appendix provides additional 
background information, more detailed methodology, and more exhaustive results than 
could be included in the journal article. 
Additional Literature Review 
Quantitative Spatial Analysis 
Spatial analysis requires all data to be attributed to a location in space.  However, 
it is possible to take non-spatial raw data and relate it to known spatial points.  Raw data 
can either be imported into a geographic information system (GIS) as data with arbitrary 
X-Y points or with unique identifiers that can be related to other data containing 
geographic attributes (Old 2000).  The arbitrary X-Y points can either relate to 
geographic points on earth or be relative to each other without regard for the true location 
on earth.  These two methods allow for visualization and statistical analysis of data points 
relative to each other or relative to true geographic locations (Old 2000).  The analysis of 
wage rates relates attributes of the raw non-spatial data to data containing geographic 
locations. 
When spatial data is available for singular points, but analysis requires a 
congruent surface, GIS applications allow for the generation of a surface.  Software 
performs interpolation on the voids between data points to generate a surface.  In ESRI 
ArcInfo four surface interpolation methods exist: trend surface, inverse distance weighted 
(IDW), triangulation, and Kriging (Hu 1995).  Triangulation generates surfaces 
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represented by irregularly spaced points (TIN) while the other methods’ surfaces are 
represented by equally spaced data points, or grids.  The trend surface interpolation 
method uses least-squares polynomial regression with observed data points to generate 
the surface.  While this method is easy to understand, it is highly affected by uneven data 
point distribution and extreme values.  The IDW method weights observed points so “the 
influence of one point relative to another declines with distance from the new point” (Hu 
1995).  The advantages of this method include the speed and reasonable results.  The 
disadvantages include the possibility of ambiguity when the characteristics of the 
underlying surface are unknown and inaccuracies caused by uneven data point 
distribution.  Triangulation generates data from existing surfaces and data points.  Due to 
this ability, triangulation can offer more accurate surfaces when the attributes of existing 
surfaces are known.  Also, triangulation is more accurate than any grid method because 
known data points are located exactly on the surface rather than only being honored 
occasionally.  However, surfaces generated by triangulation are generally not smooth and 
may have discontinuous slopes around edges and data points.  Also, triangulation is 
usually unable to extrapolate beyond the observed data points’ domain.  Finally, surfaces 
generated by Kriging are based on the weighted moving averaging method.  The main 
assumption of the Kriging method is a statistically homogenous dataset.  The Kriging 
method uses semivariograms, based on the data variance, to weight data and generate a 
smooth surface.  Additionally, this method utilizes clustering by weighting a series of 
nearby points with a singular value located at the centroid of the cluster.  While the 
Kriging method provides a smooth interpolated surface, its weaknesses include the fact 
that original data points are seldom honored, and the estimation of the semivariogram 
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may not correctly relate to the spatial correlation of the existing, known, data.   In order 
to validate the correct method was utilized, the distribution of the interpolated data can be 
validated against the distribution of the existing data (Hu 1995).  ArcInfo allows for the 
utilization of a variety of surface generation methods which can be used to generate data 
where observations do not exist. 
Detailed Methodology 
This section provides additional details regarding the methodology used to 
analyze the effects of the Davis-Bacon Act on USAF construction.   
Data Utilized 
Analyzing the impacts of the DBA prevailing wage rate involved acquiring, 
merging, and analyzing spatial and quantitative data from a variety of government 
agencies.  The following agencies provided data used for the DBA wage rate analysis: 
• U.S. Census Bureau – The Census Bureau provides spatial data including state 
and county boundaries as well as metropolitan and micropolitan statistical 
areas.  Additionally, the Census Bureau provides place names that can be used 
for spatial analysis.  The 2011 Tiger data were used. (U.S. Census Bureau 
2011) 
• Wage Determinations OnLine Program – The MHD provides DBA wage 
determinations via its WDOL.gov site.  The data are raw and non-spatial. 
WDOL.gov is the official repository for DBA prevailing wage acts.  The May 
2012 data were used.(Wage Determinations OnLine 2012) 
• Bureau of Labor Statistics – The BLS provides tables of employment and 
wage data that are matched to statistical areas provided by the Census Bureau.  
The BLS also provides area definitions of nonmetropolitan areas.  The May 
2011 data were used. (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011; Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2011) 
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Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) – The OSD provides GIS data for all base 
locations via data.gov.  The January 2010 data were used. (Department of Defense 
Installations & the Environment 2010)       
Geospatial Analysis 
This section provides an overview of the steps taken to perform spatial analysis 
comparing DBA prevailing wage rates to BLS survey wage rates.  A spatial analysis is 
the most appropriate methodology because both the BLS survey wage rates and the DBA 
prevailing wages vary by geographic location.  Additionally, the spatial analysis allows a 
quantitative analysis of data across geographic boundaries.  The analysis required four 
main steps with a multitude of sub-operations.  Appendix D contains a detailed procedure 
log of all manipulations.  All procedures listed were carried out in Microsoft Excel or 
ESRI ArcMap. 
1. First, all shapefiles, excel worksheets, and DBA text files were downloaded from 
sources listed previously.  The dates of files downloaded provide a static look, a 
snapshot in time, at DBA wage rates compared to BLS wage surveys since both 
the DBA and BLS data are updated frequently. 
2. Next, spatial data were created based on the non-spatial data provided.  
Specifically, the DBA wage data are not spatial data that can be directly loaded 
into ArcMap. 
a. Create the boundary data for the BLS data based on metropolitan and non-
metropolitan statistical areas.  This is accomplished by focusing on 
metropolitan statistical areas and matching the nonmetropolitan statistical 
areas to county data.  However, due to inconsistencies between the Census 
Bureau and BLS MSAs some IDs must be changed.  Table 27 in Appendix 
D summarizes the changes that must be made to the BLS data to ensure 
data integrity, continuity, and accuracy. 
b. For the BLS information, the data were limited to the electrician and 
carpenter trade codes, 47-2111 and 47-2031 respectively.  The data were 
joined to the boundary information thereby creating one set of spatial data 
for BLS survey wage rates. 
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c. The applicable USAF bases were extracted from the DoD installations 
spatial file.  This analysis focused on active duty Air Force bases as well 
as joint bases under Air Force command.  The joint bases analyzed 
include: Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Joint Base Charleston, Joint 
Base Andrews-Naval Air Facility Washington, Joint Base McGuire-Dix-
Lakehurst, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, and Joint Base San Antonio. 
d. For the DBA data, the zone(s) each USAF base resides in was determined 
and the extracted information was merged with the USAF base 
information.  Table 23 lists the applicable DBA wage rate files based on 
USAF installation location.  Only these wage rates were used for this 
analysis. 
e. For the DBA data only the electrician and carpenter wages for each 
required zone were extracted.  If two hourly wage rates were listed, the 
average was utilized to encompass the entire range of USAF construction.   
3. The BLS data were analyzed as a standalone entity.  A quantitative analysis of the 
carpenter and electrician BLS data was performed to determine statistically 
significant metrics such as mean, median, mode, and type of distribution.  
Additionally, the data were spatially visualized to determine how the wage rates 
vary across the country. 
4. The DBA data were also analyzed as a standalone entity.  A quantitative analysis 
of the carpenter and electrician DBA data was performed to determine statistically 
significant metrics such as mean, median, mode, and the type of distribution at 
USAF bases.  Additionally, the data were spatially visualized to determine how 
the wage rates vary across USAF bases throughout the country. 
5. Finally, the DBA data were compared to the BLS data. 
a. The two spatial datasets were visually compared to determine if there were 
similar trends.  This comparison was done by comparing the standardized 
wages rates to each other. 
b. The quantitative percentage and dollar wage rate difference were 
computed.  These differences were compared statistically and visually. 
c. Geostatistical analyst was used to map the wage rate difference across the 
entire United States.  The use of Kriging surface generation is appropriate 
due to the geographic nature of the data provided as well as the limited 
DBA availability.  DBA data were limited since it was only processed for 
each USAF base whereas the BLS data provided coverage of the entire 
United States. 
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Table 23: DBA Wage rate files analyzed 
AL58 CA29 FL18 HI1 MS90 NH13 NC65 PA1 TX2 VA115 
AK1 CA23 FL29 ID10 MO12 NJ27 NC62 PR1 TX61 VA118 
AZ1 CA29 FL64 IL7 MO51 NJ39 NC47 SC29 TX266 VA134 
AR132 CA9 FL35 IN2 MT63 NM40 NC41 SC30 TX267 WA38 
CA31 CO2 FL36 KS7 NE64 NM23 ND3 SC33 TX218 WA42 
CA33 CO6 FL70 LA9 NE66 NM32 ND7 SC23 TX268 WY23 
CA5 DE4 GA173 MD77 NV1 NM34 ND5 SC37 UT18  
CA9 DC2 GA203 MD82 NV4 NY76 OH12 SD4 UT7  
CA36 FL7 GA204 MA1 NV10 NY31 OH29 SD3 UT10  
CA9 FL1 GA208 MI135 NV1 NY13 OK14 TN37 UT16  
CA37 FL56 GU1 MS119 NH12 NC25 OK32 TN41 VA112  
 
The spatial analysis of the DBA and BLS data provided quantitative and visual 
results.  Although the use of only two craftsman trades limited the analysis, the results 
can be utilized to validate existing literature and reports related to the cost of Davis-
Bacon prevailing wages. 
Statistical Analysis 
The software solution JMP v10.0 was used for all MANOVA and t-test analysis.  
The data were provided to JMP by exporting the tables of carpenter and electrician wage 
rate data from ArcGIS.  JMP was used to determine the following additional information: 
the wage rate if DBA wages could not be lower than BLS wages, the difference and 
percent difference if the wage rate could not be lower than BLS wages, and the 
normalized DBA and BLS wage rates.  Equation 2 shows the formula used to determine a 
base’s wage rate if the wage rate could not be below the BLS wage rates. 
𝑖𝑓 �
𝐷𝐵𝐴 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 < 𝐵𝐿𝑆 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 →𝐵𝐿𝑆 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 → 𝐷𝐵𝐴 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 � (2) Equation 2 
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Additionally, Equation 3 presents the formula used to standardize the wage rates (Neter et 
al. 1996).  Data for the entire population of USAF bases are available; therefore, the 
population statistical variables are used rather than sample variables.  Both the DBA and 
BLS wage rates were standardized to allow for comparison of the high and low value by 
location.  
𝑍 = 𝑋 − 𝜇
𝜎
 
Where: 
X = the wage rate 
µ = the average of all the wage rates 
σ = the standard deviation of all wage rates 
(3) 
Equation 3 
  
MANOVA and matched-pairs t-tests were used to determine if the differences in 
wage rates were statistically significant.  For all tests, a 95% confidence interval (α=0.05) 
was applied.  A MANOVA was performed on the standardized wage rates in order to test 
whether the DBA and BLS wage rates track similarly to each other, high and low values 
in the same geographic locations.  A MANOVA was performed on the wage rates in 
order to test the hypothesis that the DBA wage rates vary from the BLS wage rates.  
Additionally, in order to get expected dollar differences a matched-pairs t-test was used 
to determine the 95% confidence interval.  These statistical tests help validate the visual 
data presented by ArcGIS. 
Detailed Results 
This section contains additional results information not contained in Chapter IV.  
The additional results include statistical details for each test performed as well figures for 
data mentioned but not provided in Chapter IV.   
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Statistical Results 
This section contains figures illustrating the wage distributions as well as the 
detailed results of the MANOVA and t-tests.  Figure 12 shows the distribution for BLS 
carpenter wage rates.  As shown, the skewed right distribution shows that few regions are 
paying the highest wage rates.  The wage rates vary between $8.81 and $34.26 with an 
average of $20.61.  Figure 13 shows the BLS electrician wage rate distribution.  The 
wage rates vary between $10.02 and $39.33 with an average rate of $24.69.  Figure 14 
shows the multi-modal DBA wage rate distribution for carpenters.  The wage rates vary 
between $7.25 and $43.59 with an average of $24.16.  Finally, Figure 15 illustrates the 
distribution of electrician DBA wage rates.  The wage rates vary between $7.25 and 
$48.28 with an average of $29.33.  The BLS wage rates distributions are shaped similarly 
for Air Force bases and wage rates across the entire United States. 
 
Figure 12: Frequency Distribution of 
BLS Carpenter Wage Rates 
 
Figure 13: Frequency Distribution of 
BLS Electrician Wage Rates 
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Figure 14: Frequency Distribution of 
DBA Carpenter Wage Rates 
 
Figure 15: Frequency Distribution of 
DBA Electrician Wage Rates 
 
The following tables contain the detailed results of all statistical analysis 
performed on the wage rate data.  Table 24 provides the MANOVA data for the 
standardized wage rates. The following two tables (Table 25, Table 26) provide matched 
pairs and MANOVA data for the carpenter and electrician trades. 
Table 24: MANOVA Analysis of Standardized Wage Rates 
Carpenter: 
F Test Value: 0.0017804 
Exact F: 0.3347 
NumDF: 1 
DenDF: 188 
Prob>F (p-value): 0.5636 
Electrician: 
F Test Value: 0.0001171 
Exact F: 0.0220 
NumDF: 1 
DenDF: 188 
Prob>F (p-value): 0.8822 
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Table 25: Carpenter Wage Rate Detailed Statistical Results 
Matched Pairs: DBA-BLS 
 
MANOVA 
F Test Value: 0.3242846 
Exact F: 60.9655 
NumDF: 1 
DenDF: 188 
Prob>F (p-value): <0.0001* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * means statistically significant at 
α=0.05. 
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Table 26: Electrician Wage Rate Detailed Statistical Results 
Matched Pairs: DBA-BLS 
 
MANOVA 
F Test Value: 0.5780305 
Exact F: 108.6697 
NumDF: 1 
DenDF: 188 
Prob>F (p-value): <0.0001* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * means statistically significant at 
α=0.05. 
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Appendix D. Davis-Bacon Wage Rate Analysis Procedure Log 
This appendix contains a detailed procedure log for analysis presented in Chapter 
IV and Appendix C.  This appendix details the data preparation and creation, 
visualization of the data, and statistical procedures used.  Microsoft Excel, JMP, and 
ESRI ArcMap were used for data creation, manipulation, and analysis.  Any names of 
files presented can change based on the year of data download but the methodological 
processes remain the same. 
Data Preparation/Creation 
This section contains procedural instructions for preparing and creating the 
required data.  Specific data sources are detailed in Appendix C. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Data Preparation (Spatial) 
In this section the data is prepared for use with BLS data by creating the 
nonmetropolitan statistical areas from county data and separating the metropolitan 
statistical areas.  These areas are used for BLS’ wage rate surveys. 
Non-Metropolitan and Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
This section contains the procedures used to create geospatial non-metropolitan 
statistical areas. 
1. Using ArcMap load the U.S. states (tl_2011_us_state) and counties 
(tl_2011_us_county) and symbolize to show the borders only. 
2. Add the Metropolitan/micropolitan statistical areas to the map 
(tl_2011_us_cbsa). 
3. Start Editor on the MSAs. 
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4. Use select by attributes to select all areas where MEMI equals 2.  This 
will select all micropolitan areas. 
5. Delete these areas.  This should leave 374 MSAs. 
6. Stop editing and save the edits. 
7. Now use the clip tool to clip the counties by MSA. 
8. Create a copy of the counties file; call this file counties_no_msa 
9. Now select by location all counties in counties_no_msa that are within the 
source layer of MSAs 
10. Start editor and delete these counties. 
11. Stop editing and save the edits.  The counties_no_msa will be used to 
create the nonmetropolitan statistical areas. 
12. Open area_definitions_m2011.xls in Excel. 
13. Create a new column called Non-MSA and use the following formula in it: 
=IF(LEN(TRIM(C2))=7,"Y","") 
This will use the MSA code to determine if it’s a MSA/non-MSA based 
on its code length. 
14. Delete all rows that do not have a Y for Non-MSA 
15. Change the heading names to no longer have spaces, dashes, or 
parentheses 
16. Create a new column called StateCountyCode 
17. Use this formula and repeat it all the way down: =CONCATENATE(A2,"-
",H2) 
This will join the state code and county code so there is a unique value for 
joining. 
18. Save and close Excel. 
19. In ArcMap add the area_definitions excel file 
20. Open the attribute table for counties_no_msa and add a new text column 
called state_county 
21. Use the field calculator to set state_county to [STATEFP] &"-" & 
[COUNTYFP] 
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22. Join the excel file to counties_no_msa linked by state_county and 
StateCountyCode 
23. Dissolve county_no_msa into a file called Non_MSAs with MSACode 
with division code as the dissolve field. 
24. Join Non_MSAs with the excel file by the MSA code with divisions 
25. Use editor and delete the 1 <Null> value in Non_MSA.  This is an area 
not tracked by the BLS. 
26. Export the joined Non_MSA as NonMSA and delete the old Non_MSA.  
This is done to ensure all the data is in one location and doesn’t require the 
join to function. 
BLS Geospatial Areas 
This section details how to combine the MSA and non-MSAs together to create 
one file containing the BLS geospatial breakdown. 
1. Use the merge function to combine MSA and nonMSA. 
2. The output file should be BLSAreas 
3. Remove all outputs in the field map except Non_MSA 
4. Add a new output called AreaCode and the inputs should be 
MSAs.CBSAFP and NonMSA.MSAcode_with_divisions; remove the 
inputs from the field map. 
5. Add a new output called FullName (len of 150) and the inputs should be 
MSAs.NAMELSAD and NonMSA.MSAname_with_MSA_divisions. 
6. Add a new output called ShortName (len of 150) and the input should be 
MSAs.NAME and NonMSA.MSAname_with_MSA_divisions. 
Military Bases (Spatial) 
The procedures in this section limit the bases to just USAF active duty 
installations. 
1. Add 
MILITARY_INSTALLATIONS_RANGES_TRAINING_AREAS_BND 
to the map. 
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2. Do the transformation to ensure proper analysis however it is unlikely to 
change anything since NAD83 and WGS84 are extremely similar. 
3. Select by attributes from the base area with this query: "COMPONENT" = 
'AF Active' OR "JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base Charleston' OR 
"JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base Elmendorf - Richardson' OR 
"JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base Andrews - Naval Air Facility Washington' 
OR "JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base McGuire - Dix - Lakehurst' OR 
"JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst' OR 
"JOINT_BASE" = 'Joint Base Langley - Eustis' OR "JOINT_BASE" = 
'Joint Base San Antonio' 
This will select all active duty USAF bases and joint bases where the 
USAF is the lead agency. 
4. Export this selection to a new file called USAF_bases. 
5. To make it easier to visualize the bases on future maps, convert the 
polygons to points using the Feature to Point tool. 
6. Save the point file as USAF_bases_points 
Davis-Bacon Wage Data Preparation (Spatial) 
This section details the procedures used to prepare a spatial file for linking with 
the Davis-Bacon Act wage determination information.  The result of this series of steps is 
a file containing each Air Force base and its correct Davis-Bacon Act wage data file 
lookup. 
1. Load states, counties, and USAF bases in ArcMap 
2. Now select by location the counties that intersect USAF bases 
3. Export the selection to a new shapefile 
4. Use Excel to open the DBF file and extract the following columns to a 
new sheet: STATEFP, COUNTYFP, COUNTYNS, GEOID, NAME, 
NAMELSAD 
5. Create new columns for the DVB FileCode and LookUp 
6. For each county on pull the FileCode and download the DVB file from 
Wage Determinations Online 
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7. For counties with multiple DVB files open the file and see which is 
applicable to the Air Force Base in the county.  For example FL1 applies 
to Brevard County Air Force Bases while FL8 applies to the rest of the 
county.  Also, NV1 is for Nellis AFB while NV4 is for the ranges. 
8. For the LookUp column run this formula for all rows of data: 
=CONCATENATE(A2,"-",B2) 
9. With the shapefile of counties intersecting USAF bases clip the files to 
just the bases (if this was done with all counties ArcMap may have been 
overloaded). 
10. Since some bases span multiple counties it is best to know which base in 
in the county.  Use spatial join to join the USAF bases to the clipped 
county file into a file called USAF_base_with_county. 
11. In USAF_base_with_county add a new field called StateCounty. 
12. Use the field calculator to set StateCounty to [STATEFP] &"-" & 
[COUNTYFP] 
13. Add the excel sheet with Davis-Bacon Wage file information to ArcMap 
14. Join the excel information to USAF_base_with_county by StateCounty to 
LookUp 
15. Export the joined file as USAF_base_DBA_file. 
16. To handle Nellis AFB and its ranges select the Nellis area bases in Clark 
County and extract them from the USAF base file. 
17. Join the Nellis bases in Clark County to the Davis-Bacon wage spatial 
data.  This will give four unique bases rather than the one “base” joined.  
This is required because not all the Clark County bases have the same 
Davis-Bacon wage determination. 
18. Use editor to delete the existing Nellis area bases in Clark County in the 
DBA file. 
19. Use append to combine the new Nellis base information with the rest of 
the DBA file. 
20. Edit Nellis Air Force Range to have a file code of NV4. 
21. Stop editing and save the edits. 
 223 
Davis-Bacon Wage Data Preparation (Non-Spatial) 
This section summarizes the process used to create excel files with the proper 
Davis-Bacon Act wage information and identifiers. 
1. Copy the applicable FileCodes from the excel file used to create the spatial 
Davis-Bacon data for each USAF base to a new file called DBA-data. 
2. Remove all non-unique FileCodes 
3. Create other columns called “WageType”, “OccupactionCode”, 
“OccupationTitle”, “WageRate”, and “FringeRate” 
4. For each FileCode there will be two rows, one for OccupationTitle = 
“Electrician” with OccupationCode = “47-2111” and another for 
OccupationTitle = “Carpenter” with OccupationCode = “47-2031”.  
WageType will be “DBA” 
5. Fill in the required data from the .dvb files.  The dvb files can be opened 
in Notepad or any text editor.  For any dual wage rates average the 
categories.  For Davis-Bacon wage determinations set by county, check 
which county the USAF base(s) is/are in and average or choose 
accordingly. 
6. Now split the carpenter data into a separate sheet and electrician data into 
another separate sheet. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics Data Preparation (Non-Spatial) 
This section summarizes the process used to create a singular excel file containing 
all the BLS data. 
1. Open oes_data_2011.xlsx. 
2. Due to some inconsistencies between the Census Bureau MSAs and BLS, 
Table 27 lists the AREA ids that must be changed 
3. Create a new excel sheet called BLS_data 
4. Create two sheets in the excel file, one called electrical and one called 
carpenter. 
5. Copy the field descriptions sheet from oes_data_2011 to the new sheet. 
6. Copy row 1 from oes_data_2011 to the electrical and carpenter sheets. 
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7. Rename GROUP to GRP in the carpenter and electrical sheets 
8. Filter oes_data_2011 to code area_type 4 and 6 
9. Filter oes_data_2011 to OCC_CODE equals 47-2111 
10. Copy the data to electrical 
11. Filter oes_data_2011 to OCC_CODE equals 47-2031 
12. Copy the data to carpenter 
13. Save the BLS_data file 
Table 27: BLS MSA ID corrections 
Old ID New ID Old ID New ID 
79600 49340 76450 35980 
78100 44140 74650 30340 
71650 14460 76750 38860 
76600 38340 73450 25540 
71950 14860 74950 31700 
75700 35300 72400 15540 
70750 12620 66 6600001 (also 
change area type to 
6) 
70900 12700 78 7800001 (also 
change area type to 
6) 
77200 39300  
 
 
Combine the Spatial and Non-Spatial BLS Data (Spatial) 
This section details the procedures used to combine the spatial and non-spatial 
BLS data.  The final output is two GIS files, one for each trades’ BLS wage rates. 
1. Start ArcMap and add the BLSAreas file. 
2. Add the BLS_data excel file. 
3. Join BLSAreas to BLS_data’s carpenter sheet by AREA to AreaCode 
4. Export the data as BLS_Carpenter_Wages 
5. Join BLSAreas to BLS_data’s electrical sheet by AREA to AreaCode 
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6. Export the data as BLS_Electrician_Wages 
Combine the Spatial and Non-Spatial DBA Wage Data (Spatial) 
This section details the procedures used to combine the spatial and non-spatial 
DBA data.  The final output is two GIS files, one for each trades’ DBA wage rates. 
1. Start ArcMap and add the USAF_base_DBA_file, counties, and states. 
2. Add the DBA-data excel sheet. 
3. Join USAF_base_DBA_file to DBA-data’s carpenter sheet by FileCode to 
FileCode 
4. Export the data as DBA_Carpenter_Wages 
5. Join USAF_base_DBA_file to DBA-data’s electrician sheet by FileCode 
to FileCode 
6. Export the data as DBA_Electrician_Wages 
Carpenter and Electrician Wage Rate Data (Spatial) 
This section explains the procedures used to create a single GIS file for each trade 
which contains the DBA and BLS wage rates. 
1. In ArcMap add BLS_Carpenter_Wages, BLS_Electrician_Wages, 
DBA_Carpenter_Wages, and DBA_Electrician_Wages 
2. Run intersect with BLS_electrician_wages and DBA_electrician_wages.  
Call the output Electrician_Wages_Intersect. 
3. Run intersect with BLS_carpenter_wages and DBA_carpenter_wages.  
Call the output Carpenter_Wages_Intersect. 
4. Add a new column to both intersect files called WageDiff with the type as 
float. 
5. Use the field calculator on the WageDiff column with this formula: 
[WageRate] - [H_MEAN] 
6. Add a new column to both intersect files called WageDiffPercent 
7. Use the field calculator on the WageDiffPercent column with this 
formula: ([WageRate] / [H_MEAN]) *100 
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8. Convert both intersect files to points for visualization and surface 
generation using Feature to Point.  Call the carpenter file 
Carpenter_Wages_Intersect_Pt.  Call the electrician file 
Electrician_Wages_Intersect_Pt. 
Visualization/Analysis 
This section of the procedure log details steps taken to visualize and analyze the 
data.   
Compare Wage Rate Differences 
This section describes the procedures used to test the hypothesis that BLS and 
DBA wage rates are different. 
Graphical Representation 
This section details how to visualize the wage rate differences.  The key to 
visualization is the generation of a surface based on wage rate difference point data. 
1. Load Carpenter_Wages_Intersect_Pt, Electrician_Wages_Intersect_Pt, 
and States in a map in ArcMap 
2. Open the Geostatistical Wizard in the Geostatistical Analyst toolbar. 
3. Under geostatistical methods select Kriging / CoKriging 
4. For the source dataset select Carpenter_Wages_Intersect_Pt 
5. For the data field select WageDiff 
6. For overlapping data points select “use mean” 
7. In step 4, select covariance as the variable because it results in less 
predicted error. 
8. In step 4, click the button to have ArcMap automatically optimize the 
model 
9. In step 5 move the searching neighborhood into the center of the United 
States since that is where the data points are 
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10. Click finish.  This has generated a surface representing the wage rate 
differences for the carpenter trade. 
11. Repeat steps 2 through 10 for the Electrician_Wages_Intersect_Pt file 
12. Clip the two surfaces to the United States using either the clip command 
or the clip function in the data frame properties 
Statistical Tests 
This section details how statistical tests were performed on the GIS data in JMP. 
1. In ArcMap open the attribute table for Carpenter_Wages_Intersect_Pt and 
Electrician_Wages_Intersect_Pt 
2. Export each attribute table as a text file 
3. Import each attribute table’s text file into an Excel worksheet; the text file 
is comma delimited and has headings 
4. Open the excel file for each wage rate in JMP 
5. Perform a MANOVA between H_MEAN and WageRate by selecting Fit 
Model in the analyze menu. 
6. Add H_MEAN and WageRate to the Y box 
7. Change the personality to MANOVA 
8. Run the model 
9. Run a matched pairs test on the wage rates to determine the average 
difference and its confidence interval 
10. Select Matched Pairs from the analyze menu. 
11. Add H_MEAN and WageRate to each axes box 
12. Run the test, the resulting p-value and confidence interval address the 
wage rate difference hypothesis 
Compare Geographic Breakdown Fidelity 
This section describes the procedures used to test the hypothesis that BLS and 
DBA wage rates had high and low values in the same areas. 
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Graphical Comparison 
This section details how to use ArcMap to visualize the high and low values for 
each wage type of a single map. 
1. Add States, Counties, DBA_Carpenter_Wages, and 
BLS_Carpenter_Wages, to ArcMap 
2. Symbolize the DBA wages as relatively large stars for easy visualization 
3. Symbolize the BLS_Carpenter_Wages with graduated colors with the 
value as H_MEAN with classification as quantile with 6 classes 
4. Symbolize the DBA points as starts with the same graduated colors 
according to the wagerate with classification as natural breaks (jenks) with 
6 classes.  Jenks is used in this case because quantiles did not make sense 
based on the histogram. 
5. The colors of the stars and the BLS polygons should be the same in the 
same areas if they hypothesis that the high and low values of the wage 
rates are in the same location is true 
6. Repeat the above steps with DBA_Electrician_Wages and 
BLS_Electrician_Wages 
Statistical Comparison 
This section details how statistical tests based on GIS data were performed in 
JMP to support the comparison of the geographic breakdown of the wage rates. 
1. Use the same excel files used for the statistical analysis  
2. Start with the carpenter wage rate information 
3. Create a new column with the type of float for each wage type.  Call the 
column DBAStandardized and BLSStandardized 
4. Use the formula Col Standardize(DBA WageRate) to get the standardized 
DBA wage rates 
5. Use the formula Col Standardize(BLS WageRate) to get the standardized 
BLS wage rates 
6. Perform a MANOVA between the two standardized wage rates by 
selecting Fit Model in the analyze menu. 
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7. Add the two standardized columns to the Y box 
8. Change the personality to MANOVA 
9. Run the model 
10. The F-test p-value will describe the statistical significance of the 
difference between the standardized wage rates 
11. Repeat these steps for the electrician wage rate information 
Additional Analysis Options 
JMP can be used to perform additional mathematical operations that can then be 
imported back into Excel.  For example, this research investigated how the cost 
premiums would change if the DBA prevailing wage rate could not be lower than the 
BLS wage rate for the area.  By using an if then statement in JMP (Equation 2, Appendix 
C) these new wage rates can be determined.  The following steps state how to export the 
data from JMP and import it into ArcMap for analysis. 
1. Perform any additional mathematical operations in JMP 
2. Export the table from JMP as an Excel file 
3. Open the excel file and delete all the existing columns except OBJECTID.  
This should leave you with an OBJECTID column and any of the new 
columns created in JMP. 
4. Add the excel file to ArcMap 
5. Join the excel table to the electrician or carpenter intersect file by 
connecting the two OBJECTID columns. 
6. Geospatial analysis can now be carried out based on the new outputs from 
JMP 
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